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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The proposed research focuses on cognitive limitations in managerial choice, and 
the potential for negative outcomes at the firm level.  The research question addresses, 
“How, why and when do various forms of management myopia destroy value in firms 
residing in established industries?”  
 Strategic choice is explored in terms of managerial bias, building upon Levinthal 
and March’s (1993) discussion of management myopia as three distinct concepts – spatial 
myopia, temporal myopia and hubris.  The three forms of myopia can be expected to 
impact strategic decision-making in all contexts; however, the impact of those decisions 
may vary under different industry conditions (Porter, 1980).  The thesis of this paper is 
that lack of fit between management bias and industry characteristics destroys value at 
the firm level.  Environmental context is addressed in terms of industry growth rate, 
consistent with both life cycle theory (Agarwal, Sarkar, & Echambadi, 2002) and 
industry task environment literature (Dess & Beard, 1984).  Value destruction (Porter, 
1980; Schumpeter, 1942/1976) is the expected firm level outcome, represented by below 
average growth in revenue and profitability.  
 The multi-lens model of strategic change developed by Rajagopalan and Spreitzer  
(1997)  provides an overall framework for linking cognitive factors (management 
myopia) to firm outcomes, and incorporating the moderating impact of environmental 
factors.  Strategic decisions and outcomes may be viewed from multiple lenses, including 
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the rational lens, the learning lens and the cognitive lens.  Managerial cognitions are 
critical in determining strategic decisions and managerial action, which, in turn, interact 
with environmental factors in determining organizational outcomes.   The multiple lens 
view provides the broad model for assessing the impact of management myopia on 
strategic outcomes.   
The focus of the simplified model to be tested in this study is on management 
myopia (managerial cognitions) as an antecedent of firm level strategic outcomes.  
Strategic decisions (i.e., strategic content) and managerial actions will be influenced by 
managerial myopia, which in turn will impact firm outcomes.  Although there have been 
few empirical tests of the linkage between management myopia and organizational 
outcomes, a negative relationship has been posited in a limited number of conceptual 
(Levinthal et al., 1993; Miller, 2002), and empirical studies (Capron & Pistre, 2002; 
Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) that address some form of myopia or enduring bias.   
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The influence of environmental conditions operates at virtually all steps and on all 
factors in the process of strategic change (Rajagopalan et al., 1997).  In the model 
presented above, industry environment is employed as a moderating factor, where the 
effects of myopia will differentially impact firm value under different industry 
conditions.  Strategic management content and process literatures increasingly emphasize 
the importance of incorporating environmental context in empirical research (e.g., Dean, 
Sharfman, & Ford, 1991; Henderson & Mitchell, 1997).   
 In the following sections of this chapter, the three forms of management myopia 
are described in terms of enduring biases that affect the way that managers view the 
world.  Industry growth acts as the environmental moderator.    Value destruction is 
discussed in terms of below average firm performance.    This is followed by a discussion 
of the significance of the study and the organization of the study.  
 
Definitions 
 Management myopia has received relatively little attention in strategic 
management research, and only limited conceptual development.  This is in contrast to a  
body of work in the field of strategic management that addresses a large, and varied 
number of individual biases initially developed in the industrial psychology field, and, 
more recently adapted to organizational behavior studies (Walsh, 1995).  As a form of 
enduring bias (the hardening of the lenses through which managers view the world), 
management myopia (Miller, 1993) provides a more concise, and potentially relevant 
construct for the study of bias in strategic decision making and implementation.   
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The concept, management myopia, relies on underlying theories associated with 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), and learning dysfunctions (Argyris & Schön, 1978; 
Levitt & March, 1988).  An important conceptual explanation of cognitive limitations and 
managerial bias is presented as learning problems and deficiencies by Levinthal and 
March (1993).  The limitations of learning are discussed in terms of three forms of 
management myopia: spatial myopia, temporal myopia and hubris.  Management myopia 
influences strategic decision making by restricting the awareness and consideration of 
alternatives.  These restrictions may encourage greater or lesser levels of exploitation 
versus exploration, variations in risk taking, and errors of judgment in strategic decision-
making processes.  The negative effects of these errors can be particularly significant for 
firms when powerful senior executives are myopic.   
Recent works addressing “short-termism” (Laverty, 1996), temporal and spatial 
myopia (Miller, 2002) and hubris (Hayward et al., 1997) extend Levinthal and March’s 
concepts (Levinthal et al., 1993), and provide important input to the definition and 
operationalization.  Spatial and temporal myopia reflect a bias favoring the near time and 
the near technology or regime (status quo) – often associated with risk aversion and 
errors of omission.  Temporal myopia may also be expected to encourage short-term 
financial, control and accounting solutions that contribute to long-term value destruction 
regardless of the environmental context.  Hubris reflects unjustified over-confidence, and 
is associated with recklessness and errors of judgment.  This typology acts as the 
theoretical base for this research.   
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Management Myopia 
Management myopia reflects a limited or narrow view of organizational 
capabilities, environmental forces, and strategies that may lead to major errors in 
judgment by senior executives (Levinthal et al., 1993; Levitt, 1960; Miller, 1993; Miller, 
2002; Richard, Womack, & Allaway, 1993).   Levinthal and March (1993) identified 
three forms of myopia that arise from simplifying experience and specializing adaptation. 
Spatial Myopia is the lack of awareness of other technologies, processes and 
routines available within or outside the organization (Miller, 2002).  Learning favors 
technologies and routines near to the learner (Levinthal et al., 1993).  Spatial myopia 
limits the set of alternatives considered for implementation.  Spatial myopia is consistent 
with a focus on dominant technologies, core competencies, and the exploitation and 
development of existing firm capabilities.   
Temporal Myopia is the lack of awareness of, or interest in opportunities and 
investments beyond the near term (Levinthal et al., 1993; Miller, 2002).   It involves 
sacrificing the long run for the short term (Laverty, 1996).  Temporal myopia will often 
be reflected in a preference for low risk, near term, relatively certain ventures and 
projects.  Moreover, an excessive interest in the short-term is often associated with a 
financial approach to strategic decisions.  Temporal myopia may contribute to spatial 
myopia through a focus on the more certain near technologies and opportunities.  
Temporal myopia, however, will likely discourage long-term investments in the current 
business, an outcome consistent with decisions made under spatial myopia.    
Hubris is unjustified overconfidence in an individual’s or an organization’s 
capabilities.  Webster's Dictionary definition of hubris is "exaggerated pride or self-
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confidence, often resulting in retribution" (Hayward et al., 1997).   Hubris encourages 
senior executives to over-estimate their ability to manage uncertainty and risk, to 
reinterpret historical results in a more favorable light, and to attribute success to abilities 
and failure to luck or external factors (Hayward et al., 1997; Kahneman & Lovallo, 
1993).    
Industry Growth  
Industry growth rate is employed in this study as the primary measure of industry 
for two reasons.  The first is that stable growth rates are logically consistent with the 
hardening of perspectives associated with management myopia.   It fits with the logic of 
myopia, whereas other industry characteristics, such as dynamism, may decrease 
managers’ inclination to act myopically.  The second is a general agreement about the 
importance of industry growth as an indicator of industry attractiveness.   
The likelihood that managerial biases will harden and evolve into myopia is 
expected to be greater in firms that reside in relatively stable industries.   A consistent 
pattern of growth reduces the level of environmental uncertainty, increasing the visibility 
and effect of firm level actions, which are a function of both internal capabilities and 
managerial cognitions.   Industry growth rate represents a relatively unambiguous and 
easily understood measure of industry attractiveness, profitability and competitive 
pressures (McDougall, Covin, Robinson, & Herro, 1994; Miller & Camp, 1985; Porter, 
1980; Sandberg, 1986).  
 Industry growth has been considered a major indicator of environmental 
conditions in a broad spectrum of organizational, financial and strategic management 
literature (Agarwal et al., 2002; Aldrich, 1979; Dess et al., 1984; Hofer, 1975; Porter, 
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1980).  It has also been employed as a primary indicator of favorable conditions in 
practitioner-oriented and academic frameworks, including the Boston Consulting Group’s 
product-portfolio matrix, as munificence in the industry task environment (Aldrich, 1979; 
Dess et al., 1984) and as the central focus of life cycle theory (Beal & Lockamy, 1999; 
Hambrick, MacMillan, & Day, 1982; Polli & Cook, 1969).   
This study draws on both task environment and industry life cycle literatures in 
structuring the moderating variable.  The definition of munificence from task 
environment literature (Dess et al., 1984) provides the primary measure for industry 
growth.  Industry conditions are focused on high and low growth rates.   
High growth industries are defined as industries that are above the mean of all 
industries in the population, but have clearly moved past the early, rapid growth period.  
Typically, these industries have experienced a shake-out of less successful enterprises.  
These stable, but high growth industries are associated with Porter’s (1980) description of 
industries in transition from growth to maturity, still realizing some benefits and 
following some of the patterns of the rapid growth stage.   These industries are also 
associated with a “second growth period” (the “mature-growth” stage) identified by other 
life cycle theorists (Agarwal et al., 2002; Gort & Wall, 1986; Nelson & Winter, 1982), 
which follows a convergence of technologies.  Conceptually, this stage shows a shift of 
technological emphasis from that of product and service innovation in the earlier stage to 
that of refinement in the late growth stage.  In the refinement stage, firms increasingly 
emphasize quality and efficiency (Agarwal et al., 2002; Gort et al., 1986; Nelson et al., 
1982).  Success may be based on a firm’s ability to compete, improve efficiency and 
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quality, and refine core technology in an existing growing market, rather than in its 
pursuit of variety or new opportunities.    
Low growth industries are defined as industries that are clearly below the mean of 
all industries in the population, but have not entered the decline stage.  Low growth 
industries can be considered stagnant, or in the late maturity stage, and are typified by 
intense competition, low exploration, imitation, and declining margins (Porter, 1980).  As 
the precursor to entering the decline stage, organizations may show signs of inertial 
forces and rigidity in decision-making (Cameron, Kim, & Whetten, 1987a; Staw, 
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).  A lack of exploration and an unwillingness to take risks on 
new concepts may result in sub-par performance and reduced resources and capabilities.     
The choice of mature, high growth and fully mature, low growth industries 
incorporates a substantial population of established, medium-to-large businesses, while 
still providing distinct differences in growth rates. 
Negative Firm Outcomes (Value Destruction) 
Value Destruction appears in the guise of disruptive innovation (Schumpeter, 
1942/1976), equilibrium-seeking intense competition (Porter, 1985), and in management 
induced error (e.g., Cannella, Pettigrew, & Hambrick, 2001; Fama, 1980; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984; Simon, 1957).   Value destruction can be viewed as the opposite of value 
creation.  Value creation may be defined as the developing of capabilities and innovative 
capacity by a firm and the exploitation of that innovative capacity, under some level of 
real uncertainty (Knight, 1921), to introduce new products, services and methods that 
substantially alter the competitive landscape (the overall definition is developed from 
Schumpeter’s, 1934, detailed explanation and analysis).   
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As the opposite of creation, value destruction includes declining revenues, 
reduced capability, reduced investment in long term projects and overall resources, 
declining profitability, and eventual stock price decrease (Capron et al., 2002; Hayward 
et al., 1997; Lorange & Nelson, 1987; Lys & Vincent, 1995).  Value destruction in this 
study is associated with negative deviations from industry average growth in revenue, 
profit and return on investment.  Destroying value does not mean that the firm will end 
up in bankruptcy -- only that its overall capability will be impaired, and that its strategic 
outcomes are below industry averages.        
 
Significance of Study 
Management bias is considered a pervasive factor in strategic decisions of top 
management, yet has received little attention relative to strategic outcomes.    In assessing 
firm strategy and performance, the majority of the literature focuses on essentially 
rational processes, such as choice of generic strategy (Porter, 1980; Porter, 1985), the 
sources of competitive advantage (e.g., Barney, 1991; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), 
and diversification strategies (e.g., Geringer, Tallman, & Olsen, 2000; Stimpert & 
Duhaime, 1997).  The emphasis has been on the positive outcomes of rational decisions, 
with less interest exhibited in negative outcomes.      
The study of cognitive limits of senior managers has generally focused on a 
limited subset of strategic decisions, biases or contexts.  These include research streams 
addressing decision-making processes (e.g., Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992), acquisitions 
that destroy value for the initiating firm (e.g., Capron et al., 2002; Seth, Song, & Pettit, 
2002); firms in decline (e.g., Cameron et al., 1987a; D'Aveni, 1989), top management 
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team characteristics (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), and disruptive innovation (e.g., 
Tripsas, 1997).  There is an opportunity to extend the study of cognitive influences to 
include the destructive forces of management myopia.      
Extending the study of management bias may lead to a more in-depth 
understanding of processes that contribute to the enhancement or destruction of firm 
performance and firm value.  Linking managerial cognitions in terms of myopia to 
strategic outcomes implies a set of actions and processes that affect strategic choice and 
implementation, the impact of which may be altered in direction and magnitude by 
industry conditions.  
 
Organization of the Paper 
 Chapter II incorporates a review of the literature relative to the role of 
management bias in strategic management decisions, negative firm outcomes, and the 
moderating effect of industry context on managerial choice.  This review is followed by a 
presentation of the model and specific hypotheses.   Chapter III presents the research 
methodology including descriptions of the sample, measures of the key constructs and the 
methods used in analyzing the data.  The remaining chapters present the results, 
discussion of those results, and conclusions.   
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The normative and positive orientation of strategic management theory and 
research encourages a focus on the calculative rationality of choice in creating a fit 
between firm strategy and capabilities on one hand, and constraints and opportunities 
inherent in the firm’s environment.  The emphasis tends to be on successful actions, 
positions and strategies in answering the question “How, why and when do some firms 
perform at a higher level than other firms?”   
In contrast, the question addressed in this paper is: “How, why and when do 
various forms of management myopia destroy value in firms?”  This question shifts the 
focus of interest from the benefits of rational decision-making and visionary leadership to 
the cognitive limitations of managerial choice, and from firm success to negative 
outcomes.  This “darker” perspective on managerial influence does not imply that most 
executives are prone to destructive decisions and actions, but that management judgment 
really does matter.  There are differences in individual cognitive structures that lead one 
executive (or team of executives in an organization) to increase firm value while others 
reduce that value -- that a cognitive orientation (even a biased one) may be successful in 
one context but not in a different context.    
This literature review addresses three forms of management myopia operating at 
the highest level of the organization, and explores their effects on firm value under 
different industry environments.  Cognitive and learning theories identify patterns of 
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behavior associated with management judgment, beliefs, biases, and myopias.  These 
cognitive factors affect management decisions and firm outcomes (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Levinthal et al., 1993; Simon, 1957).  The behavioral view of 
strategic decision-making is integrated with mainstream competitive strategy concepts 
(Barney, 1991; Porter, 1991), adapting a comprehensive strategic decision-making model 
(Rajagopalan et al., 1997) to establish the linkage between cognitive factors (specifically 
management myopia) and firm outcomes.   
The Strategic Change Framework (Rajagopalan et al., 1997) provides a 
comprehensive multi-lens model linking managers’ cognition and learning to firm 
outcomes through strategic decisions and actions taken by senior executives.  This 
comprehensive model includes multiple environmental influences (e.g., industry 
conditions) at various stages of the strategic change process.  The direct link between 
cognitive factors (i.e., myopia) and firm outcomes is derived from this broad framework 
in a simplified model.  Literature specifically addressing management myopia is then 
presented.   The moderating influences of environment are discussed in terms of life 
cycle theory and the task environment literature.  Alternative approaches to firm 
outcomes are reviewed relative to negative results and value destruction.   
 
Strategic Decision Making (SDM) Frameworks 
 Strategic decision-making (SDM) research addresses the process of strategy 
formation and strategic change as a complement to the more extensive body of content 
research (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).  The content model of strategic choice focuses on 
the antecedents and consequences of strategic change in a primarily rational orientation 
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(e.g., Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Miller & 
Cardinal, 1994; Schendel & Hofer, 1979).  Consistent with its roots in industrial 
organization (I/O) economics, the content model assumes that decision-makers will act 
rationally, and that rational action is clearly understood by decision-makers.  The process 
model of decision-making also focuses on the role of the manager in initiating and 
enacting strategic change (Rajagopalan, Rasheed, & Datta, 1993).  The process approach, 
however, generally acknowledges both rational and boundedly-rational behavior of 
managers, and the social and political nature of strategic decisions (Eisenhardt et al., 
1992).   
Four frameworks in the strategic decision making literature (Bell, Bromiley, & 
Bryson, 1998; Rajagopalan et al., 1993; Rajagopalan, Rasheed, Datta, & Spreitzer, 1998; 
Rajagopalan et al., 1997) strive to integrate the process and content perspective (Hough, 
1999) -- incorporating managerial actions into the formation of strategy content, with 
both action and content impacting strategic outcomes.  These frameworks include a 
strong cognitive orientation, and emphasize the influence of contextual factors on 
decision-making and economic outcomes.   These frameworks are summarized in Table 
1, including their theoretical focus, factors incorporated into the frameworks and their 
primary contributions.  
Bell and associates (1998) sought to emphasize the integrated relationships among 
context, process, and content in producing strategic outcomes.  This framework positions 
environmental factors as antecedents of processes, content and outcomes, and as 
moderators of the relationships between content/process and outcomes.   The process of 
strategic decision-making is the central focus of this framework.  This framework 
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addresses the complexities involved in the study of strategic decision-making (SDM), the 
importance of contextual influence in decision processes, and critical methodological 
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The other three frameworks are closely related, with some overlap of authorship 
and a core structure of key elements and relationships.  Rajagopalan and associates 
(1993) based their integrative frameworks on empirical studies of strategic decision 
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processes.  Their extensive review of literature incorporated a wide range of perspectives 
from the “rational” model of an integrated, well coordinated body of decision-makers 
with clearly defined choices and objectives (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965) to political 
and behavioral models where individuals and subunits of unequal power bargain over 
conflicting perceptions and intentions (Pettigrew, 1973; Tushman, 1977).  Environmental 
factors were explicitly identified in the framework as either antecedents or moderators of 
decision processes, process outcomes and economic outcomes.  This framework was 
accompanied by an extensive literature review, which highlighted the lack of integration 
of content concepts, and the absence or simplistic treatment of environmental factors.  
The empirical orientation of this framework emphasized decision processes and decision 
outcomes, without specifically addressing managerial cognitions and actions.  
Both the 1997 and 1998 Rajagopalan and associates’ frameworks (Rajagopalan et 
al., 1998; Rajagopalan et al., 1997) incorporate three theoretical lenses, specifically 
incorporating managerial cognition and action as key elements of the model.  The 
multiple theoretical perspectives of the 1997 integrated change framework included the 
rational lens, the cognitive lens, and the learning lens; the 1998 integrated process 
framework discussed the three perspectives in terms of linear, interpretive and adaptive.  
Both of these later models emphasize the centrality of management cognition and action, 
and reinforce the importance of context.  The 1998 “Decision Process” model continues 
the earlier model’s (Rajagopalan, Rasheed & Datta 1993) primary focus on process.   
In a departure from the process focus of the other SDM frameworks, the  Strategic 
Change Framework (Rajagopalan et al., 1997) shifts the emphasis from the process itself 
to a more integrative perspective on strategic change, and develops the cognitive and 
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learning lenses more completely.  Consequently, the 1997 Strategic Change Framework 
provides the closest underlying theoretical basis for the current study’s exploration of 
managerial bias and value destruction.  It incorporates constructs from both the process 
and content traditions, with firm outcomes as the dependent variables.  Linkages are 
identified that establish the rationale for the effect of cognitive and learning elements on 
strategic content and firm outcomes.   Only this “multi-lens” model of strategic change 
(Rajagopalan et al., 1997) will be reviewed in detail relative to management myopia, 
environmental context and value destruction. 
Overall Strategic Change Framework   
The Strategic Change Framework (Figure 2) integrates the rational lens, the 
cognitive lens and the learning lens to link managers’ cognitions, learning processes, 
actions and decisions to strategic decisions and firm outcomes.  This perspective seeks to 
integrate content and process approaches, which have developed as separate streams of 
strategic management literature.  (See Rajagopalan and Spreitzer, 1997, for a complete 
review of the three lenses, and their integration in the overall framework.)  This 
framework provides insight into why, when and how organizations initiate and 
implement strategic change, which impact firm performance and changes in firm value.  
The framework also provides insight in understanding why, when and how organizations 
fail to act and do not initiate change.  
The rational lens provides a relatively deterministic or normative approach to 
strategic decision-making.  Senior executives select appropriate strategies based on their 
assessment of industry and external conditions, and of internal capabilities and resources.  
In the rational perspective differences in resources and capabilities explain differences in 
   
  17 
firm outcomes (Barney, 1986, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).  The problem of strategic 
management is viewed as one of finding optimal solutions based on unambiguous 
information and expected outcomes (Ansoff, 1965; Mintzberg, 1990).  The rational 
perspective ignores the black box of organizational processes (Pettigrew, 1992) and does 
not account for differences in managerial capabilities and attitudes, differences that are 
observed frequently in every-day business operations and in strategic decision-making 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Schwenk, 1988; 1995). 
    
FIGURE 2 
 
Multi-Lens Framework of Strategic Change 
(Rajagopalan & Spreitzer 1997 – rational, learning and cognitive lenses) 
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cognitions have a direct effect on organizational outcomes (Gaertner, 1989; Thomas, 
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reciprocal interaction of managerial cognitions, decisions and actions with the 
environment and the organization (Rajagopalan et al., 1997).    
Both the learning lens and the cognitive lens support the centrality of managerial 
cognitive factors (including biases such as management myopia) in decision-making 
processes, and ultimately, firm outcomes.   The linkage between management myopia 
and firm outcomes is discussed in the simplified model below.  
Simplified Model of Strategic Change 
The multi-lens Strategic Change Framework provides the underlying logic and 
conceptual support for the multiple linkages between learning /cognitions and firm 
outcomes.   A simplified model (Figure 3) can be structured that will enable tests of 
potential relationships between these learning/cognitive factors (e.g., management 
myopia) and critical firm outcomes (e.g., value destruction).  As indicated in Figure 3, the 
myopia of senior executives represents an enduring orientation that biases judgment 
relative to strategic decisions.  Management myopia will influence (and be influenced by) 
cognitions, learning, actions and organizational factors in the process of strategic 
decision-making.  Strategic decisions reflect the myopia of senior executives, which 
ultimately impact firm outcomes.   
 The simplified model indicates how the overall Strategic Change Framework 
(Rajagopalan et al., 1997) can be reduced to focus on individual aspects of executive and 
organizational cognitions and decisions.   For the purposes of this review, management 
myopia is the central factor of interest, and the focus of the simplified model.  
Management myopia is formed by organizational, internal, individual and experiential 
factors, as presented in the box titled “Management Myopia, Organizational Interactions 
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& Decision”.   Managers at the highest level of the firm are subject to myopic tendencies, 
which reduce the scope of information considered in decision-making and influence how 
information is interpreted.  Management myopia is expected to vary relative to personal 
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Management myopia is posited as an enduring perspective that affects and 
constrains managerial decision-making abilities.  Consequently, extreme levels of senior 
executive myopia are expected to influence firm outcomes (e.g., Christensen & Bower, 
1996; Hayes & Abernathy, 1980; Levinthal et al., 1993; Miller, 1993).   If some senior 
executives are substantially more myopic than other senior executives in similar 
circumstances (e.g., industry context), then substantial differences in senior manager 
myopia will be reflected in firm outcomes (e.g., value destruction).   
Consistent with the integrative approach to strategic decision-making (Amit et al., 









Management Myopia, Organizational 
Interactions & Decisions  
Cognition/myopia 
 
Organization  Strategic  
Factors   Content 
 
Action 
   
  20 
organizational/environmental fit (Schendel et al., 1979), the environment is included in 
the simplified model as a moderator.  The impact of management myopia on firm 
outcomes is expected to vary depending upon industry context.   
 This simplified model provides the underlying logic of this review.   The key 
assumptions of the model are discussed next, followed by a review of relevant literature.   
Key Assumptions  
The 1997 Strategic Change Framework provides assumptions critical to 
establishing the relationship between management myopia and firm level value 
destruction.  The first assumption is that managers, primarily executives at the highest 
level of the organization, dominate the process of strategic decision-making.  Senior 
managers (particularly CEO’s) play an important role in determining strategic content 
and firm level outcomes.  This argument is supported by a broad stream of SDM research 
(e.g., Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson, 1986), and the 
upper echelons perspective (Finkelstein et al., 1996; Hambrick et al., 1984).  A 
substantial body of organizational and strategic management literature directly or 
indirectly supports this viewpoint, that is, the importance of firm management in 
determining strategic choice (e.g., Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Chandler, 1962; Child, 
1972; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Hough & White, 2003; Peteraf & Bergen, 2003).     
Second, managers are not purely rational in all individual cognitive processes, but 
are influenced by past experience, time constraints, and other behavioral factors.  The 
SDM frameworks (Table 1) discuss management bias as a relevant cognitive factor.  The 
importance of bias and errors of judgment in the strategic decision-making process is 
expressly identified in a wider body of strategic management literature (e.g., Amit et al., 
   
  21 
1993; Bateman & Zeithaml, 1989; Das & Teng, 1999; Ocasio, 1997; Schwenk, 1995).  
The importance of executive biases and shortsightedness/myopia is also supported in 
recent qualitative research and literature (Burgelman, 1991, 1996; Finkelstein, 2004; 
Tripsas, 1997; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000), in research focused on individual decision-
making (Bazerman, 1994; Kahneman et al., 1993), and in learning theory literature 
(Argyris, 1990; Levitt et al., 1988).    
The third assumption is that strategic decisions made by senior executives impact 
strategic content and the actions of the organization, which in turn influence firm level 
strategic outcomes.  The normative nature of early strategic management theory 
emphasizes strategic choice.  Senior managers make and implement important decisions 
that are believed to impact the direction and success of the firm (e.g., Andrews, 1971; 
Baum, Locke, & Smith, 2001; Chandler, 1962; 1977; Child, 1972; Desarbo, Di 
Benedetto, Song, & Sinha, 2004; Drucker, 2004; Finkelstein et al., 1996; Seth, Song, & 
Pettit, 2000).  The field of strategic management is based on the premise of managerial 
action and choice (Bourgeois, 1984; Dean & Sharfman, 1996).  Upper echelons 
perspective (Hambrick et al., 1984) and concept of dominant coalitions (Cyert et al., 
1963) contribute to and support this argument.   
The fourth assumption is that internal and external context will impact the 
effectiveness or appropriateness of strategic content and firm actions.  Different strategies 
will be more or less effective depending on the environment in which they are enacted 
(Porter, 1980; Porter, 1985).  The organization’s ability to create a “fit” with the 
environment is a central tenet of strategic management theory and research, reflecting the 
rational lens in these integrative models (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Hofer, 1975; 
   
  22 
Hofer & Schendel, 1978).  The SDM literature (Dean et al., 1996; Rajagopalan et al., 
1993; Schwenk, 1995) specifically incorporates the contingent and critical impact of 
environment relative to decision processes and effectiveness.  
Table 2 identifies the assumptions critical to establishing the relationship between 
management myopia and firm level outcomes, along with the areas of theory and research 
that support those assumptions.  
Table 2 
 
Critical Assumptions and Supporting Literature 
 
   Critical Assumptions    Supporting Literature 
Executives at the highest level of the organization, 
dominate the process of strategic decision making. 
Upper Echelons Perspective; SDM, Early 
Normative literature (indirectly), 
qualitative/process literature 
Managers are not purely rational in all individual cognitive 
processes, but are influenced by past experience, time 
constraints, & other behavioral factors consistent with the 
concepts associated with bounded rationality. 
Bounded Rationality; the Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm; Upper Echelons 
Perspective; Cognitive Theory; Decision 
Theory; SDM; Learning Theory 
Strategic decisions impact strategic content & the actions 
of the organization, which in turn influence strategic 
outcomes.   
Normative Theory; RBV; I/O Econ; 
Strategy-Structure- Performance.   
Internal & external context will impact the effectiveness or 
appropriateness of strategic content & firm actions, such 
that, different strategies will be more or less effective 
depending on the environment in which they are enacted. 
Normative Theory; RBV; I/O Econ; 
Strategy-Structure- Performance; 




Management Myopia and Bias  
In this section the definition of myopia is established, and its relationship to 
management bias clarified.  The rationale for selecting management myopia rather than 
management bias as the cognitive independent variable of interest is then presented.   
This section is followed by an overview of literature that has addressed management 
myopia, and a discussion of Levinthal and March’s (1993) three types of myopia.    
Common definitions of myopia address “a lack of foresight or discernment; a 
narrow view of something” (Merriam-Webster, 1998), and “short-sightedness in thinking 
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or planning”  (American-Heritage, 2001).  These common definitions are reflected in the 
way that myopia is explored in marketing, management and finance literature.  Myopia 
has been described as a form of bias or an orientation that restricts serious consideration 
of alternatives to decision-makers (Dess & Picken, 1999; Feinberg, 1995; Levitt, 1960; 
Merchant, 1990; Pinches, 1982).  The term bias is generally defined as “an inclination of 
temperament or outlook; a personal and sometimes unreasoned judgment” (Merriam-
Webster, 1998), and “a preference or inclination that inhibits impartiality” (American-
Heritage, 2001).   
These common definitions indicate a relationship between myopia and bias.  The 
“inclination or outlook” in the bias definition is more specifically addressed as “a 
narrowing of vision” in the definition of myopia; “unreasoned judgment” (of bias) is 
more specifically addressed in the definition of myopia as “a lack of foresight” or “short-
sightedness in thinking”.  The common definitions of myopia and bias suggest that 
myopia is a form of enduring bias that hardens into a consistent orientation in the way 
individuals and groups of individuals view the world.    
This common definition is supported and enhanced by the relatively limited body 
of management literature that discusses both myopia and bias concepts.  Kogut and 
Kulatilaka (1994) reference managers’ myopic view of the world as a form of bias that 
influences investment decisions.  Miller (1993) discusses myopia as “lenslike cognitive 
structures” that dictate “what managers will perceive, what they will ignore, and how 
they will interpret their perceptions”.  These lenses “harden and focus more narrowly” 
(page 119) on behavior and activities that appear to have been most clearly successful in 
the past (Staw et al., 1981).    Schwenk (1988) summarizes empirical research supporting 
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the argument that “availability, the illusion of control and other biases….may affect 
strategic decisions by restricting the range of strategic alternatives” (page 44), alluding to 
the effects of bias on myopia.  Levinthal and March (1993) describe three forms of 
myopia (temporal, spatial and failure) respectively, as tendencies to ignore or overlook 
the long run, the larger picture, and failures.   
These discussions of bias and myopia in the management literature indicate that 
biases may contribute to myopia as an enduring orientation, and that myopia contributes 
to biased decision-making and errors in strategic direction and action.   Consistent with 
these descriptions and the general definition, management myopia is defined in this paper 
as a stable perspective that narrows the set of alternatives considered by managers, and 
that exposes individual decision-makers and their organizations to errors in judgment.    
Although the relationship between bias and myopia has not been clearly 
established in prior literature, research that supports the influence of bias of management 
decision-making and firm outcomes provides indirect evidence of the potential impact on 
management myopia.  Table 3 provides a description of strategic management decision 
studies that have explored the effect of bias in strategic decision contexts.  The concepts 
studied include causal attribution (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; 
Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Schwenk, 1985; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983), 
retrospective interpretation of outcomes (Bukszar & Connolly, 1988; Golden, 1992), 
rationality in planning (Durand, 2003; Hodgkinson, Bown, Maule, Blaister, & Pearman, 
1999; Ireland, Hitt, Bettis, & de Porras, 1987; Shoemaker, 1993), over-confidence 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Simon & Houghton, 2003; Simon, Houghton, & Aquino, 
2000; Tetlock, 2000), illusion of control(Simon et al., 2000), strategic change (Barr, 
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Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992) and the impact of bias on firm 
outcomes (Bateman et al., 1989aa; 1989bb).   Because myopia can be considered a more 
enduring form of bias, the impact of myopia on managerial decision making and firm 




Bias in Strategic Management Literature (Includes SDM) 
 
Author       Biases               Other Variables   Results 







Claims of causality 
Internal cause of positive outcomes;  
External cause of negative outcomes 
Staw, McKechnie 








Claims of causality 
Performance not a strong determinant of 
causal attribution; 
Stock declined after defensive attributions; 
Interpreted as impression management 
Salancik & 
Meindl 1984   





Claims of TMT on 
causality 
 
Overall attribution supported;  
Intentional attribution claims were 
supported – unstable firms took more 
credit for pos & neg outcomes; 
Performance improved after impression 
management 




Resource commitments  
Confidence in 
management 
Support for attribution bias;  
Self-serving bias relates positively to 
resource commitments & confidence 
Bukszar Connolly  
1988  
Hindsight of success 
factors 
Assessment of causal 
factors 
Hindsight bias supported  
Ireland, Hitt, 
Bettis & de Porras 
1987  
Availability  Differences in Strength & 
Weaknesses evaluated;  
Levels of Mgt; Industry  
Differences found in level & in different 
firms (attributed to industry); 
Supports availability heuristic existence 
Bateman & 




Escalation of commitment; 
Past decisions;  
Slack 
Dec Framing & Rationalization 
(attribution) lead to escalation of 
commitment; Interaction effects 
Bateman & 






Prediction of biases by 
subjects in earlier study; 
Escalation of commitment; 
Slack 
Inaccurate prediction of bias; separation 









Claims of causality for 
pos/ neg performance 
Support for attribution rather than 
impression;  
Neg relation of attribution & performance 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 
Author       Biases               Other Variables   Results 
Lant, Milliken & 






Strategic Reorientation  
Past Perform,   
Environ. Turbulence 
TMT characteristics 
Mixed findings on attribution; 
Positive on awareness; 
Mixed on TMT; 
Pos on Turbulence 
Barr, Stimpert & 
Huff  1992 
 
Attention: salience of 
environment 
Perception: need for 
change not perceived 







Evidence of learning: Munificence delays 
recognition of need for change & slows 
alternatives 
Golden 1992  
 
Recollection bias  Performance; Strategic 
orientation; Extent of 
change in strategies 
Recollection errors related to strategic 
orientation, past performance & extent of 
change.  
Shoemaker 1993  
 
Framing  
Availability bias  
Anchoring bias 
Conjunctive fallacy  
Scenarios; 
Widening of confidence 
intervals (more realistic) 
Scenario planning seems to reduce 
framing, availability & anchoring bias; but 








All bias is not uniformly systematic; 
Variation in managers cognitive states 
Hodgkinson, et al.  
1999  
Framing bias (DV) Mapping techniques 
(Case analysis) 
Premapping reduces framing bias 
Simon, Hougton, 
& Aquino  2000 
 
Overconfidence 




Risk perceptions differ because of type of 
biases; Entrepreneurs may perceive less 
risk venture formation  
Tetlock 2000  Over-confidence 
Attribution  
Variation in ideology & 
cognitive style 
Differences found in willingness to exhibit 
biases by authoritarian execs 
Simon & 
Houghton, 2003 
Overconfidence Extreme certainty,  
Achieved success,  Risk 
propensity& Pioneering 
Positive relationship to pioneering 
Durand 2003   
 
Illusion of control  
Self-perception 
Ignorance of regression 
to the mean  
Education (internal  
focus) as bias  
Market info investment  All biases produced higher positive error 
in forecasts, & most overall error; 
Market information moderated the effects 
of bias 
 
The concept of myopia is directly related to concepts of bias, particularly those 
expected to impact strategic decision-making (SDM) processes and outcomes, as 
presented in Table 3.  The benefits of reviewing biases that have received empirical 
attention relative to the discussion of management myopia are four-fold.  First, the 
research provides some evidence that biases impact important decision making processes 
and firm outcomes.  In that myopia is defined in this paper as an enduring bias, the 
research provides support for the strategic impact of management myopia.  Second, any 
literature review that addresses myopia as enduring bias would be incomplete without a 
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thorough evaluation of SDM bias literature.  Third, a number of these biases share 
characteristics with at least one of the myopias (e.g., over-confidence is closely related to 
failure-myopia and hubris).  Fourth, some of the biases explored empirically appear likely 
to contribute to the development of multiple forms of management myopia (e.g., 
framing).   The first two points are addressed in the previous review of the relationship 
between myopia and bias.  The last two points deserve some additional discussion.    
Some of the sixteen biases identified above appear to share some of the 
underlying characteristics of one or more of the three management myopias.   Hubris may 
develop from or share characteristics or outcomes with over-confidence, internally-
focused attribution, impression management and illusions of control.  Over-confidence, 
by definition, relates directly to hubris.  Attribution of firm success to internal or firm 
level factors and impression management are described in terms that are consistent with 
hubris.  As an extreme form of confidence, managers who exhibit hubris are likely to 
credit their own skill and intuition as the cause of firm success, while downplaying the 
contribution of others.   Illusion of control is a concept closely associated with internal 
attribution, and has obvious implications for over-estimation of individual capabilities.  
Illusion of control and internal attribution may be concentrated in one or a few senior 
managers as an indicator of hubris, rather than attribution to the firm in general.   
The studies of over-confidence focus on differences in cognitive states for 
different types of managers, providing some support for cognitive and behavioral 
differences at the managerial level.  The studies of attribution and impression 
management included in Table 3 link internal attribution to firm performance, external 
awareness and strategic reorientation.  Although results have been mixed, there is clear 
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evidence of a relationship between attribution bias and performance.  Illusion of control 
was associated with over-confidence, risk perception  and forecast error in the studies 
reviewed (Durand, 2003; Simon et al., 2000; Tetlock, 2000).   Durand indicates that 
illusion of control may also, in some cases, lead to reinforcement of current technologies, 
inertia and escalation of commitment.  As such it may contribute to both hubris and 
spatial myopia, depending on the circumstances of the business.  
Spatial myopia may share some characteristics or tendencies associated with 
external attribution.   Attribution of negative outcomes to external factors reinforces the 
current regime, and may lead to escalation of commitment even in the face of negative 
feedback.   Recollection bias, selective perception, availability bias, lack of awareness, 
internal focus, and range limits also may encourage a preference for existing operations 
and technologies, while discouraging external search and new concepts.   Because these 
biases operate in all conditions and in all circumstances, it is also possible that they will 
reinforce tendencies toward hubris as well.  However, it seems likely that they are more 
closely linked to spatial myopia. 
Other biases, like framing and anchoring, may contribute to the development of 
any of the three myopias.  Depending upon the initial framing of a specific set of choices, 
decision-makers have exhibited different preferences for risk.  It is possible that framing 
results from the historical pattern of a business/industry and the experiences of its leaders.  
If the environment is perceived to have rewarded variety and risk taking (e.g., a high 
growth environment), there may be a greater tendency to take risks.  In a less munificent 
environment, conservative strategies may be more common.  These sources of bias may 
simply reinforce or increase the level of any or all of the myopias, depending on the 
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circumstances.  Potential links between these sixteen biases and the three myopias are 
outlined in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 
Comparison of Management Myopia and Bias 
 
Myopia     Bias 
Hubris Over-confidence 
Illusion of Control 
Internal Attribution (toward senior 
executives) 
Impression Management 
Spatial Myopia External Attribution 
Selective Perception 
Availability Bias,  
Lack Of Awareness,  
Education toward Internal Focus  
Range Limits 
Temporal Myopia There was no clear comparison for 
temporal myopia in this set of biases  
Contributors to all forms of myopia Framing  
Anchoring  





The potential linkage between these biases and types of myopia is somewhat 
speculative.  These comparisons are based on definitions of the myopia concepts 
previously stated, and on their relationships with other variables (e.g., escalation of 
commitment, forecast error, strategic reorientation).  Empirical analyses of these 
comparisons represent a worthwhile future project; however, it is beyond the scope of 
this study.     
Rationale for Studying Management Myopia 
There are a number of advantages in selecting myopia over bias as the cognitive 
concept of interest within the Strategic Change Framework.   First, the Levinthal and 
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March (1993) typology provides a strong theoretical argument for the myopia of learning.  
Second, myopia can be considered a hardening of the lens through which a manager 
views the world (Miller, 1993), with a more enduring impact on multiple, strategic 
decisions.   Third, the three myopias appear to relate directly to specific firm strategic 
issues already identified in the strategic management literature, such as commitment to 
the status quo, short-termism and over-confidence.  Fourth, employing Levinthal and 
March’s typology simplifies the construction of measures and the testing of those 
measures (in deference to having to select some types of biases and omitting others 
identified in the cognitive lens stream). 
 
Three Forms of Management Myopia 
 Levinthal & March’s (1993) three forms of management myopia are grounded in 
learning theory, particularly in concepts associated with dysfunctional learning. In this 
section, literature on dysfunctional learning is discussed as in contrast to learning as a 
positive phenomenon.  The concept of myopia as a learned bias is then presented.  This is 
followed by a detailed review of the three forms of management myopia.   
Learning is argued to be critical to performance in the face of changing business 
environments (Burgelman, 1990; Levitt et al., 1988).  It is seen as a means to develop 
capabilities that are valued by customers, as difficult to imitate, and as an important 
contributor to competitive advantage (Crossan & Berdrow, 2003).  Learning is frequently 
represented as a positive phenomenon (Argyris et al., 1978; Senge, 1990; Watkins & 
Marsick, 1993).  In much of the literature, learning is presented as a rational process 
within the domain of decision-making and choice (Cohen & Sproull, 1996; Lant & 
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Mezias, 1990; 1992).  However, there has been less emphasis on the negative 
consequences of learning (Crossan et al., 2003).   
Learning not only contributes to positive outcomes, but can become 
dysfunctional, leading to bias, myopia and errors in judgment.  Lewin’s (1947) concept of 
unfreezing, change and refreezing relates to both positive and negative impacts of 
learning.  Similarly, Argyris & Schön (1978) note the limitations of single-loop learning.  
Cognitive maps learned under one set of circumstances may no longer be appropriate in 
different circumstances (Barr et al., 1992). The nature of learning itself involves 
substantial limitations in the acquisition and use of intelligence.  The same processes that 
contribute to experiential wisdom may also encourage superstitious learning, competency 
traps and erroneous inferences (Leonard-Barton, 1992; March & Shapira, 1987).   
Dysfunctional learning stems “partly from inadequacies of human cognitive 
habits, partly from organization features, partly from characteristics of the structure of 
experience” (Levitt et al., 1988: 335).   Models of adaptation and qualitative research 
indicate that the fittest do not always survive (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 1997; 
Nelson et al., 1982; Tripsas et al., 2000), and that learning does not necessarily maximize 
results (Busemeyer, Swenson, & Lazarte, 1986; Levinthal, 1997; Miner & Mezias, 1996).  
Learning may contribute to a “stable suboptima” (Denrell & March, 2001) and inertia 
even when managers are provided negative feedback (Miller, 1993; Staw, 1976; Staw, 
1981).  Experience can be a misleading teacher in its inadequacy to incorporate the 
complex and changing nature of the world in which learning takes place (Levitt et al., 
1988).   
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The results of learning processes are evidenced in routines and heuristics that help 
improve decision-making through simplification and specialization processes.  While 
these processes may be of benefit in commonly experienced decisions, they can interfere 
with the efficacy of less frequent strategic decisions.  Miller (1993) posits that 
organizations face negative results by amplifying and extending a single path of action 
while de-emphasizing others.  Qualitative evaluations of simplifying routines provide 
evidence of the negative impact of extreme focus on a single, dominant business model.  
Once-exceptionally performing businesses have been found to stagnate or even decline 
(Burgelman, 2002; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Miller, 1990; Starbuck, Grave, & Hedberg, 
1978) as they fail to develop “requisite variety” (Buckley, 1968: 485).   
Miller (1993) further notes that the impact of myopic inclinations on inertial 
tendencies increase when the “lenses harden and focus more narrowly” (page 120).   
Myopia becomes a powerful force that leads managers to ignore even negative feedback, 
falling prey to rationalizations and to inaccurate attributions (Staw, 1977).  This lack of 
response to negative feedback is also noted by Weick (1979: 175), explaining that "the 
environment is full of equivocal cues that are easy to misinterpret.”  The result can lead 
organizations to mechanically embrace a narrowing of skills, markets and technology 
(Miller, 1990).   Homogeneous experience and conformity limit the scope of learning, 
decrease flexibility, and promote myopia and complacency (Miller et al., 1994a; Zollo, 
2004).  
The concept of myopia can also be found in other research streams.  The idea of 
myopia originates with Theodore Levitt (1960) who introduced the concept, marketing 
myopia.   Marketing myopia was initially described as a firm's shortsightedness or 
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narrowness when it is attempting to define its business.  Myopia has been associated with 
risk and prospect theory (Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz, 1997) relative to 
myopic loss aversion (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995.).   Accounting literature discusses short-
term financial actions as myopia (Merchant, 1990) and “short-termism” (Laverty, 1996).     
Levinthal and March’s (1993) typology provides a structured approach for 
organizing the study of management bias as three forms of myopia.   Literature 
addressing each of the three forms of management myopia is discussed in the following 
sections.  
Spatial Myopia  
Levinthal and March (1993: 101) characterize spatial myopia as “overlooking 
distant places” and as “the tendency to ignore the larger picture.”   Spatial myopia 
develops from learning that “favors effects that occur nearer the learner” (page 110), 
leading to positive adaptation in some circumstances, but leading to self-destructive 
rigidities in others for individuals and organizations.    Unlike temporal myopia, however, 
there is relatively little literature that addresses spatial myopia directly.  
Miller (2002) defines spatial myopia as “the lack of awareness of other 
technologies within or outside the firm” (page 689).   This form of myopia is believed to 
arise from managers' cognitive limitations and intra/inter-firm boundaries, restricting 
search and deployment of alternative technologies, and the potential benefits of 
technology interactions.  This is consistent with Kahneman and Lovallo’s (1993) concept 
of isolating errors, whereas managers consider investment decisions individually.  
Levinthal (1997) represented the problem of spatial myopia as one of disconnections to 
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multiple peaks in a complex landscape, where it is impossible to identify optimum 
alternative opportunities without extensive and widespread search.     
Levinthal and March (1993) also relate spatial myopia to the dominant logic 
(Cyert et al., 1963; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) of the senior executives of the firm.  
Simplification and decomposition tend to restrict scope and reinforce boundaries, 
encouraging the hardening and institutionalizing of mental models.  This leads to 
screening out input that is divergent from the dominant logic. Learning at the operating 
level substitutes for learning at a higher level of the organization, and reinforces rigidities 
that arise from increased competencies on existing routines.  As noted in the temporal 
myopia section, spatial myopia is increased by the character of temporal myopia 
contributing to a focus on efficiency and refinement.  But unlike temporal myopia, spatial 
myopia will likely encourage long-term investment on current business models and 
technological approaches.       
Although Levinthal and March (1993) discuss the negative ramifications of 
temporal myopia as developing competency traps, the description they provide indicates 
spatial myopia as the ultimate cause.  Incumbent inertia is substantially explained by the 
competency trap, where firms are likely to pursue technologies and activities that are 
compatible with existing markets, activities and technologies (Christensen, 1997; Teece 
et al., 1997; Tripsas, 1997).  Learned skills and subsequent cognitive heuristics and biases 
become impediments to anything that is inconsistent with the core business (Burgelman, 
1996, 2002).   
This perspective is amplified by Danny Miller’s (1993) discussion of the dark-
side of successful simplification and focus.  An abundance of anecdotal cases (e.g., 
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Halberstam, 1986; Lyon, 1984; Meyer & Zucker, 1989; Miller, 1990; Starbuck et al., 
1978) indicate that many successful organizations decline as a result of their focus on a 
single strength, while neglecting capabilities that may be critical to future opportunities.   
Success creates a dangerous preoccupation with simplicity and focus.  The simplification 
process increasingly narrows and hardens the lenses into spatial myopia.  Success is 
attributed to the dominant program or policy even when multiple alternative explanations 
are likely (Staw et al., 1981).  Focus initially produces efficient competence, eventually 
leading to errors of attribution, and rationalization (Staw, 1977; Weick, 1979).  These 
biases encourage an increasing focus on the dominant business logic, even in the face of 
contrary evidence.  This extreme focus can evolve into spatial myopia, leading to errors 
of judgment including incumbent inertia and irrational escalation of commitment.   
 Several examples may clarify the impact of spatial myopia in deference to 
temporal.  Burgelman (2002) explains how Intel’s cycle of single-minded focus on its 
primary business model excluded significant investment in newer, and therefore, less 
competent strategies and alternatives.  The superior performance of the single, dominant 
logic left no room for any other significant thrust.  The persistent exclusion of emerging 
opportunities became embedded in the investment logic of Andrew Grove (Intel CEO) 
who continued to make large financial commitments to the dominant technology.  
Ultimately, the firm ran out of growth and profit opportunities in its primary business.  
Inadequate investment in new business concepts and technologies severely limited 
options for growth.      
 In an in-depth study of Polaroid, Tripsas and Gavetti  (2000) provide an example 
of spatial myopia in the absence of temporal myopia.  Commitment to the historical 
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business model led Polaroid to resist the quick return potential (short-term benefit) of the 
“hardware” aspect of digital imaging.  Even though competitors were clearly exploiting 
this market successfully, Polaroid’s management favored a longer-term commitment to 
technology – a strategy that had launched their initial successful product.  The executive 
team escalated commitment to a very complex, uncertain, and high investment 
technology, viewing this approach as more consistent with the historical competency of 
the organization.  The company exhibited spatial myopia, but not temporal myopia by 
making major commitments to historically successful long-term technical development 
while ignoring the immediate financial payoffs to the hardware segment.   
These examples provide some evidence that spatial myopia and temporal myopia 
are not only theoretically, but also practically different.  Spatial Myopia is, therefore, 
characterized by a lack of awareness or denial of utility of other technologies, processes 
and routines available within or outside the organization (Miller 2002).  Learning favors 
technologies and routines near to the learner (Levinthal & March 1993), and limits the set 
of alternatives considered for implementation (Miller 2002).  Spatial myopia is consistent 
with a focus on, and commitment to dominant technologies, core competencies, and the 
exploitation and development of existing firm capabilities, regardless of the time frame 
for financial payoff.  
Temporal Myopia  
Levinthal and March (1993) describe temporal myopia as the tendency to ignore 
the long run in “overlooking distant times” (page 101) and to sacrifice the long-run for 
the short-run.   The same type of logic is found in discussions of trade-off between the 
short-term and the long term relative to exploitation versus exploration (Brown & 
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Eisenhardt, 1997; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).   
This stream of research emphasizes concepts such as adaptation, maladaptation, inertia 
and absorptive capacity within a learning framework to explain the general preference for 
exploitative or short-term orientations.   At the same time, a similar logic can be applied 
to spatial myopia (which is discussed in detail in the following sub-section).   The 
exploitation versus exploration stream of literature, including Levinthal & March’s 
(1993) conceptual development of management myopia, does little to distinguish 
temporal from spatial myopia.   However, the economic perspective provides a more 
specific emphasis on financial aspects of temporal myopia, which sets it apart from the 
spatial myopia concept.  
In the economics and finance perspectives, temporal myopia can be identified as a 
short-term orientation, where it has been an important subject in finance and accounting 
literature.  Significant external and firm level pressures have been identified as important 
factors that encourage firms and their managers to favor short-term actions over long 
term ones.   Laverty’s (1996) review of publications that address myopia and "short-
termism" indicates the dominance of the economics and finance literature.   While the 
important role played by short-termism in these streams of literature provides support for 
temporal myopia as a unique concept, there is a virtual absence of the organizational and 
the managerial perspectives.   
Laverty (1996), in attempting to integrate the organizational/strategic perspective 
with that of the economic perspective, traces economic short-termism to five potential, 
underlying causes.  The first three are consistent with the economic perspective: stock 
market pressure, impatient capital, and information asymmetry (Feinberg, 1995; 
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Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1986; Merchant & Bruns, 1986).   To these structural causes 
emphasized by finance and accounting scholars, Laverty adds two behavioral causes: 
flawed management practices and managerial opportunism.  Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) 
also link external pressures and biased heuristics as combined sources of short-term 
myopia by organizations and senior executives.   This link is developed further by Coff 
and Laverty (2001), who differentiate temporal myopia from other forms of bias in 
organizational and strategic settings.   In short, managers and their cognitive biases, in the 
form of temporal myopia, lead to flawed management practices (errors).   External 
pressures that favor short-term, low risk actions operate fairly constantly in the market 
place.   It is the way that managers interpret that environment that causes differences in 
individual managers’ tendency toward temporal myopia.   The combination of the 
economic and behavioral view of short-termism as an important management bias 
contributes to the perspective of temporal myopia as a unique concept.   
In one of the few evaluations comparing spatial and temporal myopia, Kent Miller 
(2002) references both the learning and the economic perspective in developing a 
working definition of temporal myopia.  The logic Miller developed is helpful in 
understanding different forms of myopia in more generalized activities and routines that 
have been refined by the organization.  His view of temporal myopia involves uncertainty 
about current states, failure to consider future states and limited foresight for technology 
investments.  Shortsightedness can reduce the range of technologies adopted into the 
firm's knowledge inventory. Under temporal myopia, incumbent technologies are more 
attractive than new alternatives that include large initial costs and require some period of 
time and practice to compete with existing technologies.     
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Following Miller’s (2002) logic, existing technologies, markets and processes are 
favored by both temporal and spatial myopia; however, the approach to investment in the 
current regime can be expected to differ between the two forms.   Temporal myopia is 
posited to produce a preference for the existing regime at all levels of the organization; 
however, unlike spatial myopia, it can also be expected to develop a resistance to 
investment in the existing or related activities that cannot provide an early return, or that 
involve substantial commitments with longer-term payoffs.  Temporal myopia may also 
produce a bias in favor of an acquisition approach over internal development, with a 
perceived faster implementation.  The bias against longer-term payback on existing 
technology and markets should not be the case in decisions that reflect spatial myopia 
only.       
Differentiating temporal and spatial myopias is in concert with qualitative and 
quantitative research dealing with risk in managerial decision-making.  Shapira (1995), in 
a survey of chief executives and managers, found that true risk is to be avoided, and that 
managers expect to manage and control risk through their own intuition and capabilities.  
Long-term projects (regardless of spatial implications) are inherently perceived to be 
uncertain, involving unknown amounts of risk.   Executive choice will be biased toward 
the more certain, short-term alternatives.  This view is consistent with the concept of 
myopic loss aversion (Benartzi et al., 1995.; Thaler et al., 1997), which combines 
preferences for short horizons and a strong distaste for losses.    
Temporal myopia is, therefore, characterized by the lack of awareness of, or 
interest in opportunities and investments beyond the near term (Levinthal et al., 1993; 
Miller, 2002).   It involves sacrificing the long run for the short term (Laverty, 1996).  
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Temporal myopia will often be reflected in a very high preference for low risk, near term, 
relatively certain ventures and projects.  Temporal myopia may contribute to spatial 
myopia through a focus on the more certain near technologies and opportunities.  
Temporal myopia, however, will likely discourage long-term investments in the current 
business, an action consistent with decisions made under spatial myopia.   Moreover, an 
excessive interest in the short-term is often associated with a financial approach to 
strategic decisions.   
Hubris 
 Hubris is defined as the unjustified overconfidence in an individual’s or an 
organization’s capabilities, evidencing exaggerated pride (Hayward et al., 1997).   Hubris 
encourages senior executives to over-estimate their ability to manage uncertainty and 
risk, to reinterpret historical results in a more favorable light, and to attribute success to 
abilities and failure to luck or external factors (Hayward et al., 1997; Kahneman et al., 
1993).  Managers often confuse correlation with causation by attributing success to 
specific management practices and decisions that are assumed to be driving forces in 
perceived success (Zollo, 2004).  There have been a number of terms that tap into a 
similar concept including failure myopia (Levinthal et al., 1993), overconfidence 
(Bazerman, 1994; Schwenk, 1986), and superstitious learning (Levitt et al., 1988).  
Failure myopia is the third form of myopia identified by Levinthal and March 
(1993), reflecting “the tendency to overlook failure” (page 101) through the 
“oversampling of successes, and the undersampling of failures” (page 110).  Failure 
Myopia is evidenced in individuals who overestimate their ability to deal with problems 
unrelated to issues in which they have experienced their successes.  Failure myopia can 
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lead to extremely high levels of confidence.  While Levinthal and March (1993) 
employed the concept of failure myopia to reinforce management focus on the current 
business model, its extreme forms of “excessive confidence” lead to a willingness of 
executives to take extreme risks.    These extreme forms of overconfidence share the 
characteristics of the hubris concept.   ·  
 Over-confidence has been identified as one form of cognitive bias in a number of 
behavioral decision-making studies focused on negotiations and decisions under risk.  
Bazerman (1994) relates over-confidence to a phenomenon where people extend belief in 
their abilities from simpler decisions to more difficult decisions, and over-estimate their 
ability.   In empirical strategic decision literature, levels of over-confidence have been 
linked to differences in ideology and management style (Tetlock, 2000), to differences in 
risk perception in entrepreneurs(Simon et al., 2000), and to differences in mental maps of 
large firm managers and entrepreneurs (Busenitz et al., 1997).  Over-confidence has been 
characterized as cognitive bias in these studies.   
 The mismatch between confidence and competence where “the subjective 
experience of learning is compelling” and “the connections between actions and 
outcomes are mis-specified” has been discussed as superstitious learning (Levitt & 
March, 1988: 325).  Superstitious learning involves misjudging the cause of successful 
outcomes.  Managers often confuse correlation with causation by attributing success to 
specific management practices and decisions that are assumed to be driving forces in 
perceived success.  Zollo (2004), in one of the few empirical studies of superstitious 
learning, found a positive relationship between superstitious learning and acquisition 
experience.      
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 Acquisitions have also been the subject in studies of hubris.  Roll (1986) 
introduced the concept of hubris as an explanation for acquirers’ non-value added 
acquisitions.  Hayward and Hambrick (1997) found a relationship between the level of 
CEO hubris and overpayments in acquisitions.  They also found that weak governance 
structures increased the negative impact of CEO hubris.  Seth, Song and Petit (2000; 
2002) identified a substantial number of acquisitions that provided evidence of hubris as 
a motivation for overpayment by the acquirer.  CEO celebrity, a potential contributor to 
hubris, has been related to the “fundamental attribution error” in CEOs (Hayward, 
Rindova, & Pollock, 2004).  CEO celebrity can distort perceptions of control for the 
CEO, stockholders and employees.  Celebrity can lead to over-confidence and 
commitment to continuing strategic choices associated with that celebrity (Camerer & 
Lovallo, 1999).   
There are a number of concepts similar to hubris (over-confidence, superstitious 
learning, failure myopia and CEO celebrity) that share a central focus on excessive levels 
of confidence that can lead to serous errors of judgment.  The empirical literature 
provides some support for differences in the level of confidence executives possess, and 
for the negative influence of over-confidence on strategic decisions and firm outcomes 
(Busenitz et al., 1997; Hayward et al., 1997; Seth et al., 2000; Simon et al., 2000).  
Although hubris can have serious and destructive consequences for executives and 
organizations, it may also produce necessary risk-taking in some circumstances 
(Levinthal et al., 1993).        
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Summary of Myopias 
In summary, the myopia of learning provides a sound theoretical structure for 
exploring the effects of managerial bias on strategic decisions and firm outcomes.  
Although the three forms of management myopia have not been fully developed 
conceptually nor empirically tested, diverse streams of literature provide conceptual and 
empirical support for their influence on firm level actions and outcomes.  These diverse 
literatures indicate that management myopia contributes to negative organizational 
phenomena, including inertia, escalation of commitment, lack of long term investment 
and overpayment for acquisitions.    
There is no agreement on the issue of management myopia as primarily a unified 
concept, or as related, but separate dimensions.  Levinthal and March’s (1993) 
presentation of management myopia emphasizes the focus or inertial influences of all 
three dimensions, which are proposed to favor the dominant logic and existing 
competencies of the firm.  Other scholars address the dimensions as important individual 
types of bias individually, generally employing different terminology (e.g., 
overconfidence and short-termism) and without reference to the overall concept of 
management myopia.   The relatively limited numbers of empirical studies on the 
individual dimensions indicate some support for treating them as separate concepts.   
Relative to contextual issues, some scholars (e.g., Levinthal & March 1993) 
expect that management myopia may have greater or lesser effect depending on the 
environments in which the subject firm operates.  In the following section, industry-level 
environmental factors are discussed as moderators to firm level strategies and actions, 
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which are expected to be influenced by senior executive errors in judgment associated 
with management myopia.     
   
Industry Context 
While strategic management has historically debated the relative influence of the 
industry factors versus that of the firm, an integrative perspective has received increasing 
support (e.g., McGahan & Porter, 1997; Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994; Spanos & 
Lioukas, 2001).  Firm level resources that provide sustainable competitive advantage are 
most likely embedded in organizational capabilities, managerial expertise and tacit 
knowledge (Barney, 1991; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Teece et al., 1997).  This is in 
keeping with the management choice arguments made by early organizational and 
business policy scholars.  The distribution of capabilities in any given industry reflects 
deliberate managerial action within the context of environmental and industry context 
(e.g., Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Barnard, 1938; Chandler, 1962).    
The strategic decision-making frameworks discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter (Table 1) reinforce the integrative perspective by incorporating environmental 
factors in models of decision-making and strategic choice.  The authors argued that much 
of strategic management research gives inadequate attention to the interaction of 
firm/management and environmental factors (e.g., Bell et al., 1998; Rajagopalan et al., 
1998).   The Strategic Change Framework (Rajagopalan et al., 1997) particularly 
emphasizes the impact of industry factors in multiple steps in the strategic change 
process.  Multiple conceptual and empirical streams of research in the field of strategic 
management support industry effects as both direct and moderating factors in strategic 
decision-making and firm outcomes (Henderson et al., 1997; Robinson & McDougall, 
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2001).   The moderating influence of industry conditions on strategic decision-making 
processes and rationality has also received substantial support in strategic decision-
making literature (Goll & Rasheed, 1997). 
For the purposes of this study, senior executive myopia is considered an important 
firm factor relative to knowledge-based resources of the firm (Levitt et al., 1988; Miller 
& Shamsie, 2001).  Consistent with the integrative view of firm and environmental 
factors, industry conditions are posited to moderate the relationship between senior 
executive myopia and major firm outcomes. 
Two major perspectives have been advanced relative to industry context as a 
moderating influence on firm level actions, the industry life cycle (Hofer, 1975) and the 
organization task environment (Dess et al., 1984).  Both perspectives identify growth as a 
major determinant of industry conditions.  Munificence, substantially represented by 
industry growth, is associated with a favorable environment when growth is high, and 
environmental hostility when growth is low (Goll et al., 1997).  Similarly, the growth 
stages in industry life cycle theory have been associated with lower competition, higher 
profitability and greater, more varied opportunities (Porter, 1980).   The task environment 
stream of literature also identifies two other important characteristics, dynamism and 
complexity.  While these additional dimensions represent interesting and important 
elements for a broad spectrum of strategic decision-making processes and outcomes, they 
are of less interest for this specific research question.   
Industry growth (munificence) is proposed as the most appropriate characteristic 
in assessing the impact of management myopia on firm level outcomes in established 
industries for three reasons.   First, cognitive biases and errors of judgment associated 
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with management myopia will be affected by senior executive perceptions of the industry 
environment.  Even for established industries, the perception of participation in a high-
growth versus a low growth (i.e., stagnant industry) is expected to significantly impact 
the orientation and outlook of senior executives responsible for charting the course of a 
business.  Second, the simplification processes discussed in the myopia section of this 
review suggest that those senior executives will also simplify their view of the world 
(Miller, 1993).  The labeling of industries as growth versus non-growth reflects this type 
of simplification process, which is likely to be reflected in senior executive cognitive 
orientations and business media reinforcement.   Consequently, industry turbulence 
(dynamism) may restrict the formation of hardened biases (myopia).  Third, there is less 
theoretical support for the impact of the complexity and dynamism characteristics relative 
to the relationship between myopia and firm level outcomes.    Fourth, the focus on 
established industries reduces the likelihood of significant differences in dynamism and 
complexity (Castrogiovanni, 2002), allowing for a more restrictive test of the influence of 
industry growth.   
In this section, task environment and industry life cycle theory and literature will 
be presented and the choice of industry growth rate supported as the most critical industry 
factor for this research question.    Growth rate is a primary indicator of the life cycle 
stages.   The task environment literature addresses revenue growth as a key driver of the 
munificence characteristic.   
Industry Life Cycle Theory 
A number of scholars consider industry or product-evolution life cycle as a 
fundamental variable in strategic management research (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984; 
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Beal et al., 1999; Hambrick et al., 1982; Hofer, 1975; MacMillan, Hambrick, & Day, 
1982; Robinson et al., 2001).  Industry life cycle theory is derived from product life cycle 
concepts introduced in the 1960’s in business, marketing and economics literature 
(Buzzell & Nourse, 1968; Cox, 1967; Levitt, 1965; Polli et al., 1969).   
Hofer (1975) considered industry or product-evolution cycle as the “most 
fundamental variable in determining an appropriate business strategy” (page 789).  A 
body of research suggests that industry life cycle plays an important role in competitive 
strategies (e.g., Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984; Hambrick et al., 1982; Hofer, 1975; 
MacMillan et al., 1982); however, this literature has offered somewhat conflicting 
evaluations of the match between competitive strategy and different stages (Beal & 
Lockamy 1999).  Moreover, research incorporating life cycle concepts often focuses on 
the emergent or early growth stages (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; MacMillan & Day, 1987).  A recent example is Robinson and 
McDougall’s (2001) support for the moderating effect of industry life cycle on the 
relationship between entry barriers and performance in new ventures.  Similarly, 
Lumpkin and Dess (2001) found that industry stage moderated the relationship between 
entrepreneurial orientation (a cognitive factor) and new venture performance.  Still, there 
is little research incorporating life cycle stages in more established industries, notably 
those in the mature-growth (also termed late growth) and full maturity stages (Beal & 
Lockamy 1999). 
The industry life cycle is commonly portrayed as four stages of emergence, rapid 
growth, maturity and decline, with important ramifications for firm strategies and 
outcomes (Porter 1980; 1985).   The four-stage model provides a basic framework for 
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understanding major changes that occur between emergence and growth and between 
maturity and decline.  It is particularly effective in identifying differences between very 
young, emerging firms from those that have reached full maturity.  The four-stage model, 
however, provides little insight into the complexity of changes that occur in more 
established industries that still experience substantial differences in rates of growth 
(Hofer, 1975; Jovanovic & MacDonald, 1994; Polli et al., 1969).  A number of scholars 
have identified additional sub-stages (Buzzell et al., 1968; Day, 1981; Greiner, 1996; 
Kotler, 2003; Sallee & Frankwick, 2004) that directly address this issue.  The additional 
sub-stages are particularly applicable to established industries, whereas the maturity stage 
can be separated into periods of high or low growth.    
Industry Growth and Life Cycle Stages 
Product classes and industries pass through an emergence and rapid growth stage 
before a shakeout occurs and stronger, more efficient firms survive and prosper Agarwal, 
Echambadi & Sarkar, 2002; Gort & Wall, 1986).  This shakeout has been described in 
terms of a transition period (Porter, 1980), as period of deepening and concentration of 
innovation (Agarwal et al., 2002; Nelson & Winter, 1982), and as the competitive 
turbulence stage (Wasson, 1974).  The industry is still growing; however, there is a shift 
from product and technology innovation to process innovation, efficiency and quality in a 
more “competitive” environment (Day, 1981; Utterback, 1994).  This is substantially 
different from the post-emergence period of rapid growth in an industry that has yet to 
experience a shake-out of weaker firms.    The post-emergence, rapid growth period still 
reflects substantial levels of experimentation, variation and technological innovation.  
The context of the early/rapid growth stage is substantially different from the later growth 
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period, which is more stable and generally preceded by a shakeout of less efficient firms.  
The industry is still growing, but there is a significant reduction in the levels of 
uncertainty and variety.    The mature-growth stage increasingly rewards traditional 
competitive actions and focus, which is reflected in Porter’s (1980) discussion of 
transition from growth to maturity. 
Growth may continue for an extended period, but eventually gives way to a period 
of low growth, characterized by stagnation and increased competition.  The existence of 
multiple growth and multiple maturity stages is documented in early product life cycle 
discussions (Buzzell et al., 1968; Polli et al., 1969), as well as in recent literature 
(Greiner, 1996; Kotler, 2003).  Polli & Cook (1969) separate three stages of maturity – 
sustained maturity, maturity, and declining maturity, relating to differences in levels of 
real growth during those periods.  Consistent with early treatments, and more recent 
studies, Cook and Polli (1969) identified multiple periods of growth and decline/ 
stagnation in mature industries that did not lead directly to severe decline, dispersion or 
bankruptcy.     
This body of literature supports important differences between periods of high 
and low growth within the stage traditionally identified simply as mature.   The 
differences in environmental conditions between high-growth and low-growth periods are 
expected to play a critical role in moderating the relationship between management 
myopia and value destruction in established firms.      
Munificence and the Task Environment 
 The three dimensions of the task environment include munificence, dynamism 
and complexity.  Dess and Beard’s (1984) factor analysis, supported by Rasheed and 
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Prescott (1992), indicates that munificence is impacted substantially by sales growth, and 
that dynamism is primarily a measure of variation in growth factors (instability/stability 
in Aldrich’s 1979 review).  Both studies found only geographic concentration as a 
measure of environmental complexity, with no real support for product diversity or 
specialization ratio.  The general definition of each of the dimensions is as follows (Dess 
et al., 1984; Goll et al., 1997):  
• Munificence: Environmental capacity or the ability of the environment to sustain 
growth (only measures of growth supported).  High growth industries are 
considered munificent environments; low growth industries are considered hostile 
environments. 
• Dynamism: The unpredictability of rate of change in a firm’s environment (only 
variation in growth measures supported).   
• Complexity: The degree of uncertainty in the environment associated with the 
number and variety of organizations in the environment (only geographical 
concentration supported).    
The theoretical relevance of the task environment is tied to arguments from 
population ecology and resource dependence perspectives (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; 
Hannan et al., 1984).  An organization’s survival is contingent on the acquisition of 
critical resources from the environment in general, and from other organizations.  The 
nature of the environment and the organization’s ability to access available resources 
largely determine which organizations will survive and which will fail (Aldrich 1979; 
Dess & Beard 1984).     
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There are several obvious relationships between life cycle theory and the munificence 
dimension.  As Dess and Beard (1984) showed, the concept of munificence is primarily a 
rate-of-growth concept.  Growth is believed to increase the number of options available 
to competitors, provide some level of slack, and evidence far less intensity of 
competition, not only in the actual environment, but also in the perceptions of the 
participants.  The concept of munificence clearly parallels the logic of life cycle.  Both 
munificence and life cycle stages are substantially associated with the rate of growth in 
an industry.  They agree on the idea that higher growth is associated with more favorable 
environments, and lower growth with more competitive or hostile environments.    
Goll and Rasheed (1997) argue that environmental munificence exerts an important 
influence on managerial choice.   More munificent environments encourage greater 
managerial discretion, and are more likely to evidence variety in strategic direction (Goll 
et al., 1997; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).  More hostile environments are more likely 
to reinforce more rigid, conservative approaches to strategic change (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990).  This has a particularly important influence on the cognitive states of 
senior executives and their boards of directors.   The level of munificence in an industry 
will likely impact the perceived choices of senior executives.   For example, hubris may 
be allowed to have greater negative effect on firm outcomes in munificent industries due 
to fewer real and perceptual constraints placed on “intuitive” or arrogant decisions.  On 
the other hand, low munificence environments may reward actions encouraged by overly 
confident executives who initiate changes that break the organizational out of the inertial 
forces of stagnation.  Conversely, low munificence levels may encourage rigidity in some 
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executives, leading to increased focus on the existing business model, and the avoidance 
of risk associated with new markets and technologies.   
 Dynamism, the second dimension of the task environment, has received a 
considerable amount of attention in strategic management decision-making literature.  A 
number of articles have tied industry dynamism to greater or lesser benefits of rational 
decision processes (Goll & Rasheed, 1997).   Arguments have been made for greater 
benefit of rational processes in empirical studies of both dynamic (e.g., Eisenhardt et al., 
1990; Goll et al., 1997; Miller & Friesen, 1983), and stable markets (e.g., Fredrickson, 
1984; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989).   The ambiguity in results offer somewhat less 
convincing arguments for the moderating influence for the dynamism dimension relative 
to the three forms of management myopia.    
The third industry dimension, complexity, has received somewhat less attention in 
the strategic decision-making literature.   Moreover, the definition and measurement of 
complexity have been disputed (Harris, 2004; Rasheed & Prescott, 1992; Sharfman & 
Dean, 1991).  Beard and Dess’ (1984) factor analysis supported only geographic 
concentration.  Others have measured concentration and density ratios in relation to new 
business entry (Boeker, 1991).   Heterogeneity or range of competitors, suppliers, 
customers and organizational task was not supported Beard and Dess’ (1984) factor 
study, but is believed to be an important conceptual approach to complexity 
(Castrogiovanni, 2002).  The multiple potential definitions of complexity complicate the 
already difficult task of determining potential interaction effects with management 
myopia.  At this juncture, there is little theoretical support for addressing a specific type 
of complexity relative to the research question under review.   
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In summary, both life cycle theory and task environment theory provide support 
for employing industry growth as the primary measure of industry context.   Dynamism 
and complexity are recognized widely as important industry characteristics, but do not 
appear to be as clearly related to the effects of management myopia. 
Management Myopia and Industry Growth 
The learning lens provides insight into the effects that industry growth patterns 
have on managerial cognition and to the potential impact of managerial myopia on 
strategic decisions.  Managers may interpret their environment to fit with their view of 
the world (Barr et al., 1992; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Weick, 1979), which in some 
cases is more or less myopic than in others (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Miller, 1993).  
Porter (1980) notes that the actual stages of the growth cycle can be difficult to 
determine, particularly for executives operating within real industries, and without the 
benefit of hindsight.  This perspective is especially relevant for the focus of this study, 
which is on established industries that have passed the rapid growth phase and have yet to 
enter the permanent decline phase.      
Variety is greater and competition less severe in the earlier stages than the later 
stages (Miles, Snow, & Sharfman, 1993), which can be applied to established industries 
in a high or low growth mode.  Porter (1980) gives significant attention to the transition 
phase between growth and maturity.  Growth is still high in this phase, but uncertainty 
relative to the favored technology (or a limited number of technologies) has substantially 
dissipated.  These conditions can be expected to benefit firms that build and exploit 
competitive advantages associated with the dominant technologies or regimes.   These 
firms are rewarded by focusing on development (rather than exploratory research), 
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investment in process improvements and quality, and efficiency efforts (Gort et al., 1986; 
Jovanovic et al., 1994).  The high-growth stage combines the competitive orientation of 
efficiency and focus with the positive advantage of growth and variety.   
Because firms are rewarded for focus, efficiency and exploitation of existing 
technologies, spatial myopia may have little or no negative effect on firm outcomes.  
Focus is likely to be rewarded, even in the extreme form.   Conversely, managers who 
experience extreme levels of hubris may be encouraged to explore and to take major risks 
on new businesses when the rewards are substantially greater for exploiting existing 
technologies.   
Mature industries also experience low real growth.  In these conditions, industries 
tend to evidence even less uncertainty, increasingly aggressive competitive tactics (often 
easily understood and matched by competitors), decreasing variety, and greater 
standardization (Gort et al., 1986; Nelson et al., 1982).   This is most evident for 
established industries that have fully passed through a transition period from rapid growth 
(as in Porter’s 1980 explanation), and have entered what is called the stagnation stage 
(Hamermesh & Silk, 1979).  Porter’s (1980) description of the maturity stage reflects this 
low growth condition.  Firms tend to view the industry as stagnant, with substantially less 
opportunity to differentiate.  Competition tends to be more imitative.  Prior periods of 
extensive focus on current technology and markets may contribute to structural inertia 
and rigidity in approach.  The firms and their executives have experienced success (and 
survival) during shakeout phases of growth that rewarded focus, efficiency and quality, 
with relatively fewer rewards for variation and investment in new opportunities.    
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In the low-growth period, firms that continue to focus on existing markets and 
technologies are likely to confront intensifying competition for a relatively fixed market.  
The focus on existing markets and technologies (Porter 1980) can lead to spatial myopia, 
which can increase the firm's reliance on the increasingly competitive business model.  
Spatial myopia biases the top management team to emphasize focus, efficiency and the 
core business concept and processes (Levinthal et al., 1993; Miller, 1993; Miller, 2002).  
Barriers to exit exist both objectively and in the cognitive maps of senior executives that 
have defined success (Barr et al., 1992).  These cognitive maps even screen out objective 
feedback on lower than average industry performance.  Executives may invest deeper 
into old technologies and markets where competitors are involved in a downward spiral 
of excessive competition.   
In low growth industries, spatial myopia may also restrict consideration of new 
concepts, new markets and new technologies that could lead to lower competition, higher 
growth and greater profitability.   The lack of search and investment in opportunities 
restricts a firm's ability to find less competitive positions, niches and new markets (Beal 
et al., 1999).  The context may have the opposite effect on hubris.  Levinthal and March 
(Levinthal et al., 1993) note that hubris may contribute to strategies that encourage the 
firm to break-out of the spiraling competition of stagnating businesses.   Over-confidence 
can lead to critical experimentation and consideration of new concepts.  In summary, 
differences in growth patterns involve substantially different contexts, in which there may 
be substantial variation in the effects of different forms of management myopia on firm 
outcomes.   
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Negative Firm Outcomes: Value Destruction 
The research question of this study addresses the dysfunctional aspects of learning 
of senior executives, which are expected to result in negative outcomes for the firm.  Just 
as dysfunctional learning, bias and myopia depart from the positive orientation of 
normative and rational processes of strategic management theory, the background for 
assessing negative firm outcomes must be sought outside the convention of positive, 
financial performance.  Literature focused on organizational decline, retrenchment and 
turnaround, and value destruction specifically address negative firm outcomes.   
 
Decline Literature 
Organizational decline was identified as an important but little studied 
management issue by Whetten (1980).  Whetten’s observation was followed by a number 
of studies that have taken varying positions on the potential for negative or positive 
factors associated with decline, suggesting a contingent relationship (Mone, McKinley, & 
Barker, 1998).  The theoretical and empirical works addressing decline provide evidence 
that other factors (e.g., management error, bias and myopia) impact firms differently.  
This stream of literature also provides a definition of decline and a number of 
operationalizations of the concept.  Even though the decline literature generally seeks to 
understand the effects of decline on organizational behavior (Cameron, Whetten, & Kim, 
1987b; D' Aveni, 1989), it also provides some information on the potential antecedents of 
decline.  For example, management error and bias that contributes to organizational 
inertia may also be a cause of decline, rather than an effect.      
Evidence of positive and negative relationships between organization decline and 
subsequent firm outcomes suggests that other factors may influence that relationship.  
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The “negative” perspective of one body of decline literature has emphasized outcomes 
associated with inertial forces.  These negative outcomes include increased rigidity (e.g., 
(Staw et al., 1981), reduced innovation (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984), and/or escalation of 
commitment (Staw, 1981).   The body of work supporting negative outcomes suggests 
that decline is associated with intensified, restrictive focus on existing operations and 
technologies, and a heavy emphasis on efficiency (Brockner, 1992; D' Aveni, 1989; 
Ocasio, 1995).  Although this body of work stresses firm decline as the theoretical 
antecedent to inertial characteristics, the direction of the causal relationship is not clear in 
all circumstances.  Extreme focus on the current regime and on efficiency (consistent 
with managers who exhibit spatial myopia) may also contribute to decline in sales, 
profitability and/or capabilities.        
The streams of literature supporting positive outcomes following decline point to 
actions that stimulate innovation, initiate strategic change, and/or involve higher risk 
(Boeker, 1994; Lant et al., 1992; McKinley, 1984; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; Zajac & 
Kraatz, 1993).   Once firms are in decline, this stream of literature argues that 
organizations will be encouraged to act in novel and innovative ways.  This evidence 
appears to contradict the negative effects stream of decline literature, but actually may 
indicate differences in environments, organizational cultures or management factors 
(Mone et al., 1998).  A potential significant individual factor is the cognition of managers 
as represented by management myopia.   Differences in managerial perceptions and 
organizational actions may contribute to the decline of some firms in a growing or stable 
industry, while others prosper.  Even firms that recover after a period of decline through 
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strategic change may have been lead into decline by myopic decisions and management 
error.   
Cameron, Whetten and Kim (1987) defined organizational decline relative to a 
substantial, absolute decrease in an organization’s resource base that occurs over a 
specific period of time.  Mone and associates (1998) considered organizational decline as 
a measurable threat to an organization's viability, referencing protracted reductions in 
market share, financial losses, reduced enrollments, and substantially reduced product 
demand and sales.  The general view of this literature steam is that firms may decline as a 
result of either industry contraction or of firm specific problems, although some authors 
consider firm causes as much more critical (Mone et al., 1998).  Empirical treatments of 
organizational decline have employed multiple measures, including real decline in 
revenues (Cameron et al., 1987b), failure as cessation of operations (Amburgey, Kelley, 
& Barnett, 1993; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988), reduction in overall asset levels (Wiseman 
& Bromiley, 1996), and low levels of profit returns (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988).   
Turnaround Literature 
Scholars interested in retrenchment and turnaround activities shift the emphasis of 
research from factors associated with organizational decline to activities designed to 
correct strategic and operational problems (Barker & Duhaime, 1997).  This body of 
work builds on the decline literature in relating decline to management cognition and 
error, emphasizes firm induced decline, and provides additional operationalizations of 
negative firm outcomes.   
The cause of decline is a critical factor in determining conditions most associated 
with turnaround activities, specifically targeting firms that underperform relative to their 
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peers (Barker & Barr, 2002; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983).    For turnaround theorists, the 
greatest interest is in firms that have failed because they have not enacted strategic 
change, have chosen the wrong action, or have implemented it poorly (Barker & 
Patterson, 1996; Hofer, 1980; Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Schendel & Patton, 1976).   
Decline has been specifically linked to bias, managerial failure, and misguided beliefs 
and interpretations (e.g., Barker et al., 2002; Barker et al., 1997; Nottenburg & Fedor, 
1983).   The link between misguided beliefs, bias and management error draws direct 
comparison to Levinthal & March’s (1993) management myopia.   
Turnover literature also includes multiple measures of decline; however, there is a 
greater emphasis on more traditional financial measures (Bruton 1989).  Some early 
authors employed qualitative measures, including impression of firm’s overall financial 
condition, market position, strategic health, published stories of profits and market 
shares, and in-depth interviews (e.g., Firsirotu, 1985; Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1981; 1986).  
The most frequent quantitative measure incorporates some form of change in profitability 
or profit ratio (e.g., Barker et al., 2002; Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994; Ford & Baucus, 
1987; Furman & McGahan, 2002; Schendel, Patten, & Riggs, 1976), which are generally 
normalized for industry levels.  Z scores, indicating a risk of bankruptcy, have also been 
employed as indicators of decline (Barker et al., 2002).   Barker and associates (2002) 
defined declining organizations as those with significant reductions in asset levels, 
number of employees, and normalized sales.  In a study of acquisitions of financially 
distressed firms, Bruton and associates (1994) employed qualitative assessments of firm 
success.     
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Value Destruction Literature 
Value has historically played an important role in strategic management theory.  
Porter argued that “Competitive advantage grows fundamentally out of the value a firm is 
able to create for its buyers” (1985: xvi).   Value is the first component of Barney’s 
(1991) VRIN (valuable, rare, inimitable and not-substitutable) formula for determining 
sustainable competitive advantage.  For firms to be successful, they must create value in 
terms of perceived customer benefit or loss, and they must capture value for the firm, 
avoiding giving away value already created (Bowman, 2001).  
The related issue of value destruction has had substantially less attention in 
strategic management research (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996).  In Schumpeter’s (1942) 
view of creative destruction, the decline of existing firms is the result of the introduction 
of new technologies or administrative approaches.  However, there are other sources of 
decline and destruction at the firm level.  Porter (1985) provides an extensive review of 
the negative aspects of intense competition that is expected to develop in stagnant or 
declining industries.  The Five Forces model and the Value Chain concept specifically 
discuss how value can be lost to competitors, customers, suppliers and potential new 
entrants by an individual firm and its management.  Managers may lead their firms by 
successfully creating and sustaining firm value, or can destroy firm value by succumbing 
to management error, self-serving actions, bias and myopia (e.g., Cannella et al., 2001; 
Fama, 1980; Hannan et al., 1984; Hayward et al., 1997).    
Finance and economics literatures employ capital market theory in equating value 
creation/destruction to changes in stock market value (e.g., Fama, 1976; Lubatkin & 
Shrieves, 1986).   Changes in shareholder value have been found to vary after major 
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“events” occur that affect the value of the firm.  Individual evaluations of AT&T’s 
acquisition of NCR (Lys et al., 1995)  and the attempted merger of Volvo and Renault 
(Bruner, 1999)  describe post-announcement declines in shareholder stock price as value 
destruction.  Bruner particularly attributes the destruction to “hubris, managerialism and 
the escalation of commitment” (page 125).  Supporting these claims, empirical studies in 
the finance and economics areas have found that many acquisitions result in declines in 
the acquiring firms’ long-term profitability (e.g., Fowler & Schmidt, 1988; Ravenscraft & 
Scherer, 1987) and in shareholder value (e.g., Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992).   
A number of strategic management scholars have taken up the issue of value 
destruction by the management of acquiring firms, based on concepts of managerialism 
(Baumol, 1962) and hubris.   Seth, Song & Petit (2002) found evidence of synergy, 
managerialism and hubris in a study of cross-border acquisitions.  They concluded that 
managerial motives explain why some acquiring managements create value and others 
destroy value.  In a more specific study of management hubris, Hayward and Hambrick 
(1997) found that hubris of the acquiring firms’ CEOs was specifically tied to the 
payment of unjustified premiums, resulting in the destruction of value for the acquiring 
firms.   
Overall, the study of value destruction in acquisitions provides qualitative and 
quantitative evidence of value destruction as a transfer of value to other organizations and 
individuals.  The cause of this destruction has been tied to management error, self-interest 
and hubris.  The study of acquisitions is, however, limiting in its measures.  Acquisitions 
often represent short-term events relative to their announcement to the public.  Moreover, 
the change in price reflects the markets best-guess of future potential based on current 
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information, not actual value captured or lost (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001).  Changes in 
stock price are also subject to manipulation by executives (Dechow & Skinner, 2000; 
Johnson & Kaplan, 1987), and by unrealistic expectations by investors and stock analysts 
(Cornell, 2001; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994).  Although stock price has been found to be 
appropriate for single event type studies, its problems limit its application as a single 
measure of value creation or destruction.     
The problems of employing a single type of measurement are not restricted to the 
use of market values.  The frequent employment of profit ratios in strategic management 
theory has been frequently criticized (Chakravarthy, 1986; Geringer et al., 2000; 
Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).   The common measures of profitability (e.g., ROI, 
ROA, and ROE) are, by themselves, incapable of capturing the full dynamics of growth 
and decline.    
The different approaches to negative firm outcomes reviewed in this section 
suggest a multi-dimensional approach to measuring value destruction.  The term value 
destruction is employed to indicate that value is dissipated by firms in a number of ways 
not fully captured by single-measure approaches (e.g., ROI) or by shareholder wealth 
concepts.   
For the purpose of this study, negative firm outcomes are described in terms of 
value destruction, which is measured by declining revenues, declining profits and 
declining returns on assets.  Revenue growth rates indicate the extent to which firms 
provide value to customers (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Geringer et al., 2000; Porter, 
1985).   Lower growth as compared to competitors in the same industry indicates value 
destruction.   Profit growth rates reflect both the creation or destruction of customer 
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defined value, and the extent to which a firm captures or retains the value it has created 
(Bowman et al., 2000).   Return on assets factors in the efficiency in which the firm 
employs assets in creating or destroying value.     
 
Model and Research Hypotheses 
 The Strategic Change Framework (Rajagopalan et al., 1997) reviewed at the 
beginning of chapter II (Figure 2) provides the primary logic for a simplified model that 
links enduring management cognitions to important firm outcomes.   The simplified 
model focuses on the relationship between management myopia, industry growth patterns 
















Management myopia represents the enduring orientation of senior executives in 
decision making that ultimately impacts firm outcomes.  The dysfunctional nature of 
myopic learning suggests negative firm outcomes, which are represented as value 
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destruction in the model.  Environmental conditions are represented by industry growth 
patterns as the moderator of that relationship.  
As noted earlier in this chapter, management myopia is defined as a stable 
perspective of managers that narrows the set of alternative choices, and that exposes the 
individual or organization to errors in judgment.   Levinthal and March (1993) develop 
the concept of dysfunctional learning as “the myopia of learning” (page 95), identifying 
three forms of myopia that can have substantial effects on strategic decisions and firm 
outcomes.  Temporal myopia reflects short-term thinking and actions.  Spatial myopia 
reflects the trade-off of exploiting current technology or seeking variety and innovation in 
new areas.  Failure myopia leads to over-confidence and hubris, which can result in 
higher risk decisions.     
Learning theory provides the underlying logic for the destructive potential of 
management myopia (e.g., Argyris et al., 1978; Cohen et al., 1990; Levinthal et al., 1993; 
Levitt et al., 1988)  Management myopia is a product of valuable learning processes that 
are effective in repetitive situations, where experience, and past successes are relevant to 
ongoing decisions.   This presents a paradox for strategic decision-makers.  Senior 
executives are involved in a large number of relatively ongoing decisions that benefit 
from simplification processes and effective heuristics.  Much of their success may be 
attributable to making and implementing operationally oriented decisions; however, the 
simplification processes associated with learning may not be applicable to strategic 
decisions.  Strategic decisions are relatively infrequent, involving substantial ambiguity 
and uncertainty.   Feedback on success or failure of individual strategic decisions may not 
be realized for several years, and even then, evaluation is subject to alternative 
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interpretations of success or failure.  Consequently, senior executives are particularly 
exposed to errors of judgment in strategic decisions, which are associated with a 
narrowing of viewpoints and constraints on consideration of alternatives (i.e., 
management myopia).    
The strategic management perspective generally regards rational decision-making 
as beneficial to the quality of those decisions and to firm outcomes (e.g., Andrews 1971; 
Porter 1980, 1985).   Following the logic of dysfunctional learning, strategic decisions 
made by executives with higher levels of myopia will be less rational than those with 
lower levels of myopia, with a restricted range of alternatives considered and an 
increased potential for significant errors.  Although all managers may exhibit some level 
of myopia, managers with higher levels of myopia will introduce greater levels of error 
into strategic decisions, with negative firm consequences.  This can be expected to occur 
for any of the major forms of myopia identified by Levinthal and March (1993).   
The dysfunctional side of organizational theory provides theoretical support for a 
relationship between high levels of management myopia (temporal myopia, spatial 
myopia and/or hubris) and value destruction at the firm level.   Negative firm outcomes 
are identified as value destruction in all hypotheses.  Value destruction is reflected by 
changes in firm level revenue and profitability that are below industry averages.  
 
Hypothesis 1: High levels of CEO spatial myopia will be significantly and positively 
related to value destruction at the firm level.   
Hypothesis 2: High levels of CEO temporal myopia will be significantly and positively 
related to value destruction at the firm level.   
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Hypothesis 3: High levels of CEO hubris will be significantly and positively related to 
value destruction at the firm level.   
 
The Moderating Influence of Industry Growth 
The learning literature stresses that myopia results from a learning process, 
whereas success can ultimately lead to myopia and value destruction (Rosenkopf & 
Nerkar, 2001).  On one hand, building core competence by extending existing 
technologies, markets and capabilities enhances value for the operation.  However, that 
same process can lead to competency traps, superstitious learning and core rigidities 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levitt et al., 1988).  This paradox implies that focusing on the 
core business may be a strength within certain contexts, but become myopic and 
deteriorate value in other contexts.  Levinthal and March (1993) note that the 
overconfidence (i.e., hubris) may contribute to errors of recklessness in many situations, 
but could also have a positive effect under circumstances where sustaining exploration is 
beneficial to firm value.  This paradox suggests that external context will moderate the 
relationship between executive myopia and value destruction.   
 In this section, an argument is made for different conditions existing in the high 
and low growth industries.  These different conditions moderate the effects and intensity 
of the three forms of myopia.  The primary thesis of this paper is that lack of fit between 
management bias and industry characteristics destroys value at the firm level.   Consistent 
with the paradox of beneficial and dysfunctional learning, different forms of management 
myopia may contribute to value destruction in high growth industries, but not in low 
growth industries, and visa versa.  It is even possible that high levels of spatial myopia 
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may be beneficial in high growth environments by increasing emphasis on the transition 
to quality and efficiency; and that high levels of over-confidence may be necessary for 
executives to break the organization from inertial tendencies in stagnant industries.  The 
interaction of each form of myopia and industry context is evaluated individually. 
Spatial Myopia 
Spatial myopia contributes to an organization falling into competency traps and to 
increased rigidity in action.  It involves a less than rational exclusion of alternative 
business processes, technologies and markets that do not fit with the top managements’ 
view of the core business.  A key problem in Levinthal & March’s (1993) view is that 
spatial myopia crowds out exploratory learning in favor of exploitation and leads to 
organizational inertia and rigidity.   Spatial myopia is expected to be associated with 
investment in near technologies and markets, in efficiency and quality programs that 
enhance and leverage existing core competencies (Miller, 2002).  This reflects a choice of 
exploitive versus exploratory strategies.   
 The lack of fit between spatial myopia and low growth environments is expected 
to result in value destruction for the firm.  Low growth industries can be characterized by 
intense competition, and little uncertainty about technologies, markets and competitive 
strategies (Porter, 1980).  Firms have learned how to compete with standard efficiency 
and focus strategies, which paid-off during the transition from early growth to mature-
growth periods.  These strategic actions may continue to protect value for a period of 
time in firms that execute these strategies most effectively.  Eventually, however, the lack 
of uncertainty, fewer opportunities and increasingly transparent competitive actions will 
lead to price-cutting, excessive competition, and a downward spiral of value corruption 
   
  68 
for those firms committed to the established business model (Cameron & Whetten, 1983; 
D' Aveni, 1989; Mone et al., 1998).  
An argument for the negative effect of spatial myopia is not as compelling in 
periods of high growth.  Growth itself allows for more variety in establishing strategic 
positions, and has been associated with higher levels of slack (Agarwal et al., 2002; Goll 
et al., 1997; Miles et al., 1993).  Executives may be less inclined to recognize and 
interpret lower than industry growth as a deficiency in strategy as long as “acceptable” 
growth is achieved, and the threat of serious financial problems perceived to be remote 
(Hall, 1976, 1984; Hambrick et al., 1988; Hedberg & Jonsson, 1977; Miller & Friesen, 
1984; Whetten, 1980).  Decline can involve complex circumstances, be difficult to 
interpret, and develop over an extended period of time (Barker et al., 2002; Cameron et 
al., 1987b).  This may lead some firms to continue to invest in variety when there is a 
more significant benefit to focus on existing markets and process technologies.  Spatial 
myopia may even contribute to a beneficial “focus” in high growth environments that can 
discourage investment outside core product lines, and encourage beneficial aspects of 
focus on existing strengths (Miller & Chen, 1994b). 
The industry growth pattern can be expected to moderate the relationship between 
spatial myopia and value destruction.   
 
H4: The relationship between spatial myopia and value destruction will be stronger in 
lower growth industries than in higher growth industries.     
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Temporal Myopia 
Levinthal & March (1993) argue that temporal myopia contributes to and is 
highly correlated with spatial myopia; however, there are important differences in 
strategic decision-making and action (Laverty 1996; Miller 2002).  Temporal myopia 
reflects a bias toward the certainty of short-term, fast return investments.  While this will 
favor the near term pay-off of exploitative investments (cost reduction and quality 
programs) over explorative investment (new markets, technologies), it will also favor 
immediate actions that will discourage major investment of any kind that has a longer 
pay-back.  This financial and control orientation of temporal myopia is supported by 
prospect theory and research (Kahneman et al., 1993), the increasing evidence of short-
term dysfunctionality of businesses in general (Laverty 1996), and the theoretical 
distinction between temporal and spatial myopia (Miller 2002).   
 The negative effects of temporal myopia are likely to be more severe in periods of 
intense competition, whereas some form of experimentation or exploration is essential to 
breakout of the equilibrium-like conditions of stagnant industries.  Cutting off essential 
capabilities for the core business not only limits the exploration and exploitation of future 
opportunities, but also undermines the firm’s ability to compete in the current technology 
and market (Levinthal et al., 1993; Miller, 1993).   
 Unlike spatial myopia, it is likely that temporal myopia will have a negative 
influence on value in high and low growth contexts, but that its impact will be more 
severe in lower growth industries.  Industry growth patterns will moderate the 
relationship between temporal myopia and value destruction, with different levels of 
influence on the two environments.  
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H5: The relationship between temporal myopia and value destruction will be stronger in 
lower growth industries than in higher growth industries. 
 
Hubris 
Hubris is an extreme form of over-confidence.  While some level of 
overconfidence can be expected to influence executives who have achieved substantial 
levels of success, it will generally act to reinforce the existing logic of an organization in 
maintaining focus and defending established positions (Levinthal et al., 1993).   
However, there is evidence of extreme levels of overconfidence that exists in some 
manager’s cognitive states (Hayward et al., 1997; Hayward et al., 2004; Levitt et al., 
1988).  This extreme overconfidence, or hubris, leads executives to overestimate their 
ability to make and execute high-risk strategies, and to underestimate uncertainties and 
external forces.  The extreme impact of hubris can be aggravated by the celebrity that 
accompanies highly visible actions, and by high levels of individual power that can be 
accumulated by highly visible CEO’s.  The likely effect of senior management hubris is 
to over-estimate their ability to manage and control their environment, and engage in 
high-risk projects without objective estimates of success (Kahneman et al., 1993).   This 
orientation can lead senior executives to deviate from the core existing business strategy.   
 Life cycle theory indicates that consolidation, focus and efficiency can be 
appropriate strategic actions in high growth industries.  Risk taking in uncertain and non-
core markets and technologies can distract the organization from the critical strategies of 
building core competencies.   Senior executives with high levels of confidence in their 
own judgment and abilities may actively seek to embark on unique strategies that run 
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counter to the industry norm.  Executives who fail dramatically tend to suffer from the 
illusion of infallibility, to be obsessed with their personal image and vision, and 
downplay the reality of real complications and obstacles (Finkelstein, 2004).  Hubris will 
likely encourage departure from a basic strategy of focus and building on core 
competencies that can be expected to be critical in higher growth environments.     
 Conversely, in periods of lower growth, benefits may accrue from countering the 
forces of inertia and taking more calculated risks (Kahneman et al., 1993; Porter, 1980).   
Firms that have successfully persisted through periods of shakeout and intensifying 
competition had to rely on core competencies, focus and efficiency.  These values 
become engrained in the beliefs of the organization and its leadership, even when an 
industry suffers from low growth and high levels of direct competition.   Altering the 
nature of the competition and seeking less visible opportunities may provide growth and 
opportunity in stagnant environments.   Hubris may actually contribute to the seeking of 
new opportunities, and pull an otherwise inertial organization out of a downward spiral 
(Levinthal et al., 1993); however, it is uncertain as to the ultimate success of new 
businesses and technologies.  They can lead to value creation or even an acceleration of 
value destruction. 
The industry growth pattern is expected to moderate the relationship between 
hubris and firm outcomes (value destruction).   Hubris may lead CEOs in higher growth 
industries to depart from a very successful business model in favor of less certain 
opportunities.  In this situation, the expected effect is negative.  In lower growth 
industries, the same departure may have benefits in breaking out of a low growth pattern, 
encouraging entrance into new markets where higher growth and profitability is possible.  
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There is no guarantee, however, that entry into new markets will be successful.  The 
effects of some firms entering new businesses successfully may be offset by the failure of 
other firms attempting to diversify.    
 
H6: The relationship between hubris and value destruction will be stronger in higher 




 A primary tenet of the strategic management paradigm is that senior managers in 
an organization substantially impact firm outcomes through the strategic decision-making 
and implementation processes.   The cognitive and learning perspectives indicate that 
strategic decision-making is influenced by the biases and myopias of senior executives.  
Strategic decision-making and life cycle theorists have made strong arguments for a 
moderating affect of environment on the effect of strategic decisions.  These perspectives 
are integrated in the Strategic Change Framework (Rajagopalan et al., 1997), and 
amplified by Levinthal and March’s (1993) presentation of management myopia.  The 
literature suggests that enduring biases of senior managers, represented by management 
myopia, influence firm outcomes, and that the influence may be moderated by industry 
context.  The methodology for exploring the hypothesized relationships is presented in 
Chapter III.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Chapter III describes the sample, measures and analytical techniques employed in 
this study to evaluate the research hypotheses and research questions stated in chapter II.  
First, the methodology for identifying and selecting samples of firms from specific 
industries is discussed.  This is followed by a review of measures for all variables 
included in the empirical model presented in chapter II.   Finally, analytical techniques 
employed in testing the validity of the measures and evaluating the research hypotheses 
are identified.   
  
Sample 
The sample to be used in this study is comprised of medium to large publicly 
traded firms from industries with different rates of growth for the period 1998 through 
2000.  Approximately half of the firms are from higher growth industries, balanced by a 
similar number of firms from lower growth industries.  The selection of industries is 
guided by the theoretical development of the management myopias as enduring forms of 
bias.  These biases are “learned” and “harden” over time, and are more likely to be 
represented by firms that operate in consistently high or low growth environments.  The 
differences in industry growth rates serve as the moderating variable in the study.  
Industries were selected that evidenced steady annual growth of 8 percent or more, or that 
evidenced steady growth of 5 percent or below for the period 1998 - 2000.   These ranges 
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compare to an average growth rate of 7 percent for all companies reported by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis in the period 1998-2000.    An attempt was made to achieve a clear 
separation between “higher and lower” growth industries.  This delineation is similar to 
those used previous by  Polli and Cook (1969) and Cameron, Whetten and Kim (1987).    
The industries chosen exhibit relatively little dynamism (variation in growth rate).   
The sample excludes emerging industries and declining industries, which do not match 
the requirement for sustained patterns of growth.  Industries dominated by a single firm 
were also avoided.      
To be included in the sample, companies must be publicly traded in the United 
States and be in operation from 1998 through 2003.  Additionally, they meet a minimum 
revenue threshold ($1 billion) by 2003, which includes most of the largest 1000 publicly 
traded U.S. companies.   Companies that meet this minimum sales revenue are more 
likely to have developed enduring biases, and are more likely to be the subject of media 
attention.  All companies from target industries that meet these criteria have been 
included in the research sample.   Information on the industries is presented in table 5.   
An initial review of industry sectors and industry segments was accomplished 
employing published census data from the bureau of economic development, various 
public investment/ financial services (e.g., Reuters, Hoover’s, Standard & Poor's), and 
business publications (Business Week, Forbes and Fortune).  These industries were then 
evaluated relative to revenue growth rate for the period 1998 to 2000 from the 
COMPUSTAT database.  All companies meeting the criteria with the same primary SIC 
code were included in the COMPUSTAT analysis in order to capture the full industry 
statistics for industry growth.  Annual sales growth for the target industries has been 
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calculated from firm revenue figures in COMPUSTAT, adjusted for any additions or 
deletions of firms from 1998 to 2003, and restatements associated with major, abnormal 
acquisition activity.      
Table 5  
 
Industry Sample 
                      
Higher Revenue Growth Industries                       Number   Avg. Rev.  
  Industry/SIC Code              of  Firms       Growth  (%) 
Semi-conductors/3674 13 15% 
Pharmaceuticals/2834 10 11% 
Family Apparel/5651,21 14 13% 
Comp Processing & Data Prep Svc/ 7374 6 12% 
Hospital & Medical Svc Plans/ 6324 6 8% 
Drug & Proprietary Stores/ 5912 6 14% 
Total Higher Growth Firms 55 12% 
                   
Lower Revenue Growth Industries    
  Industry/SIC Code                         
Dept Stores / 5311 8 3% 
Grocery Stores/ 5411 12 5% 
Newspaper Publishers/ 2711 9 5% 
Fire, Marine, Casualty Ins/ 6331 19 3% 




 Measures of management myopia, industry munificence, and firm performance 
are discussed in this section.  Three forms of management myopia are measured from 
multiple sources.  Negative firm outcomes (value destruction) are measured as changes in 
revenue, profit and return on assets (ROA), normalized to account for industry 
influences.  The moderator, industry growth rate, is structured in the sample selection of 
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high and low growth industries as noted in the previous section.   Control variables are 
also identified and explained. 
 Data for independent variables and control variables have been collected for the 
base period (1998-2000).  Data for dependent variables was collected for the subsequent 
three years (the outcome period, 2001-2003).   
Independent Variables 
 Measurement of the three forms of myopia creates a number of challenges for this 
study.  This is the first attempt to clearly differentiate the three forms of myopia in terms 
of definitions and operationalization.   
Table 6 
 
Management Myopia Measures 
 
Type of          ---------------------------Form of Myopia------------------------------------- 
Measure  Spatial Myopia Temporal Myopia  Hubris 
Cognitive  Focus Orientation in letters 
to shareholders (new) 
 
Defensive Attributions 
relative to problems & 
performance (Adapted from 
attribution literature) 
Short-term Orientation in 
letters to shareholders  (new) 
 
 
Financial emphasis in letters 
to shareholders (new) 
Favorable Media Reports 
(Hayward & Hambrick 
1997) 
 
Personal statements in 
letters to shareholders (new) 
Management 
Characteristics 
TMT Tenure (from 
escalation of commitment) 
 
TMT Homogeneity (from 
escalation of commitment) 
Functional Concentration in 
finance or accounting 
(adapted from functional 
TMT literature) 
CEO Relative Pay (Hayward 





Line of Business 







Operationalization of the three constructs involves a clear definition of each, the 
employment of existing measures that are consistent with the definitions, and the 
development of new measures.  Cognitive measures are taken from content analysis of 
letters to shareholders and from media sources.  Behavioral measures are derived from 
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financial data provided in COMPUSTAT and in company reports.  These cognitive and 
behavioral measures have been supplemented by top management team (TMT) 
characteristics, which have been associated with management cognitions, and firm level 
variables that indicate senior executive decisions and behavior.   Table 6 provides a 
summary of each proposed measure.   
 Spatial Myopia 
Operationalization of the spatial myopia construct relies on the detailed definition 
to establish a new cognitive measure, to adapt existing attribution variables, to employ 
TMT characteristics (which have been employed as proxies for managerial cognitive 
states and perspectives) and to include a firm level indicator of strategic persistence.  The 
definition and development of this construct is based on dysfunctional learning theory, 
but is also influenced by literature that addresses extreme levels of focus, strategic 
persistence, escalation of commitment, and commitment to the status quo.  The common 
denominator of these concepts with spatial myopia is in the cognitive limitations that 
impede management’s interest in, and their ability to depart from the current business 
model.  Spatial myopia by senior executives can be expected to contribute to irrational 
decisions that are consistent with escalation of commitment, unjustified strategic 
persistence, and excessive commitment to the status quo (Levinthal et al., 1993; Miller, 
1993; Miller, 2002).     
 For the purposes of this study, spatial myopia is defined as a lack of awareness, or 
the denial of utility of technologies, processes, routines and markets that are not central to 
the existing operations of the firm.  It can be expected to limit the set of alternatives 
considered for implementation, and is consistent with a focus on dominant technologies, 
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core competencies, and the exploitation and development of existing firm capabilities, 
regardless of the time frame for financial payoff.  Spatial myopia is represented by 
extreme focus on current markets, technologies and administrative structures.  Spatial 
myopia implies very limited consideration of change, particularly any major departure 
from existing processes, technologies and markets.  Spatial myopia can be consistent with 
significant, long-term investment, but not variation from the existing business logic.   
This definition serves as the basis for establishing the domain of the construct, and the 
basis for identifying measurement proxies that adequately reflect the concept.      
Three cognitive indicators of spatial myopia are incorporated into this study, 
defensive external attribution, defensive internal attribution, and focus orientation.   Two 
TMT characteristics, which have been identified with strategic persistence and escalation 
of commitment in strategic management research, are believed to tap into the same 
concept as spatial myopia.  These measures are TMT tenure and TMT homogeneity.  
Additionally, a measure of strategic persistence is employed relative to the diversification 
of the firm’s portfolio of businesses (line of business by SIC code), where no change 
represents a commitment to the existing business.    
Attributional variables employ existing self-serving attribution measures, 
combining attribution of low-performance to external factors (external-defensive 
attribution), and attribution of low-performance to “investment” in the current strategy or 
business model (internal-defensive attribution).    
External–defensive attribution is based on existing attribution measures employed 
in previous studies of letters to shareholders (Clapham et al., 1991; Gordon, Stewart, 
Sweo, & Luker, 2000; Salancik et al., 1984; Staw et al., 1983).  It includes all statements 
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that attribute negative results to external forces.   External-defensive attribution is a 
common reaction of senior executives in explaining firm level problems or low 
performance by external and uncontrollable factors.  External-defensive attribution is 
particularly associated with sensemaking (Weick, 1979) by managers who seek to justify 
the existing business operation and strategy (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991).  By diverting 
attention from firm level influences, particularly the current strategic direction, managers 
may increase commitment to existing strategies even in the face of negative results.  
External-defensive attribution has been linked to escalation of commitment, irrational 
commitment to the status quo, and a narrowing of perspective in case studies and 
empirical research (Barker et al., 1996; Hedberg et al., 1977; Lant et al., 1992; Nystrom 
et al., 1984; Staw et al., 1983).  Escalation of commitment, commitment to the status quo 
and strategic persistence all reflect a cognitive preference (orientation) for the current 
business and strategic direction.  These outcomes are consistent with the definition of 
spatial myopia, whereas executives increase their focus on the current business model, 
harden their position, and screen out contradictory information (Levinthal & March 1993; 
Miller, 1993; Miller, 2002).    
Internal-defensive attribution follows a similar logic, but involves a refinement of 
the internal attribution measure.  Prior literature has generally interpreted internal 
attribution of negative events as an awareness of internal deficiencies that require change 
in strategy or structure (Barker et al., 1996).   The logic is that managers who recognize 
internal causes are more likely to initiate a change in strategy or structure.  This 
viewpoint is supported when management identifies the necessity to change, but is not 
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born out when management specifically makes a commitment to the existing strategy or 
business practice despite unfavorable results.   
The implication is that internal attribution, linked with a statement of change, will 
encourage broader search and consideration of new approaches; whereas internal 
attribution accompanied by commitment to the existing strategy is more consistent with 
inertial tendencies (escalation of commitment, strategic persistence, and commitment to 
the status quo).  Consequently, this study uses the term defensive-internal attribution in 
cases where CEOs link problems and low performance to their commitment to the current 
strategy or business operation. 
An example may clarify the difference between defensive and change-oriented 
internal attributions.  An example of defensive-internal attribution is revealed in the 
following statement referring to investments in the current business model.   
“Unfortunately, like all investments that create theoretical opportunities in the future, 
they cost real money right now.  Consequently, during the fiscal season, they helped drag 
down our net income.”  In contrast, a change-oriented internal attribution is reflected in 
the following statement about “disappointments” that require change.  “Weaker overall 
ratings at the network signaled a need for change.  Consequently, we have refocused our 
programming, and retooled our schedule.”       
Letters to shareholders provide the evidence of defensive attributions.   Each type 
of defensive attribution was coded in a content analysis of the letters, based on detailed 
instructions consistent with the definition and examples presented in this section.   
Defensive attribution measures are calculated as the ratios of total number of statements 
for each type of attribution to total statements in 1998-2000 letters to shareholders.   
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Focus orientation, the second cognitive measure, assesses the number of 
statements in letters to shareholders associated with a commitment to, and focus on the 
existing business model and strategic direction of the firm.  The focus orientation 
measure is developed directly from the definition of spatial myopia, as applied to the 
current and future strategy of the firm.     
  The content analysis of letters to shareholders is designed to capture evidence of 
spatial myopia through the measure of focus orientation (as compared to other strategic 
orientations, such as short-term actions or strategic change).  This involves coding of 
statements based on key words and phrases as the initial step.   The selected words and 
phrases were then evaluated within the context of adjoining sentences and paragraphs to 
determine if the initial coding unambiguously identifies the orientation of the statement.   
Ambiguous statements (or ones that clearly refer to temporal or change-orientations) 
have been excluded.         
Key words/phrases (and derivatives) about current and future strategies, thrusts, 
plans and visions that are positively related to spatial myopia include: focus, core, 
conventional, current, efficiency, established, proven, exploit, process/continuous 
improvement, and commitment.  The calculation for focus orientation is the ratio of the 
number of focus orientation statements to total statements in letters to shareholders for 
the 1998-2000 period.       
These cognitive measures of spatial myopia are complemented by two top 
management team (TMT) characteristics, tenure and homogeneity.  There is theoretical 
and empirical support for an association between these structural indicators and high 
levels of commitment to the current business model (i.e., strategic persistence), to the 
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status quo and inertia (Boeker, 1997; Finkelstein et al., 1990; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & 
Fredrickson, 1993; Lant et al., 1992).  Resistance to change, inertia and strategic 
persistence are consistent with a focus orientation.    
TMT Tenure: The relationship between TMT tenure and level of strategic change 
has received substantial support theoretically and empirically.   Long-tenured 
management teams can be expected to have greater social cohesion, tend toward 
consensus rather than conflict, have developed a more consistent view of the world 
through similar “lenses”, and are more reluctant to change past ways or challenge the 
status quo (Michel & Hambrick, 1992).   Empirical works provide consistent support for 
this relationship.   Long-tenured TMTs have been found to increase the commitment to 
the status quo (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Boeker, 1997) and to lower the likelihood of 
strategic change (Finkelstein et al., 1990).  Conversely, shorter average TMT tenure and 
higher levels of TMT turnover have been associated with strategic change (Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992).    
Team tenure is measured as the mean number of years of employment by TMT 
members of the firm in year 2000 (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Boeker, 1997), the last 
year prior to measuring rate of change in sales/profit/asset growth.   
TMT homogeneity: Empirical studies of TMT homogeneity and heterogeneity 
have also found relationships with strategic change orientation and inertial tendencies.   
In this study, homogeneity of TMT tenure is employed, consistent with findings of 
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) and Boeker (1997).  Wiersema and Bantel found a 
relationship between heterogeneity and strategic change.  Boeker found a relationship 
between TMT homogeneity and the extent of strategic change, where high levels of 
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homogeneity limited the extent of strategic change.  Teams that are more homogeneous 
are less likely to consider broader information sources and different perspectives.   The 
measure of tenure diversity is identical to that of Boeker (1997), employing the 
coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) for the tenure of 
each TMT member.    
An indirect measure of CEO and TMT behavior is represented in the 
diversification strategy of the firm.   Managers committed to the existing business model 
will emphasize existing business operations, and investment in current markets.  An 
aggressive diversification strategy indicates an orientation to change that is inconsistent 
with spatial myopia, escalation of commitment and strategic persistence.  The absence of 
any activity or very limited new industry sales revenue indicates a commitment to the 
existing business model, and can be a reflection of spatial myopia.   Changes in the 
Herfindahl index (ΣPi2, where Pi is the proportion of sales in each line of business) were 
employed to calculate change in line of business (LOB) concentration.      
Temporal Myopia 
Conceptually, temporal myopia shares a common ground with accounting and 
finance theory and research addressing the tendency for managers, stock markets and 
firms to over-emphasize the short-term to the detriment of long term investment and 
success (Merchant, 1990).  While this stream has investigated the financial implications 
and antecedents of short-term behavior, it has generally ignored the cognitive element 
(Laverty, 1996).  In this research study, two cognitive measures of temporal myopia (or 
short-termism) are developed from the detailed definition.  An existing measure of short-
term financial actions is incorporated from the accounting and finance literature.  
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Functional background, a TMT characteristic, is adapted to capture the financial 
experience of executives as a potential indicator of over-emphasis on short term financial 
results.  The definition of temporal myopia is derived from dysfunctional learning 
literature (Levinthal & March, 1993; Miller, 2002), but also reflects explanations of 
short-term bias as found in financial, accounting and strategy literature (e.g., Coff et al., 
2001; Das & Teng, 2001; Hayes et al., 1980; Merchant et al., 1986).      
Temporal myopia is the lack of awareness of, or interest in opportunities and 
investments beyond the near term (Levinthal & March, 1993; Miller, 2002).   It involves 
sacrificing the long run for the short term (Laverty, 1996).  Temporal myopia will often 
be reflected in a very high preference for low risk, near term, relatively certain ventures 
and projects.  Temporal myopia may encourage spatial myopia, because it will favor the 
more predictable characteristics of investment in current technologies and market.  
However, temporal myopia will likely discourage long-term investments in, and heavy 
commitment to the current business -- actions consistent with decisions made under 
spatial myopia.   Moreover, an excessive interest in the short-term is often associated 
with a financial approach to strategic decisions.   
Temporal myopia is best differentiated from spatial myopia by its emphasis on 
short-term thinking and actions, and on financial elements of firm performance.  The 
primary indicator of an unbalanced temporal bias is a heavy emphasis on short-term 
financial results, financial planning (in deference to vision or long-term strategy), and 
short horizon investments.   Temporal myopia will discourage executives from 
considering new and less certain innovations, technologies and markets.  It will also 
discourage commitments to current technology and markets that involve substantial 
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investments and long-term or uncertain payoffs.  Managers who are temporally myopic 
will be more likely to favor cost cutting regimes over less tangible, and more 
intermediate or long-term investments (investments in quality improvements, for 
example). 
The Short-term Orientation measure is taken directly from the construct definition 
and applied to strategic statements by the CEO in letters to shareholders that emphasize 
short-term actions associated with high probabilities of increasing profits, cutting costs, 
or reducing asset levels.   Examples of short-term financial actions include cost 
reductions, workforce restructuring, eliminating departments or businesses, finding or 
exploiting “cost synergies”, layoffs, efficiency as a cost reduction mechanism, investment 
efficiency, and managing expenses.  Key words and phrases indicating a short-term 
orientation include short-term, fast, early, quick, and certain in combination with 
investment, return, payback, cost-reduction, retrenchment, and synergy.   The actual 
measure calculates the ratio of temporal orientation statements to total statements in the 
letters to shareholders.     
Financial emphasis is the second cognitive measure of temporal myopia, 
reflecting the extent to which financial discussions dominate the letter to shareholders.  
Virtually all letters to shareholders include a financial results section; however, extreme 
emphasis on financial and capital market issues may indicate a focus of the CEO and the 
company on the financial aspect of corporate management.  Financial emphasis tends to 
focus attention on short-term results in response to capital market pressures, and can 
reflect a built-in short-term bias in financial executives, processes and (Dechow et al., 
1996; Dunk & Kilgore, 2001; Tyrrall, 1998).  A financial emphasis can crowd out 
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attention to important operational issues, reduce attention to the long term-strategy, and 
lead to management myopia (Bhojraj & Libby, 2005; Merchant, 1990).  Capturing the 
amount of space committed to financial results and issues in letters to shareholders acts as 
an indicator of the emphasis and importance the CEO places on financial matters.   The 
measure of financial emphasis is the number of statements addressing financial results 
and issues as a ratio of the total number of statements in the letter 
The Financial Experience measure is designed to capture the extent of the 
financial background of the top management team.  Although there has been relatively 
little empirical work focused on financial backgrounds of company executives, there is 
empirical support for the influence of functional background on cognitive maps of senior 
executives.  Strategic management scholars have found evidence for functional bias 
relative to emphasis on strategic change, whereas functional background may limit the 
scope of internal problems identified and possible alternatives to be considered (Waller, 
Huber, & Glick, 1995).  Functional background shapes what is seriously considered, and 
what is put-off, delayed or ignored.  Kiesler and Sproull (1992) make a case for prior 
experience impacting a manager’s level of awareness and his or her willingness to act.  
Waller, Huber and Glick (1995) identify a tendency in managers to ignore areas that are 
less familiar to them.   Executives with extensive financial or accounting backgrounds 
will be more inclined to favor what is familiar to them.  The primary mechanisms, 
processes and time frames of financial and accounting activities focus far more on short-
term rather than long-term issues.   
 Coff and Laverty (2001) identify probable causes of barriers to investing in 
strategic assets in terms of financial, control and performance monitoring mechanisms, 
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important tools employed by financial and accounting functions.   These mechanisms 
create a number of barrier mechanisms that are biased toward the short-term, including a 
bias toward tangible assets in accounting principles, a bias toward certainty implied in 
analytical tools (such as discounted cash flow models), bias toward a short horizon 
inherent in annual budgeting cycles, bias toward rewarding financial performance, and 
bias toward the power structure in allocating resources.  Three of these biasing 
mechanisms are integral to the financial organization.  The other two are closely related 
to their power base.    
 Senior executives with financial backgrounds are intensively involved in the 
quarterly, public reporting of results, which are believed to drive short-term swings in 
stock prices (Cornell, 2001).  Such a heavy emphasis and continuous exposure to short-
term financial measures can be expected to have an enduring influence on those most 
responsible for preparing and explaining the “numbers” (Loescher, 1984; Nolan, 2002).  
If a high number of powerful members of the TMT (including the CEO and board 
chairman) have extensive financial backgrounds, it is more likely that the firm will 
emphasize financial mechanisms, which may then contribute to higher levels of temporal 
myopia.  The financial experience measurement is the number of TMT members with a 
financial or accounting background (experience and education) out of the five highest 
paid executives reported in SEC filings.   
Accounting Manipulation (also called earnings management) is an important 
indicator of temporal myopia taken from the accounting literature.  It reflects 
management behavior in propping up short-term results.  The types of actions considered 
described as accounting manipulation generally involve the recording of assets or 
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liabilities rather than expenses, accelerating revenue or profit making entries, or 
disguising accounting transactions to improve current financial reports (Beneish, 1999; 
Dechow et al., 1996).  Accounting manipulations are likely to have a negative impact on 
firms in the future in a number of ways, all with depressing effects on stock prices 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Hall, 2001).  The first is that the population of accounting 
transactions that can be manipulated eventually dries up, and the firm may be unable to 
sustain an inflated revenue or profit growth rate.  A second problem is that manipulations 
may have to be reversed in the future, either because of timing or audit pressure.  A third 
and more serious issue is that accounting manipulations can lead to negative media 
reports, sanctions, and even criminal charges against the company and its officers.   All 
have the potential for negative, if not disastrous, impacts on share value.   
One of the most important and easily measured statistics identified in this stream 
of literature is accrual inflation.  Beneish (1997) found accrual levels to be significantly 
associated with GAAP violations.  Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) found a direct 
relationship between accrual inflation and subsequent earnings declines in firms subject 
to SEC enforcement actions.  Balsam (1998) tied manipulation of discretionary accruals 
to self-serving actions of managers.   Chan and associates (Chan, Jegadeesh, & 
Sougianni, 2004) report empirical support for accrual inflation as an indicator of 
manipulation (e.g., Sloan, 1996; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998).  As a major form of 
short-term manipulation, accrual inflation is included as a measure of temporal myopia.   
The Dechow and associates’ (1996) calculation is used to determine accrual inflation:  
Accrual inflation = (change in current assets – change in current liabilities  – 
change in cash/cash equivalents  + change in debt included in current liabilities  
– depreciation and amortization expense)/ lagging assets 
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Hubris 
Following the lead of Hayward and Hambrick (1997), the term hubris is defined 
as exaggerated pride or self-confidence, and is applied to managers who highly estimate 
their ability to make and carry out strategic decisions.    This definition of hubris is 
compatible with the concept of over-confidence, which has been discussed as extreme 
optimism, the tendency to ignore additional information, under-estimation of uncertainty, 
and a focus on action without rational support (e.g., Bazerman, 1994; Busenitz et al., 
1997; Fischoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977).  Hubris represents an extreme form of 
failure myopia, which is most likely to lead senior managers, particularly CEOs, into 
significant errors that have major negative impacts on the firm.    
For the measurement of hubris, this study begins with the proxies developed by 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997), media praise and CEO relative compensation.  Hayward 
and Hambrick selected these measures as contributors to CEO hubris, and found a 
relationship between these proxies for hubris and loss of value for acquiring firms.  
Media Praise for the CEO, following Hayward and Hambrick’s (1997) approach, 
is identified through content analysis of media reports for the 1998-2000 base period.   
These authors argue that hubris is “most likely activated by favorable press” (Hayward et 
al., 1997: 113).   The propensity of the media to romanticize the heroic nature of highly 
visible CEOs has been documented by other scholars (Chen & Meindl, 1991; Meindl, 
Erlich, & Dukerich, 1985).  It is also quite likely that hubris may lead CEOs to seek 
celebrity through media attention (Finkelstein, 2004; Hayward et al., 2004), reinforcing 
attributions of the CEO and others in the organization (Cameron et al., 1983) and further 
concentrating power (Pfeffer, 1981).  Media praise is identified in the attribution of 
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organizational outcomes to CEOs or other comments about CEO performance by 
members of the media.  Each media report is coded on a six-point scale from 
“unequivocally favorable” to “unequivocally unfavorable”.  Articles were identified in a 
thorough review of the Dow Jones Factiva database for magazines and newspapers.  A 
comparison of Factiva to Lexis/Nexis and ABI inform indicate that Factiva was more 
complete than the other two sources.  Comments by the CEO or reports of actions taken 
by the CEO or the company are not included in this measure.   
CEO relative compensation is the second measure taken from the Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) study.  The difference between the cash compensation of the CEO 
compared to the second-highest-paid officer (calculated as a ratio) is a measure of the 
CEOs self-importance.  CEOs have substantial influence over their own pay and that of 
senior level managers in the organization (Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989).  A substantial 
gap may reflect an inflated self-image by the CEO, which is consistent with hubris.  
Company proxy statements provide information on the five highest compensated 
executives in each firm.   
Personal Statements of the CEO in letters to shareholders is a new measure of 
hubris suggested by Finkelstein’s (2004) study of CEO failure.  CEOs who consider the 
company their own private domain may mix company and private interests and concepts.  
CEOs who identify closely with the firm may consider it an extension of themselves and 
lead the firm into high risk decisions that appeal to the CEO’s ego (Hayward et al., 2004).  
One way that CEOs communicate this phenomenon is in personal attributions, the use of 
the first-person “I”, and comments about personal activities or actions in letters to 
shareholders.  Personal Identification with the company is calculated by a simple count of 
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the number of sentences that include personal attribution, the use of the first person “I”, 
or the comments about personal activities.   The cumulative number of statements that 
include personal references to the CEO were counted and accumulated for the three 
letters (1998-2000), calculated as a ratio of total statements in those letters.   
Dependent Variables  
 The rate of change for firm growth (normalized to account for industry effects) in 
revenues, profits and ROA are three outcome variables employed to represent value 
destruction in this study.  Each of these measures addresses deterioration of value at the 
firm level.   Sales change, a measure of market value, is a prime indicator of a firm’s 
ability to meet market expectations and compete effectively (Porter, 1980).  Net income 
change is a function of both sales growth and firm efficiency in delivering products and 
services (Bowman et al., 2000; Kaplan & Norton, 1996), reflecting both the firms ability 
to create value and capture value inside the firm.  ROA change combines the impact of 
profit changes and efficiency of investment.  Each variable is measured and evaluated 
individually.     
COMPUSTAT reports corporate revenue, operating profit, and ROA, which 
provide comprehensive industry level data for public firms included in the data base.     
COMPUSTAT files provided information on all U.S. companies with target industry SIC 
codes.  The data for each company was accumulated by SIC code and then incorporated 
into an industry category.  Sales change and net income change data have been adjusted 
to eliminate the impact of abnormal acquisition activity, employing company SEC reports 
available on the EDGAR database.      
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Control Variables 
 Control variables frequently employed in strategic management studies that 
include financial performance are industry, size and prior performance.  Control for 
industry was accomplished by employing within industry Z-scores for independent and 
dependent variables.   Firm size is measured in terms of average revenue for the base 
period, 1998-2000.   The effect of prior performance is accounted for by including 
average ROA from the base period.   In order to account for changes in leadership of 
firms and potential impact on future strategic decisions, CEO change was coded as a 
control variable.   
 
Data Analysis Techniques  
Correlation Analysis and Factor Analysis 
 One of the objectives of the study is to evaluate three sets of variables, each set 
including variables expected to represent spatial myopia, temporal myopia or hubris.  
These variables were selected from different streams of literature to provide multiple 
measures for comparison purposes.  The extent to which they tap into or contribute to 
similar constructs should be reflected in at least moderate correlations and similar loading 
patterns in factor analysis.   
 These techniques are not the primary empirical focus of the research, but are 
expected to provide some insight into the relevance and relationships among the variables 
representing each of the three types of myopia.  
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Regression Analysis  
 Direct effects of the relationship between the three management myopias are 
tested through regression analysis, followed by a regression analysis of the interaction of 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
This chapter includes the methods of analysis and results of the research outlined 
in chapter III.  It is presented in four sections: descriptive information for the sample 
data, statistical tests related to assumptions in linear regression, correlation and factor 
analyses for each type of myopia, and a review of the results relative to the hypotheses 
presented in chapter III.   
 
Sample Data 
 To address the general questions of this study, data was obtained from multiple 
sources for 103 firms from 10 different industries.  Data for independent variables was 
collected for the base period, 1998 to 2000; data for the dependent variables spanned the 
subsequent three years (the outcome period), 2001-2003.  The sample consisted of 103 
firms; 55 firms from 6 industries representing higher growth environments (annual 
industry sales increases of 8.4% to 14.5%), and 48 firms from 4 industries representing 
lower growth environments (annual industry sales increases of 3.1% to 4.9%).   
Industries were selected that evidenced a consistent pattern of growth from 1997-
2000 and included at least 5 firms that operated independently throughout the six year 
period from 1998 through 2003.  The criteria for selection of firms within industries 
required that revenue exceeded $1 billion dollars, that the primary 4-digit SIC code was 
identical, and that more than 50% of sales had the same 2-digit SIC code. 
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The three types of variables included in the study (identified in chapter III) are 
cognitive, top management team (TMT) characteristics, and financial information.   
Sources for cognitive variables included letters to shareholders and media reports.   The 
sources for TMT characteristics included periodicals, company reports and media reports.  
COMPUSTAT was a primary source of financial data; however, this source was 
augmented by a review of company records relative to line of business (LOB) data, sales 
and net earnings, and accrual inflation data.  The company records acted as a check 
against the accuracy of the data and provided missing data.  A thorough review of 10-Ks 
and annual reports was essential in eliminating the impact of major acquisitions for two 
dependent variables, sales change and net income change.   
Each letter to shareholders was analyzed and coded by two individuals, the author 
and one of four individuals with work experience and post-graduate education.  Each 
coder was provided extensive training and a manual for determining each of the codes, 
including a set of letters in which their coding was not included in the data set.  For every 
letter, differences between coders were reconciled and a mutual decision made in the 
final coding.  Agreement between the author and four independent coders for all variables 
(prior to discussion and reconciliation) in the letters ranged from 85% to 92% for the four 
coders.  The total level of agreement for each variable prior to joint review and 
reconciliation is identified below:  
♦ Short-term orientation = 88% 
♦ Focus orientation = 91% 
♦ Financial emphasis = 94% 
♦ Defensive external orientation = 86% 
♦ Defensive internal orientation = 85% 
♦ Personal references = 99% 
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In over 99% of the cases the coders agreed upon the final classification.  In the 
few instances where the coders could not agree, the statement was excluded from the 
coding.  This level of agreement compares favorably to studies that employed the similar 
variables and data collection techniques (e.g., Clapham et al., 1991; Hayward et al., 
1997).   
The collection of the media praise variable followed the procedures employed by 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997). This procedure involved a search of the Dow Jones 
Factiva database between 1998 and 2000, using a scale ranging from 3 points for an 
article that was unequivocally favorable to the CEO, to -2 points for articles that were 
unequivocally negative about the CEO.  The 57 CEO’s who received no favorable or 
unfavorable press reports were given zero points.   The percentage of zero codes for 
media praise found in this sample is similar to the Hayward and Hambrick (1997) study. 
Each of the 162 articles were selected and analyzed by the author and four business major 
seniors who had work experience, and had completed a strategic management course.   
The level of agreement prior to review ranged from 89% to 95% percent, averaging 91% 
for all coders.  Subsequent joint review by the two coders resulted in full agreement on 
the score for all media praise articles, consistent with similar prior studies (e.g., Hayward 
& Hambrick, 1997).   
 The top management team (TMT) is defined as the five highest paid executives in 
the corporation (Carpenter, Pollock & Leary, 2003; Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 
2004), representing the dominant coalition of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963).  The list 
of TMT members, executive pay and company tenure was collected from SEC reports 
(EDGAR data base).   Data on functional background was collected from company proxy 
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statements, Who’s Who in Finance & Industry, Standard & Poor’s Registry of Corporate 
Directors and Executives, Hoover’s, and two on-line media report data bases (FACTIVA 
& ZoomInfo) . 
 COMPUSTAT provided the initial set of data for two behavioral independent 
variables, line-of-business (LOB) concentration and accrual inflation.   The 
COMPUSTAT data was supplemented by reviews of 10-Ks and annual reports for 
missing and contradictory data.   This was particularly critical for LOB data, in that a 
change in reporting procedure has lead to a number of errors in COMPUSTAT data.   
The construct, value creation, is represented by three dependent variables, sales 
change, net income change and ROA change.  As noted in chapter III, Sales growth is a 
prime indicator of a firm’s ability to meet market expectations and compete effectively 
(Porter, 1980).  Profit growth is a function of both sales growth and operational 
efficiency in delivering products and services (Bowman et al., 2000; Kaplan et al., 1996).  
Company SEC and annual reports supplemented COMPUSTAT data.  The use of restated 
data was essential to eliminate changes due solely to merger/acquisition activity in order 
that the rate of change information reflected performance and value creation/destruction.  
Company records of significant acquisitions and restatements were the sole criteria 
employed in determining whether or not the restatement was necessary.   
The third dependent variable, change in return on assets (ROA change), is frequently 
employed in the study of firm performance (e.g., Lenz 1980; Venkatraman & 
Ramanujam 1986).  Below average ROA change represents value destruction in terms of 
operational and asset efficiency.  It does not require restatement for acquisition activity.   
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In order to eliminate the impact of industry differences, all variables (except one 
control variable, CEO change, and the moderation variable, industry growth rate) were 
normalized and Z scores calculated within each industry.   
 The sample size of 103 firms is similar to studies employing content analysis 
because of the substantial amount of time it takes to record, code and analyze the data.  
Consistent with similar studies (e.g., Barker et al., 2002; Barker, et al., 1996; Hayward, et 
al., 1997) and the exploratory nature of this study, relationships were tested at the .10 




Linearity in the relationship between each independent variable is a critical 
assumption for linear regression analysis.  The partial regression plots for each 
independent variable were evaluated for each regression analysis.  No curvilinear or non-
linear pattern was evident in any of the variables.    
Constant variance of the error term (homoscedasticity) 
Plotting the residuals (studentized) against the predicted values (Zpred) and 
comparing them to the null plots show no distinct pattern for any of the regression 
equations.   For several models tested, the form of the scatter plot was somewhat 
compressed horizontally, but did not form into a pattern that would indicate significant 
heteroscedasticity.  Two models with net income as the dependent variable evidenced 
some compression, those with  temporal myopia variables and hubris variables.    
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Independence of the error terms (uncorrelated) 
 The scatter plots for each regression analysis indicated no issues relative to 
correlated errors.  The Durbin-Watson statistic was calculated for each regression 
analysis.  This statistic is within the acceptable range (1.75-2.25) for all models, 
indicating that the error terms were independent.     
Normality of the error term distribution 
Normal probability plots of residuals (P-P test) for each regression analysis indicate 
little deviation from the normal distribution represented by a straight diagonal line for all 
models.  Where deviations are observed, the residual plots run close to the diagonal line, 
and vary above and below the line.  The plot of residuals for models assessing 
relationships to the sales change dependent variable show more of residual plot falling 
below the normal distribution diagonal.  These residual plots are very close to the 
diagonal, indicating a mild skewness.  Although departures from normality are of some 
concern, the regression technique is robust to violations of normality.       
Outliers 
 Scatter plots for the dependent variables indicated the potential for at least one 
problem outlier for each set of regression analyses.  Studentized residuals greater than 3.0 
indicated the potential for issues with case #13 for the sales change analyses, case # 82 
for the net income change analyses, and case # 24 for ROA change.  Cook’s D indicated 
only one case that was clearly exceptional – case #24 for ROA change.  No unusual cases 
were identified employing DFBETA.  All three outliers are extreme cases, and did not 
involve any data errors.   
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 Each analysis was evaluated including and excluding each of the potential 
outliers.  There was no major difference in the results.  Consequently, all observations 
were included in the regression analyses.     
Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity was evaluated in three ways.  An examination of the correlation 
matrix for the independent variables indicates no high correlations (i.e., .90 and above) – 
the highest correlation found was .34.   The tolerance analysis confirms this with statistics 
for all independent variables well above the .10 level (multicollinearity is suggested when 
the tolerance statistic is below .10).  Similarly, all variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics 
are well below the value of 10 (levels above this indicate multicollinearity).   
Ideally, each of the sets of myopia variables will show a significant correlation, 
but that correlation will not be extremely high (e.g., .90 or above).  While there are no 
issues with multicollinearity, the variables in each set indicated disagreement even in sign 
(positive/ negative).  The implications are that those variables that are not in substantial 
agreement may not represent proxies for constructs suggested by the literature, or that the 
myopia concepts are not fully consistent with related constructs (e.g., spatial myopia and 
inertia/commitment to the status quo).  Each set of myopia variables are reviewed relative 
to correlation tables below.   
 
Review of Correlations 
 As noted in chapter III, this is the first study to develop clear definitions and to 
operationalized the three forms of myopia (spatial, temporal and hubris) identified by 
Levinthal and March (1993).  The variables chosen to operationalize these variables were 
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identified in detail in chapter III, and were described as individual variables that may 
contribute to or act as proxies for each of the three types of myopia.  The expectation was 
that the different variables representing three different lenses (management cognitions, 
TMT characteristics and financial data) would provide multiple ways to operationalize 
the construct. 
 The evaluation of these variables as representing or contributing to three single 
and individual constructs is accomplished primarily through the review of correlations 
among variables representing each construct.  Although not a strict test of content 
validity, significant correlations would provide support for the variables representing or 
contributing to a single construct.   The results of exploratory factor analysis and 
regression analysis presented in the next sections of this chapter supplement the 
correlation review.        
Spatial Myopia Correlations 
 As noted in chapter III, spatial myopia is defined as the lack of awareness, or the 
denial of utility of technologies, processes, routines and markets that are not central to the 
existing operations of the firm.  It can be expected to limit the set of alternatives 
considered for implementation, and is consistent with a focus on dominant technologies, 
core competencies, and the exploitation and development of existing firm capabilities, 
regardless of the time frame for financial payoff.  Spatial myopia is represented by 
extreme focus on current markets, technologies and administrative structures.    
 The variables chosen to operationalize spatial myopia include three cognitive 
measures derived from letters to shareholders (focus orientation, defensive internal 
attribution and defensive external orientation), two TMT characteristics (average TMT 
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tenure with the firm and TMT tenure homogeneity), and one financial measure of focus 
(line-of-business concentration).   The correlation matrix presented in table 7, includes 
the three dependent variables (1-3), three control variables (4-6), and the six spatial 
myopia variables (7-12).    
Table 7 
 
Correlations – Spatial Myopia 
 
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Sales change             
2. Net Income 
change 
     
0.32***      
     
3. ROA change 
 
0.07 
    
0.58***     
     
4. Firm Size  
    -
0.32*** -0.12 -0.14    
     
5. CEO Change 
    -
0.22** -0.13 0.04 0.10   
     
6. ROABASE 
 
    0.26** 0.07 
    -
0.39*** 
   
0.22** -0.11  
     
7. Focus orientation 
 
-0.08 -0.13 -0.06 
   
0.20** 0.16 -0.03 




  -0.19* -0.03 -0.09 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 
-
0.18* 




-0.14 -0.07 0.16* -0.10 0.12 
  -
0.22** -0.01 0.11 
   
10. Average Firm 
Tenure 
    -
0.32*** 0.03 0.09 
    




11. Homogeneity -- 
firm tenure 
 
0.04 0.12 0.02 0.11 
   -
0.21** 0.12 -0.13 -0.01 -0.11 
    
0.34*** 
 
12. LOB   
Concentration 
 
-0.11 0.01 0.01 -0.07 
   





Correlation significance levels (2-tailed):    .01 ***,   .05 **, .10 * 
N = 103 
 
 A comparison of the correlations among the spatial myopia variables (table 7) 
indicates some level of agreement in sign for defensive external attribution, defensive 
internal attribution, firm tenure, and tenure homogeneity, but only three relationships (out 
of a possible fifteen) that yield significant correlations.  Twelve correlations are not.  
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With only three significant correlations out of a possible fifteen correlations, there is little 
evidence that the six spatial myopia variables converge on a single construct.  
A review of the relationships of each of the three “spatial myopia” variables with 
the three dependent variables similarly provides little support for the six variables 
representing or contributing to a single construct.  Correlations of spatial myopia 
variables with the dependent variable sales change are generally negative (as predicted); 
however, only two variables are significantly correlated with sales change, defensive 
external orientation and average firm tenure.  None of the correlations with the dependent 
variable net income change are significant, a consistent pattern for most analyses 
including this dependent variable.  Only the correlation of defensive internal attribution 
and ROA is significant.      
Temporal Myopia Correlations 
 As defined in chapter III, temporal myopia is the lack of awareness of, or interest 
in opportunities and investments beyond the near term (Levinthal & March, 1993; Miller, 
2002).   It involves sacrificing the long run for the short term (Laverty, 1996).  Temporal 
myopia will often be reflected in a preference for low risk, near term, relatively certain 
ventures and projects.  The primary indicators of temporal bias are heavy emphasis on 
short-term financial results, cost-cutting and short horizon investments.    
 The variables expected to operationalize the construct temporal myopia include 
two new cognitive measures (short-term strategic orientation and financial emphasis in 
letters to shareholders), one TMT characteristic (financial functional background), and 
one financial measure (accrual inflation).  Table 8 provides correlations for these 
variables (7-10), the three dependent variables (1-3) and three control variables (4-6).   
   
















1. Sales change 
 
      
   
2. Net income change    0.32         
3. ROA change 
 
  0.07 
    
0.58***     
   
4. Firm size  
    - 
0.32*** -0.12 -0.14    
   
5. CEO change   -0.22** -0.13 0.04 0.10      
6. ROABASE 
 
0.26**  0.07 
    -
0.39***     0.22** -0.11  
   
7. Short-term   orientation   -0.01 -0.03 0.14 -0.14 -0.06   -0.21**    
8. Financial emphasis   -0.03 0.11 0.14 -0.01 -0.11 0.16 -0.09   
9. Financial background    0.16    0.21** -0.01 0.04 0.06    0.25** -0.03 -0.08  
10. Accrual  inflation    0.12 0.14 0.03 
   -
0.22** 0.01 0.02 -0.13 0.01 0.18* 
 
Correlation significance levels (2-tailed):    .01 ***,   .05 **, .10 * 
N=103 
 
The correlations among the temporal myopia variables are fairly low, with only  
the correlation between financial background and accrual inflation achieving significance 
(r = .18, p < .10).  Only one of the correlations between the temporal myopia variables 
and the dependent variables was significant (financial background and net income 
change).   There is no evidence that these variables represent or are highly related to a 
single construct.   
Hubris Correlations 
Hubris is defined as exaggerated pride or self-confidence (Hayward & Hambrick, 
1997), and is applied to managers who highly estimate their ability to make and carry out 
strategic decisions.    Hubris represents an extreme form of failure myopia, which is most 
likely to lead senior managers, particularly CEOs, into significant errors that have major 
negative impacts on the firm.    
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 Two of the variables (media praise and CEO relative pay) were introduced by 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997).   A third variable was derived from letters to 
shareholders capturing personal references by the CEO in letters.   
Table 9 
 
Correlations – Hubris 
 
Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Sales change          
2. Net Income change      0.32***        
3. ROA change  0.07     0.58***       
4. Firm size (sales)     -0.32*** -0.12 -0.14      
5. CEO change 98-00     -0.22** -0.13 0.04 0.10     
6. ROA: base period     0.26**   0.07   -0.39***    0.22** -0.11    
7. Media praise    0.18* -0.08 -0.16 0.12 0.10 0.01   
8. Personal references  0.02 -0.09 0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 
      
0.21**  
9. CEO  relative pay  -0.06  0.22 0.12 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.15 
Correlation significance levels (2-tailed):    .01 ***,   .05 **, .10 *      
N = 103          
 
With the exception of a moderate correlation for media praise and personal 
references (.21, p < .05), the correlations among the three hubris variables were small and 
not significant (Table 9).   The correlation (r = .18; p < .10) between media praise and 
sales change is positive.   
There is no indication that these three variables represent a single construct.   
 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 The independent variables selected for this study have been employed as proxies 
for managerial cognition (e.g., TMT characteristics and statements in letters to 
shareholders), as contributors to bias/myopia (e.g., media praise and CEO relative 
compensation), or as behaviors consistent with myopic perspectives (e.g., accrual 
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manipulation and line of business concentration).  They were chosen to provide multiple 
types of measures for operationalizing the myopia constructs.  The exploratory factor 
analysis supplements the correlation analysis in assessing similarities among variables 
chosen for each of the three types of myopia.  It may provide information about 
relationships not otherwise identified in the correlation analysis.       
 Consistent with the correlation findings, the results of the exploratory factor 
analysis, no evidence that the three sets of variables represent distinct constructs.   
 Thirteen variables were entered into the factor analysis, representing the three 
types of myopia (six spatial, four temporal and three hubris).  Both orthogonal (Varimax) 
and oblique (Promax, & Oblimin) rotations were applied to the data, with similar results 
for all techniques.  The data shown reflects the Promax rotation.   
The number of factors suggested by the review of literature and theory 
development is three; however, five factors yielded eigen values above 1.0.  The Scree 
plot shows a break after 3 factors, but only 38% of the variance is explained, clearly 
inadequate (5 factors explains only 56% of the variance compared to a recommendation 
of at least 60%).  The sample passes the Bartlett’s test of sphericity, confirming the 
existence of non-zero correlations; however the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy of .48 is well below the recommended level of .7 to .8 (indicating a 
marginal degree of correlation).  Only one variable met the .50 guideline for 
communalities extraction for the 3 factor analysis.   The anti-correlation matrix diagonals 
range from a low of .36 (accrual inflation) to a high of .61 (media praise), indicating 
several marginal variables as well.   Overall, this information provides little evidence of 
any level of common underlying component.    
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Figure 5 













 The pattern matrix shown in table 10 employs the theoretically derived three 
factor solution.  A detailed analysis of different numbers of factors was completed by the 
author.  None of the analyses provides any contribution beyond the three factor solution, 
which is shown below.   
 In the three factor solution, the six spatial variables load on three different factors 
in this solution, as do the four temporal variables.  The three hubris variables load on two 
of the factors.    
The loading patterns indicate a lack of common relationships among the sets of 
variables, and some relationship that operate across the different sets.  The lack of 
relationships is, in part, due to the difficulty in using factor analysis with secondary data; 
however, the results provide additional evidence that cognitive measures and TMT 
characteristics may not indicate simple myopic perspectives, or lead to simple behavioral 
patterns.   
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An observation that may be of some interest is in the possible impact of the 
different “lenses” used in this study to capture myopia.  As noted in table 10, the 
variables for each construct load on all 3 components in the factor analysis.  If the 
variables truly reflected a single construct, each set of variables would converge on a 
single component.  A possible explanation is that the different lenses affect the 
relationships among the variables.  There may be some similarities in the underlying 
concept within a set of variables, but the different lenses may contribute to a second level 
of underlying relationships.   
Table 10 
Factor Analysis Pattern Matrix 
 Component  
 1 2 3 
Spatial Variables    
Focus orientation  -0.55   
External attribution  0.49   
Internal attribution  0.52   
Firm tenure (avg) 0.61     
Tenure homogeneity 0.52     
LOB concentration    0.55 
Temporal Variables    
Short-term orientation  0.68   
Financial emphasis 0.50     
TMT finance background  -0.33 0.60 
Accrual Inflation 0.34   0.47 
Hubris Variables    
Media praise -0.61   -0.26 
Personal statements -0.61     
CEO relative pay    0.58 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
The lack of statistical support for employing factor analysis suggests that any 
interpretation of the matrix in table 10 can be problematic.  The regression analysis in the 
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following section provides more meaningful information for the relationships between 
individual independent variables and the three dependent variables.   
 
Hypothesis Tests 
Six hypothesis tests are analyzed in multiple regression analyses.  These tests 
provide information about the relationships of the independent variables and the three 
dependent variables.    
The analysis is organized, first, by type of myopia, beginning with spatial myopia 
followed by temporal myopia and hubris.  Each type of myopia is operationalized as 
multiple variables representing each construct as identified in chapter III.  Each 
hypothesis is tested in linear regression analysis for the three dependent variables, sales 
change, net income change, and ROA change.     
Interaction effects are then tested relative to the moderator, industry growth for 
each type of myopia.  Consistent with the hypotheses 4, 5, and 6, interaction effects are 
explained in terms of higher and lower growth industries.            
Hypothesis 1 and 4:  Spatial Myopia Variables 
As presented in chapter III, spatial myopia is operationalized with six variables, 
focus orientation, defensive external attribution, defensive internal attribution, TMT 
tenure, TMT homogeneity and line-of-business concentration.   These variables are 
evaluated in separate regression analyses for each of the three dependent variables to test 
hypothesis 1, which posits that spatial myopia will be related to value destruction in 
terms of lower than average changes in sales, net income and return on assets (ROA).    
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H1: High levels of CEO spatial myopia will be significantly and positively related to 
value destruction at the firm level.   
 
Hypothesis 4 incorporates the moderating effect of industry growth rate.  The 
relationship between spatial myopia and value destruction will be stronger in lower 
growth industries.  This moderation hypothesis will be tested for each of the six 
independent variables for each of the three dependent variables.    
H4: The relationship between spatial myopia and value destruction will be stronger in 
lower growth industries than in higher growth industries.     
Spatial Myopia Variables and Sales Change 
 Biases associated with spatial myopia (excessive focus on the current business 
model and mode of operation) will affect the judgment and strategic decisions of the 
executives in the dominant coalition.   Hypothesis 1 is first tested with sales change as the 
dependent variable, with a negative relationship posited for each of the six independent 
variables.    
As shown in table 10, control variables (firm size, CEO change, and base period 
ROA) account for 24% of the variance explained (model 1a).  Firm size is negatively 
related to sales change; base period ROA is positively related to sales change (p < .01 for 
both).  In order to account for the possible impact of the former CEO being replaced, 
CEO change was included in the set of control variables, significant in this model at the 
.10 level.  These three control variables were included in all models.   
After accounting for control variables, six variables representing spatial myopia 
were introduced into the model (1b) with a total variance explained of .344 (p < .001), an 
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R2 change of .123.   Average firm tenure is significantly and negatively related to sales 
change (p < .001), providing some support for H1.  Average firm tenure, as a potential 
contributor to spatial myopia, is associated with below average sales change.    
The five other variables (focus orientation, external defensive attribution, internal 
defensive attribution, TMT tenure homogeneity, and LOB concentration), expected to 
reflect or contribute to spatial myopia, produced no significant relationship with sales 
change, in model 1b.     
Table 11 
 
Spatial Myopia IVs; Sales Change DV: Regression Analysis 
 
Coeffiicients & Standard errors      
  Model 1a  Model 1b  
(Constant)  0.044  0.042  
  0.087  0.084  
CEO change 98-00  -0.501 * -0.480  
  0.299  0.306  
Firm size (sales) -0.380 *** -0.288 *** 
  0.091  0.098  
ROA: base period  0.326 *** 0.318 *** 
  0.091  0.089  
Focus orientation    -0.044  
    0.091  
External attribution   -0.129  
    0.090  
Internal attribution    0.000  
    0.091  
Firm tenure (avg)    -0.300 *** 
    0.103  
Tenure homogeneity   -0.079  
    0.088  
LOB concentration   0.098  
    0.093  
      
Model R square  0.241 *** 0.344 *** 
All Industries: N = 103     
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01    A6  
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Interaction Analysis: No interaction effects for the six spatial myopia variables 
and industry growth rates were found relative to sales growth (table 12). 
Table 12 
 









Focus x Ind growth -1.628 1.959    0.349*** 0.005 
DEA x Ind growth 1.239 1.929    0.347*** 0.003 
DIA x Ind growth  0.337 1.912    0.344*** 0.000 
Tenure x Ind growth -2.219 1.895    0.354*** 0.01 
Homogeneity(ten) x Ind gr 1.53 1.939    0.349*** 0.004 
LOB concentration x Ind gr -2.75 1.881    0.359*** 0.015 
      * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   
 
In that no interactions were significant, the negative direct effect of average 
tenure is the only finding linking spatial myopia to value destruction, measured in terms 
of sales change.  Longer average tenure of the top five executives in the organization is 
related to below average sales change levels.   The sales change regression analysis 
provides limited support for hypothesis 1 in the negative relationship between tenure and 
sales change.  There is no support for the moderation effect posited in hypothesis 4. 
The absence of significant relationships for five of six “spatial myopia” variables 
reinforces the observations from the correlation review.  There is no evidence that these 
six variables, as a group, contribute to or represent the same construct.   
Spatial Myopia & Net Income Change 
Hypothesis 1 posits that the relationship between each of the six myopia variables 
and net income change will be negative.   
For the net income change regression analysis, the level of variance explained by 
the control variables was very small (.034), with none of the control variables achieving 
significance.  This lack of significance for these control variables is unusual, considering 
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that firm size and prior profitability have been empirically related to performance in other 
strategic management studies.   
The regression model including spatial myopia variables (table 13) with net 
income change as the dependent variable did not achieve a significant R2 (.057) when all 
variables were entered (model 3b).   
The lack of any significant relationship provides no evidence of a relationship 
between any of the spatial myopia variables and value destruction in terms of net income 
change.   There is no support for hypothesis 1.   
Table 13 
 
Spatial Myopia IVs; Net Income Change DV: Regression Analysis 
 
Coefficients & Std Errors     
  Model 2a  Model 2  
(Constant)  0.030  0.020  
  0.098  0.101  
Firm size (sales) -0.132  -0.140  
  0.102  0.117  
CEO change 98-00 -0.342  -0.233  
  0.337  0.367  
ROA: base period 0.091  0.070  
  0.102  0.107  
Focus orientation   -0.082  
    0.109  
External attribution   -0.052  
    0.108  
Internal attribution   -0.055  
    0.109  
Firm tenure (avg)   0.040  
    0.124  
Tenure homogeneity   0.077  
    0.112  
LOB concentration   0.041  
    0.106  
      
Model R square  0.035  0.057  
All Industries: N = 103     
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01      
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Interaction Analysis: As presented in table 14, none of the regression models 
employing net income change as the dependent variable and interactions for the six 6 
spatial myopia variables produced a significant interaction term.   This analysis provides 
no support for hypothesis 4.   
Table 14 
 











Focus x Ind growth -4.033* 2.317 0.087  0.030* 
DEA x Ind growth 0.847 2.317 0.058 0.001 
DIA x Ind growth -2.612 2.276 0.070 0.013 
Tenure x Ind growth -2.346 2.277 0.068 0.011 
Homogeneity(ten) x Ind gr 3.435 2.306 0.079 0.022 
LOB concentration x Ind gr -1.196 2.279 0.060 0.003 
    * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   
 
The net income change variable measurement may be problematic.  Very small 
positive and negative net income levels in the base period create some very large or 
unusual change ratios relative to the outcome period.    
An indication of this problem is that none of the control variables evidenced any 
relationship with net income as the dependent variable.  The control variables are the 
same for the models testing the temporal myopia and hubris models (which follow in the 
next few pages).  This lack of significant relationships occurs only when net income 
change is the dependent variable.     The relationship between spatial myopia and value 
destruction in terms of profitability may be more meaningfully addressed with return on 
assets as the dependent variable.     
Spatial Myopia & ROA Change 
Hypothesis 1 posits a negative relationship between the six spatial myopia 
variables and ROA change.   
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Control variables (model 3a) account for 15% of the variance explained with 
ROA change as the dependent variable.  Model 3a achieved significance at the .01 level, 
primarily due to a strong negative relationship between base period ROA and ROA 
change.      
Table 15 
 
Spatial Myopia IVs; ROA Change DV: Regression Analysis 
 
Coefficients & Std Errors     
  Model 3a  Model 3b  
(Constant)  0.000  -0.013  
  0.092  0.093  
Firm size (sales) -0.053  -0.110  
  0.096  0.107  
CEO change 98-00 -0.003  0.146  
  0.316  0.337  
ROA: base period -0.375 *** -0.379 *** 
  0.096  0.098  
Focus orientation   -0.053  
    0.100  
External attribution   -0.159  
    0.100  
Internal attribution   0.054  
    0.100  
Firm tenure (avg)   0.180  
    0.113  
Tenure homogeneity   0.020  
    0.103  
LOB concentration   -0.026  
    0.097  
      
Model R square  0.152 *** 0.205 *** 
All Industries: N = 103    
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01      
 
The spatial myopia variables were entered in model 3b, yielding an R2 of .207 
(table 15).  The overall model is significant at the .01 level.  Although the regression 
model including the spatial myopia was still significant, the R2 change was modest (.05).  
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None of the spatial myopia variables were significantly related to ROA change in model 
3a.   A number of interactions were, however, significant.   
Interaction Analysis: An interaction for each spatial myopia variable with industry 
growth rate was entered individually into model 3 with ROA change as the dependent 
variable.  Significant interaction effects between each of three spatial myopia variables 
(focus orientation, internal attribution and tenure homogeneity) and industry growth rate 
were identified in the moderation models (table 16).   
Table 16 
 






Error R2 R2 change 
Focus x Ind growth  -3.814* 2.213  0.232***  0.027* 
Ext Attribution x Ind growth  0.448 2.129 0.205** 0.000 
Int attribution x Ind growth   -4.701** 2.047  0.248***   0.044** 
Tenure x Ind growth -0.989 2.100 0.207** 0.002 
Homogeneity(ten) x Ind gr    4.239** 2.096  0.239***   0.034** 
LOB concentration x Ind gr -2.868 2.074 0.221** 0.016 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   
 
The interaction between industry growth and tenure homogeneity is consistent 
with hypothesis 4 -- homogenous TMTs can be expected to exhibit spatial myopia by 
limiting aggressive action and profitability to a greater extent in lower growth industries 
than in higher growth industries.   However, the interactions involving focus orientation 
and defensive internal attribution variables provide contradictory results.  Focus 
orientation evidences a stronger negative relationship with ROA change in higher growth 
industries than in lower growth industries.   Defensive internal attribution is related to 
above average ROA change in lower growth industries, potentially contributing to value 
enhancement rather than value destruction.   These results are discussed in greater depth 
in separate regression analyses for higher and lower growth industries, noted below.   
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No significant interactions were found for the other three spatial myopia variables 
– average tenure, external attribution, and LOB concentration.   
Comparison of Low and High Growth Industries 
Hypothesis 4 predicts a stronger relationship for spatial myopia variables and 
ROA change in lower growth industries than in higher growth industries.   In order to 
clarify and explore the effects identified in the interaction models noted above, separate 
regression analyses were evaluated for high growth and low growth industries (table 17).   
With only the control variables entered, R2 (.248) was significant at the .01 level 
for the higher growth industries (model 3.2a), but R2 (.124) was not significant for the 
lower growth industries (model 3.1a).  Base period ROA was the only significant control 
variable, with a negative relationship to ROA change in both higher growth (p < .01) and 
lower growth (p < .05), industries, indicating a consistent relationship regardless of 
industry growth pattern.    
R2 for high and low growth samples (.361 and .403, respectively) was significant 
at the .01 level when the spatial myopia variables were entered into the model, yielding 
significant R2 change for both high and low growth firms.  The spatial myopia variables 
enhance the explanation of differences in ROA change when the context of industry 
growth is introduced, providing evidence of a moderation effect.  However, the 
relationships between each spatial myopia variable and ROA change are not the same in 
direction or intensity (table 17).   
The positive, significant relationship (p < .05) of tenure homogeneity in the 
higher growth industries (model 3.2b), and the non-significant result in the lower growth 
industries provide indirect support for H4.  This is consistent with life cycle theory (e.g., 
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Porter, 1980, 1985), whereas tenure homogeneity may contribute to a more focused and 
consistent approach in higher growth firms.  This greater focus may contribute to a 




Spatial Myopia IVs; ROA change DV: High & Low Growth Industry Regression 
Analysis 
 
Coefficients & Std Errors Low Growth Industries          High Growth Industries  
  Model 3.1a Model 3.1b Model 3.2a Model 3.2b 
(Constant) -0.056  -0.069  0.047  0.023  
  0.143  0.133  0.119  0.114  
Firm size (sales) -0.003  -0.057  -0.073  -0.118  
  0.142  0.143  0.133  0.159  
CEO change 98-00 0.536  0.664  -0.650  -0.315  
  0.449  0.461  0.448  0.448  
ROA: base period -0.287 ** -0.286 ** -0.445 *** -0.522 *** 
  0.142  0.136  0.133  0.133  
Focus orientation   0.086    -0.236 * 
    0.148    0.134  
External attribution   -0.277 *   -0.145  
    0.143    0.126  
Internal attribution   0.319 **   -0.037  
    0.145    0.135  
Firm tenure (avg)   0.366 **   -0.030  
    0.155    0.164  
Tenure homogeneity   -0.087    0.277 ** 
    0.155    0.135  
LOB concentration   0.055    -0.209 * 
    0.140    0.123  
          
Model R square 0.124  0.361 ** 0.248 *** 0.403 *** 
Low Growth Industries: N = 48        
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01         
 
Contrary to hypothesis 4, the negative relationship between focus orientation and 
ROA change was significant (p < .10) in higher growth industries (model 3.2b), but was 
not significant in the lower growth industries (model 3.1b).   The results indicate that 
focus orientation is related to value destruction in terms of ROA change in higher growth 
   
  119 
industries, but there is no empirical evidence of that relationship in lower growth 
industries.   This relationship is contrary to the hypothesis and acts in the opposite 
direction of tenure homogeneity.   
The relationship to ROA change for defensive internal attribution is significant, 
but positive in the lower growth industries (p < .05), while non-significant with a low 
negative coefficient in the higher growth industries.  The positive relationship in lower 
growth industries is contrary to the value destruction hypotheses, suggesting that internal 
attribution is associated with value enhancement in low growth industries, but may not be 
in higher growth industries.   
Firm tenure reflects a similar pattern to that of internal defensive attribution, 
yielding a positive significant relationship with ROA change in the lower growth 
industries, and a non-significant, low-value negative coefficient in higher growth 
industries.  This pattern was not identified in the regression analysis for interaction 
between firm tenure and industry growth rate, but appears in the individual regression 
analyses of higher and lower growth industries.  This result is also contrary to the 
hypothesized relationship, which predicted below average ROA change in lower growth 
industries.    
The significant, negative defensive external attribution relationship (.10 level) in 
the high growth industries appears to be similar to the relationship in low growth 
industries, although the latter relationship was non-significant.  No interaction is 
suggested.   
In summary, the three independent variables provide evidence of the moderating 
influence of industry growth rates; however, the hypothesized direction of the outcomes 
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was supported only in tenure homogeneity.  The differences between higher and lower 
growth industries relative to focus orientation, firm tenure and defensive internal 
attribution are opposite of those posited in hypothesis 4.  Additionally, two variables that 
did not yield significant interaction terms in the overall moderation model evidenced 
significant and contrary relationships in lower growth industries.  This provides further 
evidence that variables employed to assess concepts similar to management myopia (e.g., 
inertia, commitment to the status quo, and escalation of commitment) do not act 
uniformly.   
 Although the test for hypothesis 4 relative to ROA change produced mixed 
results, 5 of 6 variables yielded significant relationships in either lower growth or higher 
growth models.  This provides strong support for the importance of these variables, and 
the relevance of industry growth rate as a moderator of the relationships.  The lack of 
agreement in results for the “spatial myopia” variables in direction and intensity indicate 
that relationships to outcome variables may be very complex and substantially influenced 
by context.     
Summary of Spatial Myopia Results 
  The only significant direct effect supporting hypothesis 1 was in the negative 
relationship between average firm tenure and sales change.  Even after controlling for 
firm size and profitability, higher growth firms with longer tenured executives realized 
lower sales change levels than other firms in their industries.   
Hypothesis 4 received limited support from the interaction analyses with ROA 
change as the dependent variable.   Indirect support for the hypothesis was indicated by 
the positive relationship of tenure homogeneity to ROA change (value enhancement) in 
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higher growth industries.  However, contradictory results were evident for focus 
orientation, defensive internal attribution, and firm tenure.   
Hypotheses 2 and 5: Temporal Myopia Variables 
Temporal myopia is operationalized as four variables: short-term orientation, 
financial emphasis, financial background and accrual inflation.  Hypothesis 2 posits that 
each of the four variables will be negatively related to each of the three dependent 
variables.  They are evaluated in a regression analysis for each of the three dependent 
variables to test hypothesis 2.  The overall effect is evaluated first (H2) followed by an 
analysis of interactions of each temporal myopia variable (H5) with each dependent 
variable.  Negative relationships indicate value destruction; positive relationships indicate 
value enhancement.  Both hypotheses predict negative relationships regardless of 
industry growth. 
H2: High levels of CEO temporal myopia will be significantly and positively related to 
value destruction at the firm level.   
H5: The relationship between temporal myopia and value destruction will be stronger in 
lower growth industries than in higher growth industries.     
Temporal Myopia Variables and Sales change 
The hypothesized (H2) relationship between each of the four temporal myopia 
variables and sales change is negative.  Temporal myopia creates a focus on the short-
term at the expense of the long-term.  A short-term perspective by senior executives is 
posited to result in lower levels of performance, including below-average sales growth.   
(Note that the relationships between the control variables and the three dependent 
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variables have already been reviewed in the discussion of the regression analysis of the 
spatial myopia variables, yielding an R2 of .241.)   
Table 18 
 
Temporal Myopia Variables; Sales Change DV: Regression Analysis 
 
Coefficients & Std Errors  Model 1a  Model 1c  
(Constant) 0.044  0.049  
  0.087  0.088  
Firm size (sales) -0.380 *** -0.378 *** 
  0.091  0.095  
CEO change 98-00 -0.501 * -0.565  
  0.299  0.304  
ROA: base period 0.326 *** 0.312 *** 
  0.091  0.098  
Short-term orientation  -0.014  
    0.092  
Financial emphasis   -0.098  
    0.091  
TMT finance background  0.095  
    0.094  
Accrual inflation   0.018  
    0.093  
      
Model R square 0.241 *** 0.262 *** 
All Industries: N = 103    
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   A6  
 
Introducing the four independent variables into model 1c yielded an incremental 
R2 of only .02 (table 18).  None of the beta coefficients for the four temporal myopia 
variables met the significance test individually, providing no support for hypothesis 2.  
Interaction Analysis: Similarly, no significant relationships were found in models 
that introduced interaction terms for the temporal myopia variables (table 19).  The test 
provides no support for hypothesis 5.   
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TABLE 19 
 








orientation 1.266 1.990 0.265*** 0.003 
Financial emphasis 1.263 1.970 0.266*** 0.003 
Financial background -2.568 1.834 0.278*** 0.015 
Accrual inflation -0.634 1.959 0.263*** 0.001 
* < .10;  ** < .05;  *** < .01    
 
Temporal Myopia Variables and Net Income Change 
Hypothesis 2 posits a negative relationship between the four temporal myopia 
variables and the dependent variable, net income change.  However, little variance is 
explained.   
Table 20 
 
Temporal Myopia Variables; Net Income Change DV: Regression Analysis 
 
Coefficients & Std Errors  Model 2a  Model 2c  
(Constant) 0.030  0.034  
  0.098  0.097  
Firm size (sales) -0.132  -0.108  
  0.102  0.105  
CEO change 98-00 -0.342  -0.391  
  0.337  0.337  
ROA: base period 0.091  0.005  
  0.102  0.108  
Short-term orientation  -0.023  
    0.102  
Financial emphasis   0.109  
    0.100  
TMT finance background  0.216 ** 
    0.104  
Accrual inflation   0.071  
    0.103  
      
Model R square 0.035  0.096  
All Industries: N = 103     
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   A6  
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Neither the full model R2 (.096), nor the change in R2 (.061) were significant 
(table 20).  This absence of relationships appears in all models with net income change as 
the dependent variable.   
One variable (TMT financial background) yielded a positive, significant beta 
coefficient; however, the absence of a significant overall regression model limits any 
potential interpretation.  The positive relationship is opposite of that hypothesized in H2.  
There is no support for hypothesis 2.    
Interaction Analysis: An interaction for each spatial myopia variable with industry 
growth rate was entered individually into model 2 with net income change as the 
dependent variable.   
Table 21 
 
Temporal Myopia IVs; Net Income change DV: Interactions 
 
Interaction term Interaction  Coeff      Std Error R square 
R square 
Change 
Short-term orientation x Industry growth 1.875 2.199 0.103 0.007 
Financial emphasis x Industry growth -0.358 2.185 0.096 0.000 
Financial background x Industry growth 0.202 2.052 0.096 0.000 
Accrual inflation x Industry growth   -4.299** 2.124 0.134   0.038** 
* < .10;  ** < .05;  *** < .01     
 
As noted in table 21, none of the interaction analyses yielded significant results 
for the overall model.  One interaction term produced a significant R2 change (accrual 
inflation x  industry growth); however, the lack of significance of the overall model limits 
any potential interpretation.   Hypothesis 5 is not supported.  
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Temporal Myopia Variables and ROA Change 
Hypothesis 2 posits a negative relationship between the four temporal myopia 
variables and ROA change.  As presented in table 21, R2 is significant for the control 




Temporal Myopia Variables; ROA Change DV: Regression Analysis 
 
Coefficients & Std Errors  Model 3a  Model 3c  
(Constant) 0.000  -0.004  
  0.092  0.091  
Firm size (sales) -0.053  -0.032  
  0.096  0.098  
CEO change 98-00 -0.003  0.044  
  0.316  0.315  
ROA: base period -0.375 *** -0.429 *** 
  0.096  0.101  
Short-term orientation  0.070  
    0.095  
Financial emphasis   0.225 ** 
    0.094  
TMT finance background  0.114  
    0.097  
Accrual inflation   0.016  
    0.097  
      
Model R square 0.152 *** 0.211 *** 
All Industries: N = 103    
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   A6  
 
Only the coefficient for financial emphasis in the letters to shareholders indicates 
a significant relationship with ROA change (p < .05).  Contrary to hypothesis 2, financial 
emphasis was positively related to above-average improvement in ROA.  No significant 
relationship is indicated for the short-term orientation, TMT financial background or 
accrual inflation.    
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It is unclear what is indicated by the positive relationship between financial 
emphasis in letters to shareholders and ROA improvement.  Several possibilities may 
explain this phenomenon, and could be a subject for future studies.  It is possible that 
paying attention to the financial results and projections of the firm may be beneficial in 
terms of profitability return ratios.  This will be explored further in the chapter V.    
Interaction Analysis: The introduction of industry growth and interactions into the 
model yielded no evidence of moderation (table 23).   None of the interaction terms 















Short-term orientation 2.254 2.050 0.221*** 0.010 
Financial emphasis 0.227 2.042 0.211*** 0.000 
Financial background 0.816 1.915 0.212*** 0.002 
Accrual inflation -3.095 2.002 0.230*** 0.019 
      * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   
 
Summary of Temporal Myopia Results 
Only the relationship between financial emphasis and ROA change was 
significant, and it was contrary to the hypothesized relationship.  Moreover, the addition 
of financial emphasis and three other variables did not yield a significant R2 change.  The 
dearth of significant results for the temporal myopia variables provides almost no support 
for any effect of temporal myopia.   This suggests that these may not be meaningful 
variables, or that their relationships with financial outcomes may be more complex than 
expected.   
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Hypotheses 3 and 6: Hubris Variables 
Hubris is represented by three variables, media praise, personal references (in 
letters to shareholders), and CEO relative pay.  These three hubris variables are evaluated 
in a regression analysis for each of the three dependent variables to test hypothesis 1.  
Negative relationships indicate value destruction; positive relationships indicate value 
enhancement.   
H 3: High levels of CEO hubris will be significantly and positively related to value 
destruction at the firm level.   
 
The overall effect is evaluated first (H3) followed by an analysis of interactions of 
each spatial myopia variable (H6) with each dependent variable.   Both hypotheses 
predict negative relationships; however, the moderation effect hypothesized in H6 would 
be consistent with positive relationships between hubris variables and the dependent 
variables for lower growth industries, where hubris may actually positively impact the 
performance of the firm.  CEOs with extraordinary confidence may be willing to take 
actions that involve more significant changes to the business and overcome resistance to 
change related to inertia and commitment to the status quo.   
H6: The relationship between hubris and value destruction will be stronger in higher 
growth industries than in lower growth industries.     
Hubris Variables and Sales Change 
Hypothesis 3 predicts a negative relationship between each of the Hubris 
variables and sales change.  Hubris is expected to detract from decision quality of senior 
executives.  
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Model 1a includes the three control variables, with sales change as the dependent 
variable yielding a significant R2 of .241 (table 24).   Firm size and ROA are significant 
at the .01 level, while CEO compensation premium is significant at the .10 level.  All 
three control variables are significant when the three hubris variables are entered into 
model 1d.  Base period ROA is positively related to sales change, potentially reflecting 
access to financial and other resources that fuel growth.  Firm size and CEO change are 
negatively related to sales change.    The R2 of .306 for model 1d shows a meaningful 
increase in the variance explained, primarily due to media praise.  
Table 24 
 
Hubris Variables; Sales Change DV: Regression Analysis 
 
Coefficients & Std Errors  Model 1a  Model 1d  
(Constant) 0.044  0.049  
  0.087  0.085  
Firm size (sales) -0.380 *** -0.412 *** 
  0.091  0.089  
CEO change 98-00 -0.501 * -0.566 * 
  0.299  0.292  
ROA: base period 0.326 *** 0.329 *** 
  0.091  0.088  
Media praise   0.250 *** 
    0.088  
Personal references   -0.033  
    0.088  
CEO comp premium   -0.070  
    0.086  
      
Model R square 0.241 *** 0.306 *** 
All Industries: N = 103    
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   A6  
 
Contrary to the hypothesis (H3), model 1d indicates that the relationship between 
media praise and sales change is significant and positive (p < .01).   Higher levels of 
media praise in the base period (1998-2001) were positively related to sales increases.  
This is counter to the hypothesis that hubris will lead to value destruction, as represented 
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by lower than average sales growth.  This result should, however be interpreted in 
conjunction with the results presented and discussed in the following pages.   
Relationships between the two other hubris variables (personal references in letter 
to shareholders and CEO compensation premiums) and sales change are not significant.     
Interaction Analysis: No interactions were found to be significant, indicating no 
support for hypothesis 6, which posited a stronger relationship to value destruction in 
higher growth industries.   
Table 25 
 




Coeff      Std Error   R square  
R square 
Change  
Media praise 0.267 1.923 0.306*** 0.000 
Personal references -0.990 1.928 0.308*** 0.002 
Relative pay -0.921 1.891 0.308*** 0.002 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   
 
 
Hubris Variables and Net Income Change 
The relationship between the three hubris variables and net income change is 
posited to be negative in hypothesis 3.   
The three control variables were entered in model 2a with net income as the 
dependent variable (table 26), with no significant relationships identified, and without 
yielding a significant R2 (.035).   Model 2d included the three hubris variables, but 
achieved only a modest and non-significant change in R2 to .097.  The beta coefficient for 
the variable relative pay was significant at the .05 level, but may not be meaningful with 
the low R2.   
No support is evidenced for hypothesis 3 
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Table 26 
 
Hubris Variables; Net Income Change DV: Regression Analysis 
 
Coefficients & Std Errors  Model 2a  Model 2d  
(Constant) 0.030  0.027  
  0.098  0.097  
Firm size (sales) -0.132  -0.130  
  0.102  0.101  
CEO change 98-00 -0.342  -0.314  
  0.337  0.333  
ROA: base period 0.091  0.085  
  0.102  0.100  
Media praise   -0.024  
    0.100  
Personal references   -0.120  
    0.101  
Relative pay   0.232 ** 
    0.098  
      
Model R square 0.035  0.097  
All Industries: N = 103    
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   A6  
 
Interaction Analysis: No significant interactions were found when interaction 
terms were entered individually into the regression analysis.  There is no evidence to 
support hypothesis 6. 
This lack of results is consistent with the other tests of myopia variables relative 
to net income change.  The issues associated with this dependent variable were outlined 
in the spatial myopia section above.   
Table 27 
 




Coeff      Std Error    R2  R2 change 
Media praise -0.219 2.193 0.098 
 
0.000 
Personal references 2.278 2.189 0.108 0.010 
Relative pay -1.216 2.156 0.101 0.024 
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   
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Hubris Variables and ROA Change 
The relationship between the three hubris variables and ROA change was 
hypothesized to be negative (H3).   
None of the hubris variables contributed significantly to the explanation of ROA 
change in regression model 3d (table 28).  The R2 change was .038, with a total R2 of .19.  
Hypothesis 3 is not supported by this analysis.   
Table 28 
 
Hubris IVs; ROA Change as DV: Regression Analysis 
 
Coefficients & Std Errors  Model 3a  Model 3d  
(Constant) 0.000  -0.003  
  0.092  0.092  
Firm size (sales) -0.053  -0.031  
  0.096  0.096  
CEO change 98-00 -0.003  0.035  
  0.316  0.315  
ROA: base period -0.375 *** -0.379 *** 
  0.096  0.095  
Media praise   -0.149  
    0.095  
Personal references   0.013  
    0.095  
CEO comp premium   0.126  
    0.093  
      
Model R square 0.152 *** 0.190 *** 
All Industries: N = 103    
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01   A6  
 
Interaction Analysis: An interaction term for each hubris variable with industry 
growth rate was entered individually into model 3 (table 29).  The significant interaction 
effect of media praise and industry growth (p < .05) supports the hypothesized 
relationship – the relationship between media praise (hubris) and below average ROA 
change (value destruction) is greater in high growth industries than in low growth 
industries.    
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Table 29 
 
Hubris IVs; ROA change DV: Interaction 
 
 Interaction Coeff Std Error R Square 
R Square 
change 
Media Praise x Industry Growth -4.151** 2.033 0.224***   0.034** 
Personal Statements x Ind Growth 1.050 2.083 0.192*** 0.002 
Relative Pay x Ind Growth 0.410 2.046 0.190*** 0.000 
* < .10;  ** < .05;  *** < .01     
 
Analysis of Higher and Lower Growth Industries 
The interaction effect for media praise and industry growth is supported when the 
sample is split between low growth and high growth industries (table 30).   
Table 30 
 
Hubris IVs; ROA change DV; High & Low Growth Industries Regression Analysis 
 
Coefficients & Std Errors  Low Growth Industries  High Growth Industries  
  Model 8a  Model 8b Model 8a  Model 8b  
(Constant) -0.056  -0.055 0.047  0.044  
  0.143  0.146 0.119  0.117  
Firm size (sales) -0.003  0.019 -0.073  -0.027  
  0.142  0.146 0.133  0.134  
CEO change 98-00 0.536  0.524 -0.650  -0.611  
  0.449  0.461 0.448  0.441  
ROA: base period -0.287 ** -0.281 -0.445 *** -0.450 *** 
  0.142  0.147 0.133  0.132  
Media praise   -0.025   -0.251 ** 
    0.157   0.122  
Personal references   -0.028   0.040  
    0.157   0.124  
Relative pay   0.176   0.075  
    0.145   0.123  
         
Model R square 0.124  0.156 0.248 *** 0.318 *** 
All Industries: N = 48        
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01        
 
Consistent with the interaction analysis and supporting H6, there is a significant 
(p < .05) negative relationship (value destruction) between media praise and ROA change 
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in the higher growth industry sample.  No significant relationship was found in the low 
growth sample (coefficient is -.03). 
No significant relationships with ROA change were identified in the high and low 
growth industry samples for personal statements and CEO comp ratio.   
Overall Evaluation of Hubris Relationships 
The significant, negative relationship between media praise and ROA change in 
high growth industries is consistent with the hypothesized relationship. Comparing this 
result to the significant, positive relationship between hubris and sales growth (direct 
effect) provides an interesting contrast.   CEOs who receive high levels of praise are more 
likely to increase the sales level of the company, but in high growth industries, their 
firms’ ROA is below average.  This may be a result of the hypothesized impact of hubris 
in higher growth industries where there are fewer impediments to CEO action, both 
internal (resource availability, TMT challenges & CEO restraint) and external (e.g., board 
oversight).   The increased sales realized by highly praised CEOs may actually result in 
lowered profitability – an outcome consistent with value destruction hypotheses (H6).   
 
Summary 
 This chapter presented a description of the sample, test results for assumptions 
relevant to multiple regression analysis, and results of correlation, factor and multiple 
regression analyses.  Three sets of variables associated with spatial myopia, temporal 
myopia and hubris were evaluated to assess similarities within each set of variables, and 
to assess relationships with three firm level dependent variables.   Nine primary models 
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were evaluated for direct effects and interactions of each independent variable with the 
moderation variable, industry growth. 
Assessment of Myopia Variables 
The correlation analysis provided little support for the expected relationship 
among each set of myopia variables.   
TABLE 31 
 
Correlation Analysis Summary  
 
Type of Myopia  Significant r    Non-significant r 
Spatial Myopia 
3 of 15  significant 
correlations; only 2 
are in the expected 
direction 
Focus orientation & external 
attribution (1); however the 
relationship is negative not positive.  
 




Focus &:  external attribution, tenure, 
homogeneity, LOB concentration (4) 
 
Internal attr &:  external attribution, 
tenure, homogeneity and LOB 
concentration. (4) 
 
LOB concentration &:  external  attrib., 
tenure & homogeneity (3) 
 
Homogeneity & ext attrb. (1) 
Temporal Myopia 
1 of 6 significant 
correlations 
Financial background & Accrual 
Inflation  
Short-term orientation &: fin emphasis, 
fin background, accrual inflation (3) 
 
Financial emphasis &: financial 
background, accr inflation (2) 
Hubris 
1 of 3 significant 
correlations 
Media Praise & Personal references  CEO relative pay & : media praise, 
personal references (2) 
 
Only 3 of 15 spatial correlations yielded a significant correlation, as noted in table 
30.   The results are similar for the temporal myopia variables, with 1 of 5 possible 
correlations significant, and for hubris with 1 of 3 significant correlations.   
The results of the factor analysis provided no support for the operationalization of 
three distinct types of management myopia as represented by the variables chosen for this 
study.   
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The results of the multiple regression analysis also indicate little evidence that the 
sets of variables measure a single construct.  Differences were observed in both direction 
of relationship and in significance levels for direct effects and for interaction effects.   
Multiple Linear Regression Results 
Linear regression is the primary analysis employed in testing the models 
associated with each of six hypotheses.   These results are summarized in table 31.  There 
is little support for any of the first set of hypotheses (H1, 2, 3), which posited negative 
relationships between management myopia, in all three forms, and the dependent 
variables.  There was contrary evidence for hypothesis 3.   
A significant, negative relationship was found for longer average tenured 
executives and sales change.  Sales growth was below average for firms with longer 
tenured executives, expected to reflect spatial myopia.  This is consistent with H1.   
TABLE 32 
 
Direct Relationship Hypotheses H1 – H3 
 
   Hypothesis         Dep Variable Supporting Results     Contrary results 




Net Income chg 
 
ROA change 
TMT tenure (neg) 
 
No variables significant 
 






H2: Temporal myopia 
 Value destruction 
Sales change,  
 
Net Income chg 
 
ROA change 
No variables significant 
 
No variables significant 
 
No variables significant 
None 
 
Model not sig. 
 
Financial emphasis pos 




Net Income chg 
 
ROA change 
No variables significant 
 
No variables significant 
 
No variables significant 
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The negative relationship between financial emphasis and ROA change is 
contrary to H2.  CEOs who emphasize historical financial results in letters to 
shareholders have higher than average sales.   
There is one contrary result for H3, relative to the positive relationship between 
media praise and sales change.   A significant, positive relationship was found for the 
relationship between media praise and sales change.  CEOs who received greater 
favorable media attention relative to their capabilities and leadership lead firms that grew 
faster than other firms in their own industry.   
Interaction Effects 
There were no significant interaction effects for any of the variables in models 
with sales change or net income change as dependent variables (table 32).  A number of 
significant interactions were identified for ROA change models.     
TABLE 33 
 
Interaction Hypotheses Summary 
 
Hypothesis          Dependent Var   Supporting Results     Contrary results 
H4: : Spatial myopia 
 Value destruction; 




Net Income chg 
 
ROA change 
No interactions sig. 
 
No interactions sig. 
 






Focus orientation negative in 
high growth;  
Internal attribution &  firm 
tenure positive in low growth 
H5: Temporal myopia 
 Value destruction; 




Net Income chg 
 
ROA change 
No interactions sig. 
 
Model not sig.  
 
No interactions sig. 
None 
 
Model not significant 
 
None 
H6: Hubris  Value 





Net Income chg 
 
ROA change 
No interactions sig. 
 
No interactions sig. 
 
Media Praise negative in 
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The interaction of TMT homogeneity and industry growth rate yielded a 
significant relationship with ROA change.  In higher growth industries homogeneity was 
significantly related to ROA change.   This result provides some support for hypothesis 4.   
Contrary to hypothesis 4, focus orientation yielded a significant, negative 
relationship with ROA change in higher growth industries.  Additionally, the relationship 
between internal attribution and ROA change is positive and significant in low growth 
industries but not in higher growth industries.  These results provide additional evidence 
that variables associated with focus concepts (e.g., inertia, escalation of commitment, 
spatial myopia) do not have a consistent relationship with performance outcomes.     
The interaction effect of the media praise and industry growth supports hypothesis 
6.  At least in high growth industries, hubris can lead managers to take risks that do not 
pay off in profit returns.  The fact that there was a direct positive effect of hubris on sales 
growth for all industries may actually reinforce the hypothesized effect.  An emphasis on 
sales at the expense of profitability is a logical impact of hubris, and may be associated 
with low performing acquisitions as well.   
These results will be discussed, along with conclusions and implications for 
researchers and practitioners in chapter V.    
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The research question addressed in this paper is: “How, why and when do various 
forms of management myopia destroy value in firms?”  This study builds on the concept 
of learned myopia (e.g., Miller, 1993), specifically on three forms, spatial myopia, 
temporal myopia and hubris (Levinthal et al., 1993), within a decision-making framework 
that links managers’ cognitions to significant firm outcomes (Rajagopalan et al., 1997).   
This framework, supported by a broad spectrum of strategic management works  
(e.g.,Porter, 1980), incorporates the influence of environmental context on the 
relationship between management cognition and decision-making performance.  Errors 
associated with cognitive biases, specifically management myopia of senior executives, 
contribute negatively to firm performance.   
This objectives of the study include: 1] develop a working definition of 
management myopia and the three types (spatial, temporal and hubris); 2] operationalize 
the constructs employing existing and new variables expected to contribute to, or reflect 
the constructs; 3] test the relationship between these variables and firm outcome variables 
representing value destruction; and, 4] evaluate the moderating effect of industry sales 
growth rates on those relationships.  
The definitions were developed in detail in chapters II and III.  Chapter IV 
focuses on operationalization and testing.  This chapter reviews the empirical findings, 
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discusses explanations of contrary findings, addresses contributions and implications, and 
suggests potential future research.   
 
Overview of Empirical Results 
The results of this study produced one principle “non-finding” and one principle 
finding.  The non-finding refers to the lack of agreement among variables selected to 
operationalize each construct.  This lack of consistency requires that each variable be 
assessed individually relative to firm outcomes and industry context.  It also suggests that 
the relationships among TMT characteristics, managerial cognitions, and firm behavior 
are complex and subject to contextual influence.  
The principle finding identifies the significant influence of industry growth rates 
on the relationships between a number of variables and ROA change.  The analysis of 
ROA change indicates substantial differences in relationships for firms from higher 
growth and lower growth industries.   
The results also indicate support for several new variables introduced in this study 
and provide additional information for a number of measures previously employed in 
strategic management research.  Each of these results will be addressed in the following 
discussion.   
Lack of Agreement of Variables 
Contrary to expectations, there was little agreement among the variables 
representing spatial myopia, in terms of correlations of the independent variables, 
exploratory factor analysis, and the relationships of the independent variables to the 
dependent variables.  Although there is substantial support for the three types of myopia 
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in learning theory, the variables employed in this study did not provide a consistent 
operationalization of any of the three constructs.     
This lack of agreement among each set of myopia variables may reflect a number 
of issues associated with cognitive studies employing secondary data.  First, cognitive 
measures tapping into letters to shareholders (e.g., focus orientation, defensive internal 
attribution) and media reports (e.g., media praise) may not fully capture the beliefs and 
intentions of the CEOs or the dominant coalition in the organization.  However, the 
number of significant relationships found for the three cognitive variables noted above 
(reviewed in more detail below) provide some evidence of their relevance.  It is more 
likely that the measures, as structured, do not sufficiently capture the extreme impact of 
myopia on strategic decision-making, or that there was not sufficient time for negative 
results to be realized.   
A second concern is the inability to relate these cognitive measures to TMT 
characteristics (e.g., tenure, homogeneity and functional background) and financial 
measures of firm behavior (e.g., line of business concentration, accrual inflation, and 
CEO relative compensation).   The relationship simply was not found.   
Previous research provides some support for relationships between TMT tenure 
and homogeneity relative to inertial tendencies, irrational escalation of commitment, or 
strategic persistence (e.g., Bantel et al., 1989; Hambrick et al., 1993; Michel et al., 1992), 
although the results are not uniformly in agreement  (e.g., Finkelstein et al., 1996).  A 
review of correlations and regression results relative to the cognitive variable, focus 
orientation indicates a lack of agreement.   
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The variable, focus orientation, was carefully structured to capture focus, strategic 
persistence and commitment to the current business model in statements made by senior 
executives.   Yet, the general relationship between focus orientation and TMT 
homogeneity and tenure measures was negative.   Additionally, these TMT measures did 
not correlate with line of business concentration – a behavioral measure of focus.       
The spatial myopia correlation analysis and the factor analyses showed some 
evidence that TMT homogeneity and tenure may be more related to defensive attribution, 
accrual inflation (accounting manipulation), and financial emphasis, than to spatial 
myopia or focus.  This would indicate a level defensiveness and financial orientation for 
long-tenured and homogenous executive teams.   A potential explanation is that the 
relationship between TMT inertia, commitment to the status quo, and strategic 
persistence may be driven more by financial conservatism and defensive attributions than 
active commitment to the current business model and core capabilities.   
A third issue is that learning theory (e.g., Argyris et al., 1978; Levinthal et al., 
1993) and strategic decision-making theory (e.g., Schwenk, 1988) support both beneficial 
and detrimental effects of the heuristics that lead to myopic tendencies.  Extreme focus 
on the core business or on shorter-term, financial issues, may be beneficial for some 
companies but not for others, in some conditions but not in others.   To some extent, the 
interaction results for a number of “spatial myopia” variables lend some credence to this 
explanation  
Moderation Effect of Industry Growth Rates 
The principle finding of the study is in support of the moderating effect of 
industry growth rates.  For ROA change, interaction effects were found for one hubris 
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variable (media praise), and three spatial myopia variables (focus orientation, defensive 
internal attribution and tenure homogeneity).   Additionally, there was evidence of a 
moderating effect of industry growth rate on the relationship between average firm tenure  
and ROA change when the lower growth (no relationship) and higher growth industries 
(positive relationship) were analyzed separately.   
Consistent with Hayward and Hambrick’s 1997 study, hubris was positively 
related to higher sales growth for the full sample, but was negatively related to ROA 
change in higher growth industries.  Highly confident CEO “celebrities” (with 
cooperation from their associates and board of directors) may tend to take unnecessary 
chances (e.g., Bazerman, 1994) and seek growth over profitability (e.g., Hayward, et. al., 
2004; Zollo, 2004), particularly in expanding the core business through internal growth 
and acquisitions.   These results reinforce the use of media praise as an indicator of 
hubris. 
The results for regression analyses of the spatial myopia variables were more 
complex.  There was some support for the hypothesized relationships, but these results 
were inconsistent and even contradictory.   The relationship between firm tenure and 
sales change was negative for the full sample; however, when high and low growth 
industries are analyzed separately, five of the six “spatial myopia” variables were found 
to have significant relationship with ROA change for one or both of the split samples (as 
discussed in the previous section).  Moreover, the results contradicted the hypothesized 
effects, and were inconsistent among the variables themselves.   
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The results provide clear support for the importance of industry growth as a 
moderating factor relative to the relationships of four spatial myopia variables, media 
praise and the dependent variable, ROA change.    
In summary, the relationship of these variables to ROA change appears to be 
complex and substantially influenced by context.  In this study, industry growth was the 
focus of interaction effects; however, there are other contextual factors that could be 
important in understanding the nature of the relationships.  This finding should encourage 
more in-depth evaluations of these variables, as discussed in future research opportunities 
at the end of this chapter.   
Cognitive Variables  
An objective of the study was to explore cognitive variables expected to 
contribute to or be associated with management myopia.  Two cognitive variables (short-
term orientation and focus orientation), developed for this study, were structured to 
capture the essence of the definitions for temporal myopia and spatial myopia.   Internal 
defensive attribution was employed in the study as a cognitive measure of commitment to 
the status quo and to reflect a willingness to support sub-par investments in core 
strategies.  Media praise was expected to contribute directly to hubris by CEOs.   
This study provides empirical support for the relevance of focus orientation, but 
not in the expected direction.   In high growth industries, focus orientation was 
significantly and negatively related to ROA change; in low growth industries, the 
relationship was not significant.  A general negative relationship was hypothesized (H1), 
based on literature that has addressed the dangers of too much focus (e.g., the myopia of 
learning; lack of consideration of promising new business opportunities; inertial 
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tendencies, and irrational escalation of commitment).  What is surprising is that the 
relationship was not significant in the lower growth industries.  Scholars who have 
addressed the myopia of learning (e.g., Levinthal et. al., 1993; Miller, 1993) and life 
cycle theory (e.g., Porter, 1980) indicate that actions associated with spatial myopia 
should present a more serious problem in non-munificent (lower growth) environments.   
There are several possibilities that could explain this unanticipated result.   
One is that the more munificent environment of the higher growth industries 
provides greater discretion to the dominant coalition and/or greater access to investment 
resources.  In these conditions any type of myopia (temporal, spatial or hubris) can be 
expected to contribute to below average profitability, whereas executives in lower growth 
industries may be more restricted in pursuing more extreme strategies of any type.   This 
was the argument made for hubris having a stronger relationship with value destruction in 
higher growth industries (H3), a condition that was supported by the results for media 
praise.  This would also require a rethinking of the conditions that exist in lower growth 
(“mature”) industries, where myopia may be less likely to impact decisions than in high 
growth industries.        
A second explanation for the absence of significant relationships for focus 
orientation in the low growth industry sample could be attributed to unique industry 
characteristics.  For example, the general insurance industry had a large influence on this 
sample, with 19 of 48 lower growth industry companies (almost 40%).  It is possible that 
regulation, risk concerns, and other specific industry conditions dampen the influence and 
effect of managerial orientation and bias in this industry.   
   
  145 
For the variable, short-term orientation, there was no evidence of any relationship 
with change in sales or profitability.  This is somewhat surprising in that the negative 
consequences of short-termism are frequently noted in financial and accounting literature.   
This lack of results for the short-term orientation measure may, however, be tempered by 
the fact none of the established TMT or financial measures selected for the construct, 
temporal myopia, yielded significant results.   The minimal level of significant results for 
any of the temporal myopia variables suggest that the concept and approach to 
measurement may have to be reevaluated.  Additionally, longer time frames and other 
contextual factors should be evaluated. 
This study also incorporated a variation of defensive attribution, by capturing 
attributions specifically identifying and supporting investment in the current business 
model or core operations that were linked to sub-par performance.   Defensive internal 
attribution was significantly and positively associated with above average ROA change in 
lower growth (but not higher growth) industries.  This was contrary to the hypothesized 
negative effect (H4).  The logic of the hypothesis is that internal attribution is associated 
with irrational escalation of commitment and inertial tendencies, which should have a 
greater detrimental impact in lower growth industries.   An explanation of the contrary 
results may be found in the benefits of investing in higher risk projects in more 
competitive environments.  This is the counter-argument to that of irrational escalation of 
the commitment – in other words, this result may be consistent with “rational” 
commitment even in the face of initial problems.   
The hubris variable, media praise, developed by Hayward and Hambrick (1997), 
received strong support as a meaningful variable in significant relationships with both 
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sales change and ROA change.  The positive relationship between media praise and sales 
change provides an interesting contrast to the negative effect relationship between media 
praise and ROA change in higher growth industries.   The above average growth in sales 
is consistent with highly praised executives having higher levels of confidence and access 
to resources that can fuel sales growth – higher investment equals higher growth.  The 
same access and confidence may also lead them to making errors in lower return 
investments, as evidenced by the below average change in ROA.  This result is in concert 
with agency theory, learning theory, and “executive celebrity” literature.   
   
Implications for Academic Researchers 
 There is abundant evidence, both practical and empirical, that managerial 
decision-making is constrained by human and organizational limitations.  Various proxies 
have been employed to represent cognitions of senior level managers relative to baises, 
strategic decision-making and firm outcomes.  This study complements previous research 
by exploring CEO cognitions from letters to shareholders, and evaluating them in 
conjunction with measures and concepts that have acted as proxies for managerial 
cognitions (e.g., TMT characteristics), and factors that may indicate or contribute to 
myopic behavior (e.g., media praise and CEO relative pay).    
 Organizing cognitive limitations and managerial biases in terms of three forms of 
myopia provides a structured approach to assessing these limitations.  The study 
operationalizes these constructs and provides a vehicle for evaluating several new 
cognitive variables in conjunction with existing variables whose outcomes indicate 
similarities to the three types of myopia.    
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 This paper builds on the structure suggested by Levinthal and March’s (1993) 
myopia of learning, by identifying, defining and operationalizing spatial myopia, 
temporal myopia and hubris.  This is the first study that incorporates all three types of 
myopia, establishes three differentiated definitions and tests relationships with important 
firm performance outcomes.     
The definitions for temporal and spatial myopia drew heavily on the conceptual 
work of Miller (2002) and Coff and Laverty (2001) to clearly differentiate the concepts.  
This study employed Hayward and Hambrick’s (1997) definition and operationalization 
of hubris, which itself is based on the work of Roll’s (1986) hubris hypothesis.   This 
paper makes strides in developing the definitions, and linking the myopia concepts to 
multiple, relevant literature streams (e.g., strategic decision-making biases, financial 
myopia, short-termism, inertia, strategic persistence and escalation of commitment).   
The operationalization of the three myopia constructs was not as successful as 
anticipated.  The operationalizations of the constructs were built from theoretical 
definitions of the myopia types, and incorporated existing variables that reflected myopic 
behavior or acted as proxies for cognitive limits very similar in description to the 
myopias.  This research approach selected variables from different “lenses”, reflecting 
upper echelons, learning, cognitive and finance/accounting perspectives.  Theoretical and 
practical arguments from these disparate perspectives suggested that these variables 
would act with some consistency relative to each other and to the outcomes of interest.  
The lack of agreement among the sets of variables selected for each construct 
does not suggest, however, that they are not real or meaningful.   Instead, it suggests that 
more work needs to be done in finding measures for managerial cognitions, including 
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bias and myopia.  These results should encourage debate and discussion about the types 
of biases and myopias relevant to strategic processes and decisions, issues associated 
with different perspectives (lenses), and the difficult measurement issues associated with 
capturing managerial beliefs and intentions.   
The study introduces four new variables derived from CEO statements that may 
be useful in assessing the thinking and intentions of the firm’s primary leaders.  Two 
variables, strategic focus orientation and defensive internal attribution, seek to capture the 
CEO’s emphasis on the core business, maintaining and building upon the current 
business model.   Under certain conditions this emphasis is critical to the success of the 
firm; however, under different conditions (or when taken to the extreme), this emphasis 
on the core business can lead to destructive and ineffective decision-making.   The 
significant findings for interaction effects of these two variables with industry growth 
rates provides some evidence of their potential relationship with firm profitability, and 
their potential usefulness in exploring executive cognitions.   The tension between 
“helpful heuristics” and destructive myopia is difficult to capture, especially in secondary 
data sources.    
 Two new variables developed to represent temporal myopia (short-term 
orientation and financial emphasis) taken from letters to shareholders yielded little 
empirical evidence of relevance.  Only financial emphasis yielded a significant 
relationship, but only with one of three dependent variables, ROA change.   Moreover, 
the relationship was contrary to that hypothesized.  The overall dearth of significant 
relationships for the four temporal myopia variables, suggest the need to re-evaluate the 
concept, its measures and the measurement approach.   
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 The study also incorporated established measures associated with inertia, 
commitment to the status quo, and escalation of commitment, which by definition are 
consistent with either spatial or temporal myopia.  The expectation was that there would 
be strong correlations among these variables and the new variables discussed in the 
previous paragraphs.  The findings do not support consistent relationships among either 
set of variables.  This is particularly the case for TMT characteristics that have been 
associated with inertia, commitment to the status quo, irrational escalation of 
commitment and strategic persistence.  The lack of agreement among these variables 
suggests that TMT characteristics may have multiple, and even contradictory effects on 
managerial decision-making and firm level outcomes.  This study suggests that the use of 
TMT variables as proxies for managerial cognitions may be less direct than some of the 
literature suggests.   Additionally, there is evidence that TMT characteristics may impact 
profitability differently than growth, an important tension in strategic decision-making.      
 The study also provides support for the continued study of media praise, 
representing hubris.  The positive relationship with sales growth was balanced by a 
negative relationship to ROA change in high growth industries.  This provides evidence 
that this variable could be important in explaining the tension between a CEOs ability to 
drive sales increases, but at the expense of profitability.   
 The second implication for researchers is support for contextual differences 
relative to industry growth rates.  This was evident in the interaction results for spatial 
myopia and hubris variables in the ROA change regression analyses.  These results 
support previous theory and research by reinforcing the contextual impact of industry 
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characteristics.   The study contributes to this body of work by exploring the impact of 
cognitive factors on firm performance under different industry contexts.    
The outcomes were not, however, consistent either among the variables believed 
to act as proxies for the constructs studied, nor consistent with relationships 
hypothesized.  The relationships among structural, behavioral and cognitive variables 
appear to be complex and contextually influenced, indicating a need for more in-depth 
and fine-grained evaluations.   The results of the study should encourage greater 
exploration of the three types of myopia, as well as other biases not captured by the three 
types of myopia.   
 A third implication for researchers is the differences noted between the 
relationships of the independent variables and two important firm outcome variables, 
sales change and ROA change.   Firm tenure (spatial myopia) and media praise (hubris) 
yielded significant relationships with sales change, while their relationships with ROA 
change in higher and lower growth industries were non-significant or produced a 
significant, opposite result.  This suggests a need to evaluate multiple outcome variables 
in strategic management research and to explore contradictory outcomes relative to the 
form of outcome variable employed to represent firm performance or value 
creation/destruction.   When and why do firms increase sales but suffer in profitability?  
To what extent do is there a trade-off between growth and profitability?  To what extent 
is this trade-off driven by self-interest as contrasted with decision error?  
 The contradictory results also suggest that some of the key independent variables 
should be tested in their relationships to intermediate factors, such as commitment to the 
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status quo, strategic persistence, acquisition performance, turnaround efforts, and 
strategic change.   
 
Implications for Practitioners 
 The lack of clear agreement among the sets of spatial and temporal myopia 
variables must be taken into consideration before suggesting implications for 
practitioners.  What does it really mean when average tenure in low and high growth 
industries relate to future sales growth, while tenure homogeneity may contribute to the 
opposite effect?  Why does commitment to the core business (focus orientation) coincide 
with below average change in profit return in higher growth industries, but not lower 
growth?   
As noted in the future research section below, additional evaluation of these 
relationships is essential before drawing conclusions for executives.  That research should 
explore intermediate actions, investigate why TMT characteristics and cognitive attitudes 
do not coincide, and dig deeper into the relationships.   
 On the other hand, the investigation of hubris, particularly as represented by the 
media praise variable supports earlier studies that high-light the potential negative impact 
of over-confidence at the top of the organization (e.g., Hayward et al., 1997).   In this 
study, hubris was related to higher than average growth overall, but lower than average 
ROA in higher growth industries.  The message for senior executives and boards of 
directors is that executive celebrity may actually contribute to higher risk investments, 
exposing the firm to disappointing results.  CEOs who are considered “stars” may over-
reach the capabilities of their organizations, and take on sub-optimal expansion.  Boards 
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may be reluctant to reign-in, or question the initiatives of a highly praised, powerful 
CEOs – when that may be the most critical service they may offer to the firm for which 
they are responsible.  
 
Limitations 
 Several important limitations of the research and findings are discussed.  First, the 
use of secondary data to represent management beliefs and biases creates difficulties in 
assuring that the measures chosen actually represent the constructs intended.  This is 
particularly challenging in identifying variables that represent a potentially related but 
distinct set of myopia variables.  For example, TMT characteristics have been employed 
as proxies for cognitive attitudes of senior managers, but have also been criticized for 
lack of precision and potential for ambiguity (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). 
While there has been extensive study of TMT tenure and homogeneity linked to 
limitations in strategic decision-making, the research provides conflicting evidence.  
Moreover, how these limitations, represented by TMT characteristics, act in firm level 
outcomes is even more difficult to identify.   
 This study attempts to discover the cognitive states of senior executives by 
analyzing statements by the CEO in letters to shareholders.  One criticism of previous 
uses of letters to shareholders is that they are screened and structured by media experts.  
While this cannot be denied, the importance of the annual report to the CEO, and the 
substantial difference in strategic emphasis and attributions observed in the letters 
supports their use as an indicator of CEO’s beliefs and attitudes.  The fact that it is 
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reviewed and polished may dampen the biases that are the focus of this research; 
however, it still provides insight to the thinking of the CEO and top management.   
 A related issue is that this research is not sufficiently sensitive to capture the 
differences between beneficial, established beliefs and attitudes versus the detrimental 
influence of myopia.  When does it switch from being positive to negative?  What is the 
impact on growth versus profitability?  Although the identification of industry growth 
rate as a moderating factor provides some insight into the issue of contextual impact, it is 
just a beginning.    
 A second limitation of the study is the modest statistical power associated with 
the number of firms included in the study.  While the ratio of variables to cases was 
adequate for the direct effects analyses (about 10:1), the number of firms within some of 
the industries was less than ideal (three industries included six or fewer firms).   
Moreover, the moderation analysis may not have found interactions that actually existed 
because of the limited sample size.  A review of the higher growth and lower growth 
industries indicated some differences in results that were not identified in the regression 
analysis of interaction terms.   
 A third limitation is in the “distance” between the primary independent variables 
(representing the three myopias) and the outcome variables.  It does not address how the 
variables act on decision-making and type of strategic decisions.  An exploration of their 
impact on strategic persistence, restructuring, expansion within the core business concept, 
and other important intermediate actions would contribute substantially to this 
exploration of the concepts.  There also may be contextual factors, not identified in this 
study, which impact the relationships as well.   
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Future Research 
 There is clearly a need for and potential benefit of additional research that would 
build on the exploratory nature of this study.  The results also suggest the need for 
investigation of contradictory findings, and inconsistencies in the relationships among 
variables expected to represent similar concepts or contribute to similar outcomes.      
 The first area of future research is to address the operationalization of the three 
concepts of myopia.  While this study represents a step toward capturing cognitive 
orientations of executives in their own statements and in media praise, there are a number 
of alternative approaches or enhancements possible.  One enhancement is to re-evaluate 
the direct cognitive measures of spatial myopia and temporal myopia.   
The most direct measure of spatial myopia employed in this study is focus 
orientation.  A detailed evaluation of the focus statements in letters to shareholders 
indicates that the variable includes two types of focus, inertial strategic persistence and 
escalation of commitment.  The nature of strategic actions and firm outcomes can be 
expected to be quite difference between companies that pursue conservative strategies 
and those that invest heavily in the current business model. Inertial, low risk persistence 
may be more closely associated with the temporal myopia concept.  A strategy that 
invests heavily in the current business model and core capabilities may provide clearer 
differences between these two types of myopia.  Separating the measurement into two 
types of focus could increase the explanatory power.   
Splitting the spatial myopia concept may also provide an alternative to capturing 
temporal myopia, in that executives and firms that evidence inertial tendencies are likely 
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to take more conservative financial actions and restrict investment even in core 
capabilities and strategies.   
Additionally, survey and interview data may be more meaningful and relevant in 
identifying the extremes inherent in the definitions of the three types of myopia.  This is 
the approach that Hiller and Hambrick (2005) suggest in a recent conceptual article, 
where they propose employing a self-evaluation instrument (core self-evaluation or CSE, 
which incorporates self-esteem, self-efficacy, locus of control, and emotional stability) to 
capture the hubris concept in the cognitions of senior executives.  The complexity of this 
measure is further evidence of the difficulty in capturing cognitive orientations of senior 
executives, and it addresses only one of the three myopias of interest.  Yet, developing 
and testing primary research data directly from executives is essential in advancing the 
disciplines ability to relate cognitive states to firm level strategies and outcomes.   
A second critical area of research is to investigate the current variables and 
evaluate additional ones in relationship to intermediate outcomes, such as strategic 
persistence, inertia, irrational escalation of commitment and restructuring processes.  This 
may provide a better understanding of how cognitive concepts act on specific types of 
strategic decisions, and may help explain the inconsistent or contradictory relationships 
found in this study.  It is not fully clear that the measures employed here really represent 
myopia concepts.  This exploration should be considered a beginning point for further 
development and understanding of myopia, and consider whether or not there are other 
types of biases that are not captured in the current approach to the constructs.   
A third area for future research is to expand the target sample to include industries 
that experience different patterns of growth, and to integrate other measures of 
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munificence in the research.  This study was restricted to industries that experienced a 
consistent, but not extreme, level of growth.  The majority of the firms in the sample are 
from service industries, with limited manufacturing representation.  Moreover, the 
sample was restricted to industries with consistent growth.   Firms from industries 
experiencing decline or very high growth would provide an even greater contrast to that 
undertaken in the current study.  Additionally, the moderation variable structure could be 
expanded to incorporate other measures of munificence (dynamism & complexity).  
Increasing the number and type of industries would also help overcome some of the 
power issues identified in the discussions of limitations.   
A fourth area of study is to employ a more fine-grained review and analysis of 
companies that have experienced value destruction.  What were the attitudes presented by 
the CEO, and how did it change over time, as strategic direction was altered and 
adjusted?  This information would be invaluable in providing complementary, qualitative 
information on the relationship among CEO statements, TMT characteristics and firm 
behavior at a more detailed level that could be compared to empirical results.  Qualitative 
information would provide insight into conditions that lead to value destruction, and 
could provide important information in developing measures and research instruments in 
a survey/interview structure.   
Finally, this study focused on firm outcomes and myopia, but did not address the 
potential causes of managerial beliefs and attitudes that are expressed in letters to 
shareholders, and represented by external articles.  To what extent do firm and personal 
experiences influence the strategic emphasis of the CEO, and the kind of media attention 
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they receive?  How do executive beliefs and intentions change over time, and what is the 
result of those changes relative to firm level strategy and performance?   
 
Conclusions 
There is abundant evidence in a wide range of academic and practical 
management literature that executives can become short-sighted or myopic in the way 
they view the world.  This study draws substantially on learning and cognitive literature, 
which associates management bias and myopia with decision-making errors, such as 
inertia, irrational escalation of commitment, arrogance and trading the future for the 
short-term.  The basic hypothesis tested is that each of the three forms of management 
myopia will contribute to value destruction (lower performance).  Moreover, the strategic 
management literature suggests that conditions (e.g., Porter 1980, 1985), and, therefore, 
managerial cognitions (and biases) will vary across industries in different growth stages.   
 Although this study did not find consistent support for the hypotheses developed 
from a careful and thorough review of a broad spectrum of relevant literature, the results 
provide insight into important relationships, and suggest opportunities for future research.  
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